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 Abstract 
In the United Kingdom civil servants have traditionally been accountable to their 
managerial and political superiors for probity and due process in the execution 
of their duties. Recent parliamentary and administrative reforms have changed 
this view. Individual civil servants are now additionally accountable to a range of 
external groups for the results of their work. This change is reflected in the role 
of Senior Responsible Owner (SRO), a civil servant accountable to a 
management team for the achievement of a predefined project outcome. 
 
This thesis challenges the idea that accountability is a unitary concept that can 
be defined by others and delegated in this way. The subjective nature of human 
understanding suggests theoretical grounds for the existence of different 
conceptions of accountability among different individuals for a given outcome. In 
this research I have applied the analytical approach known as 
phenomenography to the study of these different conceptions. The approach 
has been widely used, mainly in fields outside management, to establish the 
bounded number of qualitatively different ways in which a given aspect of reality 
is conceived by different individuals. Analysis of interviews with 30 SROs from 
12 government departments revealed four different conceptions of 
accountability, each with multiple attributes. The conceptions can be arranged 
in a hierarchy of increasing richness and complexity. 
 
This research contributes to theoretical knowledge of the concept of 
accountability in the field of public administration in four ways. First, the study 
adds time to the known attributes of accountability. Second, the study confirms 
sanctions as an attribute of accountability. Third, the hierarchy of four 
conceptions of accountability throws new light on the subject that calls into 
question the unitary view. Fourth, the results refute the notion of a schismogenic 
paradox of accountability and provide empirical support for meanings of 
accountability that transcend this paradox. 
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A Note on Writing Style 
 
The matter of writing style is one that all authors must deal with. A balance must 
be struck between allowing the nuances of an argument that the author may 
wish to portray in the mind of the reader and removing the glaring errors and 
outright absurdities that obscure an argument. To achieve this balance I have 
followed the guidelines laid out in ‘The New Fowler’s Modern English Usage’ 
(1998) and ‘The Economist Style Guide’ (2003). One particular matter that has 
proved to be taxing is the avoidance of sexist language. As a result of the 
absence in English of a common-gender third person singular pronoun, I have 
used the plural pronouns ‘their, them and they’ to avoid any suggestions of 
sexism. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The concept of accountability is a cornerstone of modern governance (Dubnick, 
2002). It is the principle behind the processes that hold to account those to 
whom power has been delegated by the public (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). 
Accountability has become one of the hallmarks of democracy, as accountable 
government is perceived as good government, whereas unaccountable 
government is likely to provide ideal conditions for the cultivation of the abuse of 
power (Pyper, 1996a). It is then a sine qua non for democratic governance 
(Bovens, 2005a). 
 
Despite its importance, accountability is a ‘complex, elusive and multifaceted 
concept’ (Pyper, 1996a: 1). The meaning of accountability in government is 
dependent on the particular constitutional context and institutional 
arrangements between public servants and elected officials (Thomas, 1998). 
Since the establishment of the Permanent Civil Service in the mid-19th century, 
civil servants in the United Kingdom have been accountable only to their 
political and administrative superiors. The tradition has been for government 
ministers to accept accountability for the actions (or inactions) of the civil 
servants under their control (Dicey, 1959; Barberis, 1998). Under this 
arrangement the civil servant is an anonymous administrator, carrying out the 
instructions of their political and administrative masters. However, the increased 
scale and scope of state activity within the United Kingdom since the turn of the 
20th century, changes in the operation of Parliament coupled with administrative 
reforms within the civil service, have resulted in civil servants being publicly and 
visibly held to account for their actions (Barberis, 1998). Political scandals such 
as those surrounding the sale of arms to Iraq (Scott, 1996), the sacking of the 
heads of the Prisons Service (Barker, 1998; Polidano, 1999) and the Child 
Support Agency (Harlow, 1999), together with the circumstances of the death of 
Dr. David Kelly (Hutton, 2004) all illustrate the extent to which civil servants are 
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no longer anonymous administrators but are visible public managers, who can 
be called to account for their actions in a variety of internal and external forums. 
 
One manifestation of the increased accountability of civil servants is the Senior 
Responsible Owner (SRO). The role of the SRO was introduced in 2000 as part 
of a package of measures aimed at improving the delivery of public sector 
projects (Cabinet Office, 2000). Each SRO is accountable to a defined 
management team for the successful delivery of a project, the outcome of which 
is expressed as a performance target. However, this objective approach to 
accountability suffers from the subjective and cognitive limitations of human 
understanding. There is a risk that the performance target might not fully reflect 
the totality of the desired outcomes of the project. In addition to their managerial 
and political superiors, civil servants now also have to deal with a wide range of 
stakeholders, some external to government. In this scenario the SRO may put 
into effect a much wider understanding of accountability than that which has 
been officially defined, and may pursue outcomes that they believe would 
satisfy these multiple stakeholders. These complications, coupled with the 
clarity of intent surrounding SROs’ accountability, suggest that potentially, there 
is an opportunity to study individuals’ understanding of accountability that is 
mandated in objective terms. As a precursor to any empirical research, it is first 
necessary to examine the academic literature on accountability.  
 
In the context of government, accountability has been the subject of much 
scholarly attention. A search of the World-Wide Political Science Abstracts 
database for the term “accountability” between 1995 and 2005 resulted in 1,415 
hits in peer-reviewed journals (Schwartz, 2005). In the United Kingdom the 
notion of ministerial accountability (Finer, 1956; Woodhouse, 1994; Pyper, 
1996b; Barker, 1998; Harlow, 1999; Polidano, 1999; Clarence, 2002; 
Woodhouse, 2004) and the institutional accountability arrangements between 
the various state institutions, such as Parliament, the courts, the government of 
the day (Dicey, 1959; Barker, 1982; Jordan, 1992; Giddings, 1995; Winetrobe, 
1995; Pyper, 1995a; Scott, 2000) and more recently the European Union 
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(Christiansen, 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Harlow, 2002) have been the subject of 
much academic study. Studies that address civil servant accountability, in 
particular civil servants’ conceptions of accountability, are fewer in number. In 
the latter category, only two relevant studies have been published at the time of 
writing. Sinclair (1995) examined how the CEOs of 15 Australian public sector 
organizations understood accountability. Similarly, Newman (2004) reviewed 
how accountability was understood by a mixed group of British local 
government officers, charitable organization executives and civil servants. The 
different constitutional context in the case of Sinclair (1995) and the mixed 
nature of the participants in the case of Newman (2004) together suggest that, 
in relation to the matter of how SROs understand accountability, these studies 
are of limited value. 
 
This limitation, combined with the subjective and cognitive limitations of the 
current objective approach to SRO accountability, suggests that there is an 
opportunity to conduct research into individual accountability that uses 
individuals’ own experiences as the basis for the definition of the concept of 
accountability and for developing our understanding of accountability.  
 
This chapter has four further sections. Section 1.2 outlines the research 
objectives, research design and method. Section 1.3 sets out the contributions 
of the research and Section 1.4 presents the overall structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 1 is summarized in Section 1.5. 
 
1.2 Research Outline 
The principal objective of this thesis is to establish the different ways in which 
individual SROs understand accountability. This implies the need for a research 
design that would allow the exploration of individual understandings of a social 
phenomenon. To this end I selected the interpretive research approach known 
as phenomenography, which has been defined by Marton as ‘the empirical 
study of the qualitatively different ways in which various phenomena in, and 
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aspects of, the world around us are conceptualized, understood, perceived and 
apprehended’ (Marton, 1994: 4424). Chapter 3 contains an exploration of five 
possible approaches and a justification of this choice. 
 
1.3 Intended Contributions 
This thesis is intended to make a contribution to knowledge in the field of 
individual accountability within the public administration knowledge domain. 
This is a field where there has only been a limited amount of empirical research. 
A major proportion of the current literature on individual accountability is based 
either on anecdotal evidence or individual case studies (Schwartz, 2005).  
 
1.4  Thesis Structure 
The thesis has six further chapters. In Chapter 2 I review the history of civil 
servant accountability in the United Kingdom, the origins of the current 
accountability doctrine, and changes in the role and structure of the state that 
culminated in the introduction of the role of SRO. I then assess how SRO 
accountability is defined and examine the subjective and cognitive limitations 
inherent in the current approach to SRO accountability. From these limitations I 
draw two conclusions and develop my research question. Further, I examine the 
academic literature on accountability, present the historical and etymological 
development of the concept, the main components that make up the concept 
and some of the controversies that surround the meaning of accountability. I 
then explore the different ways in which accountability has been studied and 
conclude that despite the current emphasis in government on individual 
accountability, there is little theoretical knowledge about how individuals 
understand it.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the question of how individuals understand a phenomenon. 
This is a matter of epistemology ‘in which attention is directed towards 
determining not only the nature and sources of knowledge, but also the 
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strengths and weaknesses of particular ways of knowing’ (Watkins, 2000: 93). I 
describe four different theoretical approaches to learning about understanding 
(behaviourism, cognitivism, individual constructivism and social constructivism) 
and review their inherent limitations. I then evaluate a fifth approach, 
phenomenography, and conclude that it offers the potential to avoid some of the 
limitations of the other approaches. 
 
In Chapter 4 I describe the research design, including sample selection criteria, 
how I gained access to the sample, my data collection method and analysis 
technique. I also examine the issues of reliability and validity in relation to the 
research approach.  
 
Chapter 5 reports the results of the analysis of the research interviews. I reveal 
five different aspects of accountability that were common to all respondents and 
how these were understood by each individual SRO in one of four qualitatively 
different ways. I also discuss possible sources of variation in the results.  
 
In Chapter 6 I discuss the results in relation to the components of accountability 
presented in Chapter 2. I then compare the results with existing literature on 
how individuals understand accountability. I also review the results in relation to 
the New Public Management (NPM) view of accountability. Based on this 
discussion I present the claimed contributions to knowledge of this research.  
 
In Chapter 7 I summarize the results of the research and consider their wider 
implications for theory and practice. I acknowledge the limitations of the 
research and outline directions for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Accountability  
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on accountability. The 
chapter has five principal sections. In this first section I outline the structure of 
the remainder of the chapter. 
 
In Section 2.2 I review the literature on the concept of accountability. I present 
the governmental origins of accountability, trace its chequered history as a 
concept, and appraise 12 different typologies of accountability derived from its 
practice in government. I then review five components of any accountability 
relationship, analyze six closely related terms that are often used synonymously 
with the term accountability and from these develop a definition of accountability 
suitable for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
In Section 2.3 I review the origins of the current doctrine of civil servant 
accountability. Next, I examine a series of political and legislative changes that 
have given rise to today’s de facto civil servant accountability. I consider how 
the subject of a civil servant’s accountability - what a civil servant is accountable 
for has changed. I review the background to the creation of the role of the SRO 
in the civil service. I close the section with a review of the subjective and 
cognitive limitations of the current approach to SRO accountability and derive 
my research question.  
 
In Section 2.4 I review empirical research on accountability in two fields of 
literature that have direct relevance to the question of how individual civil 
servants understand accountability - public administration and psychology. I 
conclude that in order to answer the research question, further empirical 
research is required. I then summarize the chapter in Section 2.5. 
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2.2 The Concept of Accountability 
Accountability is a meaningful concept in a large number of fields including 
education, medicine, social and environmental accounting, political science and 
psychology, as well as public administration and management. It is a no-
opposite concept (Bovens, 2005b). As a result it is seen as uniformly good 
(Koppell, 2005). Yet it is a term that ‘has lost its meaningful “soul” in a world 
filled with rhetoricians, reformers and functionalists’ (Dubnick, 2002: 1). This 
loss of meaning is apparent in a brief search for dictionary definitions of 
accountability. The Oxford English Dictionary (1995) defines accountability as:- 
 
Accountability: - responsibility: the quality of being required to 
account for one's conduct.  
 
By way of contrast, “The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military” (2001) 
defines accountability as:- 
 
Accountability: - the legal or regulatory obligation imposed on an 
officer or other person for keeping accurate record of property, 
documents, or funds. The person having this obligation may or 
may not have actual possession of the property, documents, or 
funds. 
 
In “A Dictionary of Nursing” (2003), accountability is defined as:- 
 
Accountability: - the obligation of being answerable for one's own 
judgments and actions to an appropriate person or authority 
recognized as having the right to demand information and 
explanation, according to the terms of reference of the Code of 
Professional Conduct. A registered practitioner (nurse, midwife, 
health visitor) is accountable for her actions as a professional at 
all times, on or off duty, whether engaged in current practice or 
not. 
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In “A Dictionary of Finance and Banking” (2005), accountability is defined as:- 
 
Accountability: - An obligation to give an account. For limited 
companies, it is assumed that the directors of the company are 
accountable to the shareholders and that this responsibility is 
discharged, in part, by the directors providing an annual report 
and accounts. In an accountability relationship there will be at 
least one principal and at least one agent. This forms the basis of 
an agency relationship. 
 
So whilst there are two common components in each of the above context-
specific definitions (stewardship and an obligation to account for the discharge 
of duties in that role of stewardship), there is some confusion as to the precise 
definition of accountability. In the context of nursing, the concept contains the 
ideas of obligation and answerability. This is similar to the finance and banking 
definition, where company directors are obliged to account to shareholders, yet 
contrasts with the US military definition, which is a requirement to keep proper 
records. This confusion over the term accountability is not surprising as ‘the 
word’s etymology does not encompass its conceptual history’ (Dubnick, 2002: 
3). 
2.2.1 The Origins of Accountability 
In etymological terms accountability has its origins in the related 14th Century 
Middle English terms acompte and aconte, which mean “to count” (Dubnick, 
2002; Hoad, 2003). The first recorded use of the word accountability is in a 
history of the US state of Vermont published in 1794 (Dubnick, 2002). In many 
languages it has no direct equivalent. A search in a Japanese dictionary yields 
the term akautabiritii, a literal transposition from English. In northern European 
languages such as German, Dutch and Danish accountability has a meaning 
akin to obligation or duty, rather than its core sense of account-giving (Dubnick, 
1998).  
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In conceptual terms, accountability has a history ‘as old as civilization itself’ 
(Gray and Jenkins, 1993: 53). Around 2000BC, Hammurabi, the King of 
Babylonia, introduced a legal code, a significant proportion of which codified the 
accountability of individuals entrusted with others’ resources. These individuals 
had a duty to provide evidence of what they had received – an account (Bird, 
1973). Accountability for the use of state resources, such as wheat and flour, 
was taken seriously in Egypt’s New Kingdom (1552-1069BC) (Ezzamel, 1997). 
In democratic Athens (c.400-500AD) accountability was a brutal and direct 
affair. Ten times a year public officials were held to account in an open public 
forum where a vote was taken on their continuing in office, whether there was a 
complaint against them or not (Roberts, 1982). Athenian generals were in a far 
more precarious position; they were at greater risk of death from their own 
people, as a result of being held to account for their last performance in battle, 
rather than at the hands of the enemy (Roberts, 1982). 
 
Accountability, then, ‘is a device as old as civilized government itself’ 
(Normanton, 1971: 312). Given these origins, it is easy to see that 
accountability is the ‘foundation of any governing process’ (Dwivedi and Jabbra, 
1989: 8). Accountability is also ‘a highly controversial issue and the subject of 
considerable political conflict’ (Mulgan, 2003: 5). Its appeal to politicians and 
those aggrieved with the conduct of government is undeniable: it is ‘one of 
those golden concepts that no one can be against’ (Bovens, 2005b: 2). 
Accountability is ‘…often used as a basic benchmark against which systems of 
government can be judged. Accountable government is deemed to be good 
government, and carries with it connotations of advanced democracy. 
Governments which can be characterized as unaccountable, or not properly 
accountable, are likely to provide fertile ground for the cultivation of 
authoritarianism, totalitarianism and every type of abuse of power’ (Pyper, 
1996a: 1). 
 
Accountability is, then, ‘at the heart of governance within democratic societies’ 
(Thomas, 1998: 348) because if an individual is given absolute power, ‘his 
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former sanity will depart; for the advantage that he holds breeds hybris’ 
(Roberts, 1982: 5). Accountability is a key part of the system of checks and 
balances against tyranny and as such ‘should be irksome to those agents at 
whom it is directed’ (Barberis, 1998: 463). In democratic Athens, accountability 
of public officials was seen as a hallmark of democracy: ‘unaccountability meant 
lawlessness’ (Roberts, 1982: 6). Yet despite the fundamental nature of 
accountability to both democracy and governance and almost because of the 
gravitas attached to the concept of accountability, it has taken on an almost 
iconic status (Dubnick, 2002). It is used ‘as a synonym for many loosely defined 
political desiderata such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, 
responsiveness, responsibility and integrity’ (Bovens, 2005b: 6), with little 
regard for the meaning of the concept.  
 
Despite these problems, accountability in this context of democratic governance 
is a powerful concept that fulfils four distinct purposes. Accountability requires 
the delegation of power to take a course of action, and ‘if you give a man power 
to do right you also give him power to do wrong’ (Finer, 1950: 133). 
Accountability then constrains the discretion inherent in accountability (Uhr, 
1993). So the control of public power and assurance of the use of public 
resources are the two traditional purposes of accountability. More recently it has 
been proffered as a means of ensuring improvements in the quality of public 
services (Dubnick, 2005) – the third purpose of accountability. These three 
purposes all buttress the fourth – the enhancement of the legitimacy of 
government (Pollitt, 1999).  
 
Given the importance of the concept of accountability and its origins in simple, 
ancient societies, it is worth reviewing the different types of accountability that 
have developed as a result of the complexity inherent in the modern state. One 
useful means of distinguishing different types of accountability and of revealing 
its complexity is a typology (Mulgan, 2003). 
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2.2.2 Typologies of Accountability 
Accountability has a longstanding and important role in government, so 
typologies of accountability are derived from the practice of accountability 
therein. There are a number of different typologies, none of which has been 
widely accepted (Mulgan, 2003). The typologies can be split into three broad 
groups, discussed below. The first is based on two different components of 
accountability: the principal and the mechanism through which the steward is 
accountable. The second is based on different subjects of the accountability 
relationship (Mulgan, 2003). The third is based around information provision 
and the results of the principal’s judgement. 
 
Principal / mechanism typologies  
Principal / mechanism typologies are dependent on the constitutional context in 
which they were developed. In this category there are two broad groups: the 
American group and the “Westminster” group. The latter group covers the 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Whilst there are distinct 
differences in the constitutional arrangements between these nations (e.g. the 
European Union for the UK and federal state government in Canada and 
Australia), they do nevertheless have a number of common features. These 
include democratic elections to one or more legislative chambers, ministerial 
accountability, cabinet government and a constitutional monarch. Therefore 
they can be treated as a single group (as per Flinders (2001)). I thus use the 
term “Westminster” as shorthand for this group of national constitutions 
(Chapman, 2000). 
 
The American group. 
Romzek and Dubnick (1987), in their analysis of the loss of the space shuttle 
Challenger in 1986, defined four basic types of accountability: bureaucratic, 
legal, professional and political. These types were derived from an analysis of 
the degree of an institution’s control over its own actions (high or low) and the 
source of agency control (internal or external). Thus, bureaucratic accountability 
is a function of a high degree of control over institutional actions from an internal 
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source; legal accountability is a function of a high degree of control over 
institutional actions from an external source; professional accountability is a 
function of a low degree of control over institutional actions from an internal 
source and political accountability is a function of a low degree of control over 
institutional actions from an external source. The conclusion of Romzek and 
Dubnick’s analysis is that NASA officials placed greater emphasis on 
bureaucratic accountability than professional accountability, with tragic 
consequences.  
 
Deleon (1998) reviewed Romzek and Dubnick’s typology from a decision-
making and an organizational structure perspective. Deleon suggested that the 
particular form of accountability depended on whether a) the goals were clear or 
not, and b) whether the means to achieve the goals were clear or not. This 
analysis produced four types of accountability: bureaucratic (goals clear, means 
known), political (goals unclear, means known), professional (goals clear, 
means unclear) and “anarchic” (goals unclear, means unclear).  
 
The “Westminster” group. 
These typologies are more numerous, with contributions from Lawton and Rose 
(1991), Oliver (1991), Sinclair (1995), Stone (1995), Pyper (1996a) and Flinders 
(2001). These scholars have defined a number of different types of 
accountability. For example Lawton and Rose (1991) defined five types of 
accountability: political, managerial, legal, customer and professional, whereas 
Oliver (1991) defined four types: political, legal, administrative and public 
accountability. These studies are summarized in Table 2-1. The overlaps and 
differences between the types of accountability are highlighted in the next ten 
paragraphs. 
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Table 2-1 Summary of “Westminster” Typologies of Accountability 
Study  Level of 
Analysis 
Constitutional 
Context 
Type of Accountability 
Lawton and 
Rose 
(1991) 
 
Institutional      UK Political
 
Legal Managerial Consumer Professional
Oliver 
(1991) 
Institutional      UK Political
 
Legal Administrative Public /
Consumer 
 
 
Sinclair 
(1995) 
 
Individual      Australia Political
 
Public Managerial Professional Personal
Stone 
(1995) 
Institutional        “Westminster” Parliamentary Judicial Managerial Market Network
Relations 
 
Pyper 
(1996a) 
Institutional UK Parliamentary Legal / Quasi -
legal 
Charterism & 
Consumerism 
 
Popular  
Flinders 
(2001) 
 
Institutional       UK Parliamentary Judicial Managerial
Newman 
(2004) 
 
Individual      UK Administrative Managerial Public Local community Personal
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Political accountability refers to the accountability of ministers to Parliament – 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Under this doctrine ministers are 
responsible for the actions of their department (Lawton and Rose, 1991; Oliver, 
1991). Oliver (1991) extends this definition to include the accountability of civil 
servants to ministers and the accountability of local authorities to central 
government and Parliament. Sinclair (1995), in a different context and at a 
different level of analysis, has a different conception of political accountability, 
that of accountability of executive agency CEOs to ministers. 
 
Parliamentary accountability: both Pyper’s (1996a) and Flinders’ (2001) 
definition of parliamentary accountability include the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, but add some of the mechanisms used to make that 
accountability effective, including parliamentary questions, select committees, 
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the National Audit Office (NAO) and the 
Parliamentary Commissioner (now known as the Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman). Stone (1995) limits the definition of parliamentary 
accountability to ministerial accountability within Parliament. 
 
Legal or judicial accountability refers to the ability of the courts to challenge 
actions taken by public sector organizations through the process of judicial 
review (Lawton and Rose, 1991; Oliver, 1991). Stone (1995) adds the body of 
administrative law, tribunals and various ombudsmen as well as freedom of 
information. Pyper (1996a) includes the Parliamentary Ombudsman in this type 
of accountability, despite the Ombudsman’s inclusion in parliamentary 
accountability, as well as public inquiries and European legislation. Lawton and 
Rose (1991) also include European legislation, but place the NAO in this type of 
accountability. Flinders (2001) includes judicial review, European legislation, the 
European Courts, the Human Rights Act 1998 and public inquiries.  
 
Managerial accountability is concerned with managerial internal control of 
government departments through the use of targets and the alignment of  
departmental structures with specific objectives (Lawton and Rose, 1991; 
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Flinders, 2001; Newman, 2004). Stone (1995) takes a broader view and 
includes strategic objective setting for departments allied with the delegation of 
authority, the use of contracts, audit processes and the use of objective 
organizational and individual objectives.  
 
Public accountability and Charterism / Consumerism are concerned with 
accountability to the public, individuals and community groups (Oliver, 1991; 
Sinclair, 1995; Newman, 2004; Newman, 2004). This is a less formal type of 
accountability when compared with political or parliamentary accountability. 
Lawton and Rose (1991), Oliver (1991) and Pyper (1996a) also include 
consumer accountability, which covers a range of steps that attempt to increase 
the accountability of those delivering public services. This includes measures 
such as the Citizen’s Charter, the Patient’s Charter, increased choice amongst 
public service providers, complaints procedures and flexible points of contact for 
users of public services. Lawton and Rose (1991) define consumer 
accountability differently. They define it as accountability to consumers of public 
services by means of appeal tribunals, ombudsmen and complaints procedures. 
Newman (2004) does not include these more formal elements in her view of 
public accountability. 
 
Professional accountability is concerned with ‘the sense of duty that one has 
as a member of a professional or expert group, which in turn occupies a 
privileged and knowledgeable position in society’ (Sinclair, 1995: 229). It also 
involves being the representative of a particular profession to a wider 
community. In government, professional accountability can conflict with political 
accountability (Lawton and Rose, 1991).  
 
Personal accountability is concerned with an individual’s adherence to 
‘internalized moral and ethical values’ (Sinclair, 1995: 230) and from these 
values, doing the right thing (Newman, 2004).  
 
Network Relations accountability is concerned with mutual relations between 
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individuals and organizations that work together in a particular area. It covers 
peer groups and agencies where public and private sector organizations 
overlap, and is focussed on reputation and legitimacy in administrative decision-
making (Stone, 1995). 
 
Market accountability is concerned with the satisfaction of public service 
customers’ needs through the use of incentive-based service provision. It is 
concerned with ‘the responsiveness of service providers to a body of 
“sovereign” consumers’ (Stone, 1995: 521). It is therefore based more on an 
“exit” strategy rather than a “voice” one. 
 
Popular accountability is concerned with the accountability of the government 
to the public through various means. This includes elections, political parties, 
pressure groups and the media. These processes and groups act as ‘genuine 
facilitators of popular accountability’ (Pyper, 1996a: 37).  
 
Local community accountability is concerned with the accountability of local 
government officials to community groups and the wider community within their 
constituency (Newman, 2004).  
 
Subject based typologies 
These are far fewer in number than the principal / mechanism typologies. Day 
and Klein (1987) distinguished between political accountability, where the 
criteria for the judgement of action were contestable and managerial 
accountability, in which tasks were carried out in accordance with agreed 
performance standards. Managerial accountability is further subdivided into 
fiscal (or regulatory) accountability (that the money has been spent correctly), 
process (or efficiency) accountability (that the agreed task has been carried out 
efficiently) and programme (or effectiveness) accountability (that the action or 
investment has produced the desired outcome). Behn (2001) distinguishes 
between accountability for finance, fairness and performance.  
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Information Provision and Judgment Typologies 
The only typology in this group is derived from the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility in Parliament in the United Kingdom. In this typology 
accountability has five elements: redirectory, informatory, explanatory, 
amendatory and sacrificial elements (Marshall, 1984; McVicar, Judge and 
Hogwood, 1998; Flinders, 2001). Redirectory accountability involves those 
charged with giving an account redirecting questions to those best placed to 
provide answers (Flinders, 2001). Informatory accountability requires that the 
person charged with rendering an account does so (McVicar et al., 1998). 
Explanatory accountability goes further and involves the provision of an 
explanation in support of the account given. It therefore includes informatory 
accountability (Flinders, 2001). Amendatory accountability is the result of a 
negative judgement by the principal: it requires both an apology and action to 
rectify the shortcomings identified in the account. Sacrificial accountability takes 
this one step further and requires the steward involved to resign as a result of 
the judgement of the principal (Flinders, 2001). Sacrificial accountability is not 
consistent with Flinders’ exclusion of the component of sanctions from the 
concept of accountability, as sacrificial accountability is based on the ultimate 
political sanction – resignation.  
 
Typologies of Accountability: Summary 
The various typologies of accountability highlight a wide range of different types. 
Each of the constitutionally based typologies ‘works well within its own 
constitutional context’ (Mulgan, 2003: 32), but is not universally applicable. 
Parliamentary accountability and some of the particular aspects of 
accountability under the “Westminster” systems of government (such as 
Ombudsmen, tribunals, the PAC and the NAO) do not appear in Romzek and 
Dubnick’s (1987) typology.  
 
Even within the “Westminster” typologies there are significant differences. There 
are overlaps between political and parliamentary accountability. For example 
Lawton and Rose (1991) and Oliver (1991) include the doctrine of ministerial 
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responsibility in political accountability, whereas Pyper (1996a), Flinders (2001) 
and Stone (1995) include it in parliamentary accountability. There are also 
overlaps between some aspects of parliamentary accountability and legal and 
judicial accountability. For example Pyper (1996a) and Flinders (2001) include 
the NAO in parliamentary accountability, whereas Lawton and Rose (1991) 
include it in legal and judicial accountability. 
 
The subject-based typologies appear to be more applicable across a range of 
contexts. Accountability for finance, fairness and performance (Behn, 2001) fits 
well with Day and Klein’s (1987) definitions of regulatory and programme 
accountability.  
 
The situation with typologies is therefore somewhat confused and illustrates the 
complexity of accountability in modern government. Because of the significant 
variations in meaning across and within particular contexts, the various types of 
accountability ‘do not carry uniform connotations’ (Mulgan, 2003: 34).  
2.2.3 The Components of Accountability 
Even in a relatively simple society such as ancient Athens, public servants were 
entrusted with duties on behalf of the electorate (Roberts, 1982). In today’s 
more complex societies we are all reliant on others for the provision of many 
things which, were we to provide them ourselves, would require the expenditure 
of much time and effort. We rely on government to provide a safe, secure 
society. We depend on companies, professionals and specialists to provide 
goods and services, to advise us and act on our behalf. ‘Yet, once we have 
entrusted other people or institutions to act on our behalf, what guarantee have 
we that they will pursue our interests rather than their own?’ (Mulgan, 2003: 8).  
 
The answer to this question is that we cannot entirely do so. We must trust 
those who act on our behalf to behave in an ethical and conscientious manner, 
(O'Neill, 2002). However trust has its limits, so we must fall back on 
accountability (Mulgan, 2003). Accountability has been defined as a social 
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relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to justify his or her conduct to a 
significant other (Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Romzek and Dubnick, 2000; Lerner 
and Tetlock, 1999; Pollitt, 2003; Bovens, 2005a). It has five distinct 
components: a relationship, a subject, the provision and seeking of information 
on the subject, judgement of the conduct of the accountable party in relation to 
the subject and, finally, sanctions (Day and Klein, 1987). I shall examine each of 
these components in turn. 
 
The Accountability Relationship 
Accountability is ‘not a thing, but a relationship’ (Pollitt, 1999: 2). It is a 
relationship characterized by stewardship, with a principal delegating power and 
responsibility for a particular course of action to the agent. In this relationship 
‘stewardship is thus established when a steward accepts resources and 
responsibilities entrusted by a principal’ (Gray and Jenkins, 1993: 55). Some 
scholars use different language to describe the relationship. For example, Pollitt 
(2003) uses the words accountor to describe the steward and accountee to 
describe the principal. Mulgan (2003) uses the term account-holder to describe 
the principal. The terminology reflects a principal-agent model. However, this 
model is not useful for the concept of accountability, as it performs the same 
role as that of a blueprint for a real structure – it provides a skeleton, but not a 
functioning concept (Dubnick, 2002). Given this, the choice of terminology is 
more a matter of linguistic preference rather than being based on a substantive 
difference in meaning between the different terms. I have therefore chosen to 
adopt the terms principal and steward. What is clear, however, is that an 
accountability relationship involves a degree of authority of one party over 
another and therefore the parties are not equal (Mulgan, 1997). 
 
An accountability relationship is based on agreement between the principal and 
the steward. They are bound together by an accountability code, ‘a system of 
signals, meanings and customs which binds the principal and the steward in the 
establishment, execution and adjudication of their relationship’ (Gray and 
Jenkins, 1993: 55) that is specific to a particular context. The relationship is 
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based on this ‘shared set of expectations and a common currency of 
justifications’ (Day and Klein, 1987: 5). So ‘accountability depends on an agreed 
framework of meaning’ (Day and Klein, 1987: 243) between the principal and 
the steward in relation to action to be taken by the steward on behalf of the 
principal. 
 
The Subject of an Accountability Relationship 
A steward is accountable to the principal for something. Without a subject, an 
accountability relationship would become meaningless. A steward can be 
accountable either for outcome standards or for ‘standards for the process of 
execution’ (Gray and Jenkins, 1993: 56). Day and Klein (1987) suggest that the 
subject of an accountability relationship is context dependent. In the context of a 
managerial accountability relationship, the subject of this relationship is the 
performance of agreed tasks against pre-agreed performance criteria. This can 
be developed into three further components: fiscal or regularity accountability, 
where the steward is accountable for ensuring that money has been spent as 
agreed; process or efficiency accountability, where the steward is accountable 
for making sure that the desired outcome has been achieved in a financially 
efficient manner; and programme or effectiveness accountability, where the 
steward is accountable for achieving the desired outcome (Day and Klein, 
1987). Behn (2001) states that accountability can be for one of only three 
things: finances, fairness or performance.  
 
In an accountability relationship, the principal delegates authority and 
responsibility to the steward in relation to the subject. This delegation results in 
a degree of managerial discretion on the part of the steward over a course of 
action. This ‘permits interpretation of responsibilities and selection of value 
premises to underlie decisions’ (Linder, 1978: 182). In the absence of anything 
else, these value premises reflect the biases of those making decisions. The 
calling of a steward to account then becomes ‘a response to the biases 
associated with discretion’ (Linder, 1978: 182). So the subject of the 
accountability relationship can be regarded as the principal’s response to the 
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steward’s biases that arise out of the discretion granted to the steward by the 
principal. 
 
The Provision and Seeking of Information 
When the action is complete, or at the behest of the principal, the steward 
provides information to the principal, who then asks questions to verify the 
adequacy of the information (Romzek and Dubnick, 2000; Bovens, 2005a). This 
ability to call to account the steward acting on behalf of the principal is at the 
core of the concept of accountability. The state auditor is one of the first 
manifestations of this aspect of accountability: this role has been recorded in 
ancient Athens and the Roman Empire (Normanton, 1966). The account can 
take many forms, from a record of income and expenditure to responding to a 
specific query.  
 
The nature of the enquiry from the principal may vary as well, ranging from 
information seeking to explanation and on to justification. This investigation of 
the actions of the steward by the principal is the ‘essential basis of 
accountability’ (Mulgan, 2003: 9). Scrutiny requires action on the part of both 
parties, as effective accountability ‘cannot be reduced to periodic reporting, 
however formalized’ (Uhr, 1993: 11). Accountability implies more than 
questioning and answering. It also goes beyond calling to account: the steward 
must be held to account (Mulgan, 2003). This reflects the balance of power in 
the relationship: ‘It is the very essence of accountability, however, that [the] 
initiative must be held by the questioners ’ (Normanton, 1971: 315). 
 
Judgement 
On the basis of the account provided and from the answers given in response to 
any questions, the principal passes judgement on the conduct of the steward in 
relation to the subject of the accountability relationship (Bovens, 2005a). 
Judgement is made against some criteria agreed with the steward that are 
consistent with the subject of the accountability relationship. These can range 
from the verification of a financial statement to agreement that a performance 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two                                                         Accountability 
 
target has been achieved. Historically, verification efforts have been focussed 
on public finances (Romzek and Dubnick, 2000). However, this judgement can 
either be positive or negative (Bovens, 2005b). It may take the form of the 
approval of an annual report or the condemnation of an individual or 
organization.  
 
A mediating aspect of accountability in relation to this aspect is that it is not a 
certainty. It is a potential – accountability. The word reflects ‘the potential of 
being called and held to account’ (Mulgan, 2003: 10). This is on the 
presumption that something has gone awry and that an account needs to be 
called for, questions asked, with the possibilities of remedial action and the 
application of sanctions. So accountability usually only applies when the 
principal believes a negative judgement is possible.  
 
Sanctions 
In the event of a negative judgement, sanctions can be applied by the principal. 
These can be formal or informal. The nature of the sanctions applied also 
depends on whether the steward is an organization or an individual. Formal 
organizational sanctions include rectification, fines or failure to approve an 
account (Mulgan, 2003). Informal organizational sanctions follow from these 
formal sanctions and include the loss of, or damage to, the organization’s 
reputation. Formal individual sanctions include the loss of bonuses, fines, 
disciplinary proceedings, loss of employment and even legal penalties. Informal 
individual sanctions again follow from these formal sanctions and include the 
loss of personal reputation and damage to an individual’s career. Dr David 
Kelly’s appearance before two Parliamentary select committees in the summer 
of 2003 severely damaged his reputation and arguably his own self-esteem, 
with lethal consequences (Hutton, 2004).  
 
This aspect of accountability is controversial. Some scholars exclude sanction 
from the concept of accountability e.g. Thynne and Goldring (1987), Dwivedi & 
Jabbra (1989), Lawton and Rose (1991) and Flinders (2001). These scholars 
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restrict their definition of accountability to a relationship, a subject, the provision 
and seeking of information, and judgement. Accountability becomes ‘the 
condition of having to answer to an individual or body for one’s actions’ 
(Flinders, 2001: 13). Accountability translates into answerability: liability is 
associated with the similar but different concept of responsibility (Flinders, 
2001). This differentiation between accountability and responsibility has become 
known as the ‘Butler doctrine’ (Flinders, 2001: 47) after the Cabinet Secretary 
who first proposed the distinction. However, this view of accountability, that 
excludes the component of sanction, is not sustainable on two grounds.  
 
First, there are accountability processes that confine themselves to information 
and explanation without the element of formal sanctions (e.g. the Parliamentary 
and Health Service Ombudsman (2005)). The Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman has no formal powers to enforce sanctions in cases of 
maladministration. However, the Ombudsman’s recommendations are nearly 
always followed by those departments and agencies that have been found to be 
at fault, and therefore they have been held to account. The view of 
accountability that excludes the component of sanction fails to recognize the 
power of informal sanctions, even if formal powers of sanction are not present. 
Without sanctions, formal or otherwise, ‘the process of accountability would be 
seriously incomplete’ (Mulgan, 2003: 10). 
 
Second, the exclusion of the component of sanction from the concept of 
accountability falls foul of the daily usage of the term. ‘When people screw up, 
there are a variety of ways to hold them accountable – to punish them’ (Behn, 
2001: 3). Accountability is incomplete without effective sanctions:- 
 
‘Where institutions or officials are found to have been at fault, 
there must be some means of imposing remedies, by penalising 
the offenders and compensating the victims. Where this does not 
happen, for instance where no one is prepared to accept 
responsibility or when no restitution is forthcoming, we complain 
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that there has been no accountability’ (Mulgan, 2003: 9). 
 
It is a presumption of accountability that ‘unfavourable information leads to the 
imposition of sanctions’ (March and Olsen, 1995: 165). To be accountable 
means that an individual or an organization assumes the liability for the 
correction of errors and the offering of recompense (Caiden, 1989). It entails 
‘being liable to be required to give an account or explanation of actions and, 
where appropriate, to suffer the consequences, take the blame or undertake to 
put matters right if it should appear that errors have been made’ (Oliver, 1991: 
22). To be accountable is to be liable to pay ‘and this theme of punishment is 
essential to the core meaning of accountability’ (Uhr, 1999: 99). So it is 
reasonable to include the sanctions component in the concept of accountability.  
 
2.2.4 The Synonyms of Accountability 
Based on the five components (a relationship, a subject, the provision and 
seeking of information on the subject, judgement of the conduct of the 
accountable party in relation to the subject and sanctions), I am now able to 
distinguish accountability from some of the terms that are often substituted for it. 
A search in a thesaurus (Waite, 2003) reveals three words synonymous with 
accountability:- 
 
Accountability: - responsibility, liability, answerability. 
 
Koppell (2005) adds three further terms that are used interchangeably with 
accountability: transparency, controllability and responsiveness. Together these 
terms represent the source of much confusion about the concept of 
accountability. Whilst they depart from the definition of accountability set out 
above, they nevertheless all have what Wittgenstein called ‘family 
resemblances’ (Wittgenstein, 2001: 27), that is they are intertwined by the 
‘relatedness we “see” in them, as we would see some resemblance among a 
group of very distinct individuals who are part of a family’ (Dubnick and Justice, 
2004: 11). Using the definition set out above, I will now distinguish 
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accountability from these terms.  
 
Responsibility 
There has been much scholarly ‘territorial jousting between accountability and 
responsibility’ (Mulgan, 2000: 558). It is a common error to confuse 
accountability with responsibility (Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1994). 
These two words are used as if they were synonymous (Gregory, 2003). Like 
accountability, responsibility has its etymological roots in a duty to respond or 
reply to another party. Unlike accountability, whose meaning has broadened 
over time, the meaning of responsibility has become narrower (Mulgan, 2000). It 
has become restricted to an internal sense, ‘from the logical connection 
between being able to answer externally for one’s actions and having freely 
chosen them’ (Mulgan, 2003: 15). In this sense, the two concepts overlap as 
‘holding someone to account usually implies (in the standard individual case 
where one person is designated as the agent of another) that the designated 
person is personally responsible for his or her actions’ (Mulgan, 2003: 15). 
 
So, whilst an accountable person is usually responsible, a responsible person is 
not accountable unless an external principal is involved who can call or hold 
them to account. However, it is possible to be accountable without being 
responsible. Nazi officials may have been fully accountable, ‘yet at the same 
time profoundly irresponsible in their instrumental complicity in the pursuit of evil 
purposes’ (Gregory, 2003: 560). So the obligations of accountability need to be 
fulfilled in a responsible manner. The definition of accountability I have set out 
earlier is concerned with an external principal who can scrutinize the actions of 
the agent. Responsibility is then limited to the internal aspects of ethics and 
morality (Uhr, 1993; Bovens, 1998).  
 
Liability 
Liability is sometimes used as a synonym for accountability (see for example 
Koppell, 2005). According to some scholars it is the difference between 
accountability and responsibility (Flinders, 2001). My discussion in section 2.2.3 
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demonstrated that liability is a component of accountability in that an individual 
or an organization will face sanctions (i.e. they are liable) if the judgement of 
their action by the principal is unfavourable. It is not then the same as 
accountability, but is rather one of its components. Although being accountable 
means an individual or organization is liable, the latter does not necessarily 
mean being accountable, as ‘the mere revelation of wrongdoing or poor 
performance does not constitute accountability’ (Koppell, 2005: 57). 
Accountability exists when all five components in Section 2.2.3 are present. 
Liability, then, is part of, but not the same as, accountability. 
 
Answerability 
Answerability is another term that is used synonymously with accountability. A 
key component of accountability is the requirement for the steward to provide 
an answer to the principal. This view of accountability is at the heart of the 
concept of ministerial accountability to the House of Commons, as ‘the minister 
must always answer questions and give an account to Parliament for the 
actions of his department’ (Scott, 1996: 1800). Some scholars also take this 
view and regard accountability as answerability, for example Lawton and Rose 
(1991: 17) state that ‘accountability is a process where a person or groups of 
people are required to present an account of their activities and the way in 
which they have or have not discharged their duties’. Other scholars who take 
this view include Thynne and Goldring (1987), Dwivedi and Jabbra (1989) and 
Flinders (2001). However, answerability on its own does not equate with 
accountability. In Section 2.2.3 the threat of sanctions as a result of the 
principal’s judgement was a key part of the concept of accountability, for without 
it ‘we complain that there has been no accountability’ (Mulgan, 2003: 9). 
Therefore, answerability is a part of accountability, but it is not the same as 
accountability. 
 
Transparency 
The term transparency is also used synonymously with accountability. It refers 
to the quality of the account provided by the steward to the principal, so that ‘an 
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accountable organization cannot obfuscate its mistakes to avoid scrutiny’ 
(Koppell, 2005: 96). So transparency is important to the judgement of the 
principal, but to rely solely on the transparency of the account is to deny the 
balance of power in the accountability relationship. As I have outlined in Section 
2.2.3, accountability involves more than reporting; it involves the investigation of 
the actions of the steward by the principal. Thus, a transparent report at best is 
no more than a starting point in the provision and information seeking stage of 
accountability. Transparency is then a preliminary part of accountability, but no 
more than that. 
 
Controllability 
Controllability is another term that is used synonymously with accountability. It 
is distinct from the concept of accountability for two reasons. First, 
accountability is essentially backward-looking in nature. It ‘involves inquiring into 
actions after they have occurred and imposing remedies or sanctions for past 
breaches of rules and instructions’ (Mulgan, 2003: 18) and as such it ‘provides 
the post-mortem of action’ (Normanton, 1971: 312). It is therefore distinct from 
forward-looking controls such as laws and regulations, which limit action before 
any is taken. Laws act as ex ante constraints, whereas accountability acts as 
post ante oversight. Accountability, legislation and regulation can therefore be 
seen as part of a continuum of control (Scott, 2000). So accountability is part of 
the control mechanisms that limit the abuse of power. However, control is a far 
wider concept, in which accountability is ‘only one part of the regulatory and 
controlling agenda’ (Mulgan, 2003: 20). 
 
Second, control is only one of the purposes that accountability is meant to serve 
(Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). The other purposes are assurance that 
resources are being used appropriately and the encouragement of continuous 
improvement. All three contribute to the fourth and overarching purpose of ‘the 
enhancement of the legitimacy of government’ (Pollitt, 1999: 3). Control, then, is 
one of the possible purposes of accountability; however, it is not the same as 
accountability.  
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Responsiveness 
Responsiveness is the sixth term that is used synonymously with accountability. 
Accountability is one means of ensuring that stewards are responsive to the 
needs and requirements of their principals (Mulgan, 2003). This view of 
accountability is highlighted in the customer-focussed approach to government 
proposed by Osborne and Gaebler (1993). However, many changes that have 
developed as a result of the “reinventing government” movement have 
improved responsiveness without any increases in accountability. Such 
measures include complaints procedures about public services, the setting out 
of obligations to the public and the publication of annual reports, for example 
Her Majesty’s Land Registry (2006). Therefore, to ascribe improvements in 
responsiveness as increases in accountability (Considine, 2002) is incorrect. 
Accountability may require responsiveness on the part of the steward in relation 
to the requirements of the principal. Responsiveness, on the other hand, does 
not necessarily entail accountability as it is possible to be responsive without 
being accountable.  
 
2.2.5 A Definition of Accountability 
In section 2.2.3 I outlined five components that form the concept of 
accountability: a relationship, a subject, the provision and seeking of information 
on the subject, judgement of the conduct of the accountable party in relation to 
the subject and sanctions. In section 2.2.4 I differentiated accountability from six 
terms that are often used synonymously with the term accountability: 
responsibility, liability, answerability, transparency, controllability and 
responsiveness. Given this differentiation between these six synonyms and 
accountability, and based on the five components, accountability, for my 
purposes in this thesis, can be defined as a social relationship, with 
resources and responsibilities entrusted to a steward for a particular task 
by one or more principals, with the consequent potential for an account to 
be called for, judgement made and remedies and / or sanctions imposed.  
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2.3 Accountability in the United Kingdom Civil Service 
The definition above is derived from literature. However, ‘the practical meaning 
of any idea deeply woven into the social fabric seldom results directly and never 
results exclusively from what philosophers have said about it, a rule to which 
the notion of [accountability] is most certainly no exception’ (Harmon, 1995: 34). 
One particular body where this is the case is the British civil service, where 
accountability is deeply intertwined with its historical and constitutional 
development. Therefore my starting point in this section lies with the origins of 
the civil service. 
 
2.3.1 The Origins of Civil Servant Accountability 
Etymologically, the terms civil service and civil servant originated in the East 
India Company that ran India from 1608 until 1858. The terms were used to 
differentiate between the company’s civil and military servants (Hennessy, 
2001). The conceptual origins of the civil service, though, are somewhat older. 
The origins of the British civil service are to be found in ‘that bedraggled, 
uncomfortable caravanserai of court servants which followed the Saxon Kings 
of England round from one primitive resting place to another’ (Hennessy, 2001: 
18). This small group of servants performed a treasury function of money 
acquisition, storage and recording. The arrival of William I in 1066 brought forth 
the first chancellor. This was not the political role that we know today, but was 
rather a servant charged with the administration of the kingdom through the 
issuance of writs. The role was continually occupied during William’s reign and 
the chancellor’s writs became ‘the most characteristic expression of the King’s 
administrative will’ (Douglas, 1964: 293). Over the next 500 years this treasury 
function developed as an adjunct to the Royal household. It was not until the 
reign of Henry VIII that the national administration of the state was formally 
organized into six departments, all dealing with revenue collection in various 
forms. In addition, the King’s inner circle of advisors was institutionalized into a 
body that we recognize today - the Privy Council (Hennessy, 2001). Later on, 
Queen Elizabeth’s Privy Council bore many of the hallmarks of today’s civil 
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service including routine meetings and meticulous minute-taking. Peace with 
Spain in 1604 and the opening up of the European market resulted in the 
creation of the non-revenue raising Committee for Trade and Plantations, the 
forerunner of today’s Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). The restoration 
of the monarchy resulted in the establishment of Treasury control of Whitehall 
(Hennessy, 2001). By the turn of the 18th century, further traces of today’s civil 
service could be discerned: the Northern and Southern Departments were 
reorganized and renamed as the Home Office and Foreign Office respectively. 
However, government departments in the mid 19th century were, in effect, 
independent fiefdoms with recruitment methods that included patronage, 
influence and favouritism (Pyper, 1995b). Government employment was a job 
for life, with a publicly funded pension to boot. With public administration 
suffocating under this ‘deadweight of patronage and inefficiency’ (Hennessy, 
2001: 27), pressure for change came from the Chancellor of the Exchequer of 
the day, Gladstone, and the then Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, John 
Trevelyan. The Report on the Organization of the Permanent Civil Service 
(Northcote and Trevelyan, 1854) set out the basis for the future organization, 
recruitment and employment of civil servants. With regard to the relative 
positions of ministers and these newly recruited civil servants,  
 
‘It may be safely asserted that, as matters now stand, the 
Government of the country could not be carried on without the aid 
of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position 
duly subordinate to that of Ministers who are directly responsible 
to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient 
independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to 
advise, assist, and, to some extent, influence, those who are from 
time to time set over them’ (Northcote and Trevelyan, 1854: 3) 
 
Patronage and nepotism were to be replaced by selection by interview and 
examination, promotion based on merit and the division of labour into ‘superior 
“intellectual” and inferior “mechanical” tasks’ (Pyper, 1995b: 7). This, coupled 
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with the increasing scale and complexity of government, brought the matter of 
the accountability of civil servants in relation to that of ministers to the fore. 
 
However, the publication of the Northcote and Trevelyan report (1854) was not 
the origin of civil servant accountability in the United Kingdom. Its origins lie with 
William I and his establishment of centralized authority in Britain by means of 
the Domesday Book (Dubnick, 1998), which contains the results of a detailed 
audit of the property held by every subject at that time (Douglas, 1964). The 
Domesday Book, together with the oath of allegiance that was sworn by the 
‘landowning men of any account’ (Douglas, 1964: 355) at Salisbury in 1086, 
enabled William I to assert his sovereignty over the nation in two ways. First, 
the Domesday Book gave William I detailed knowledge of the contents of his 
kingdom (and was therefore his) and second, the oath of allegiance meant he 
had established a legal and moral claim over all that the landowners owned. 
William I had established an accountability-based relationship, in that they were 
now accountable to him as loyal subjects, bound by an oath of allegiance, and 
William I knew for what they were accountable (that which was enumerated in 
the Domesday Book) (Dubnick, 2002). These arrangements were strengthened 
further in the reign of Henry I, during which audit arrangements were centralized 
and formal account-giving arrangements were put in place (Dubnick and 
Justice, 2004). So accountability was based on a moral and legal relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled.  
 
Civil servant accountability has continued to develop and change over the 
centuries and has survived the change from monarchical to parliamentary 
sovereignty (Dicey, 1959). The Northcote and Trevelyan report (1854) resulted 
in a further change. In 1864 Parliament was adamant that civil servants be 
accountable to the House of Commons (Woodhouse, 1994). This was 
compounded in 1870 by the arrival of the first civil servants under the new 
system, who found it difficult to accept that the departmental minister would be 
the main conduit between themselves and the wider public (Woodhouse, 1994). 
Yet, by 1873, the House of Commons rejected the notion of direct accountability 
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of civil servants; the focus was to be on ministers. Civil servants were to be 
accountable to their departmental superiors within the civil service and 
ultimately to ministers. Ministers were to be responsible to the House of 
Commons for every action or inaction in their departments. This is commonly 
referred to as the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. However, in practice it is 
about the minister providing an account to the House of Commons (Marshall, 
1984; McVicar et al., 1998; Flinders, 2001). 
 
This ‘formal doctrine of accountability in the British government remains in the 
shadow of A. V. Dicey (1959) and those writers who followed in his wake during 
the earlier and middle decades of the [last] century’ (Barberis, 1998: 451). The 
doctrine is consistent with the ‘progressive’ style of public administration of the 
era in which it was developed (Hood, 1995). As politicians were assumed to be 
inherently prone to corruption, waste and favouritism,  the doctrine established 
buffers that prevented political and managerial discretion through the use of 
elaborate procedures and rules as well as the diffusion of power (Hood, 1995). 
The restricted nature of individual power and the complex rules governing 
activity effectively constrained the accountability of individual civil servants. The 
outcomes of policy implementation were the product of actions taken by a 
myriad number of individual civil servants. Complex rules restricted individual 
activity. This limited the subject of civil servant accountability to probity, equity 
and due process (Parker and Gould, 1999).  
 
Given the doctrine of ministerial accountability, the notion that civil servants can 
be held or called to account by principals external to the civil service is 
‘extremely problematic’ (Pyper, 1995b: 119). The civil servant would effectively 
become a politician and thus undermine Parliament, as it is only through the 
minister in Parliament that ministers, as part of the executive arm of the state, 
are held to account. Therefore, ‘ancillary to ministerial accountability is non-
accountability of civil servants’ (Turpin, 1994: 120). Under the doctrine ministers 
were ‘held to be comprehensively accountable whilst their agents - the 
permanent officials - retreated steadily into the mists of non-accountability’ 
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(Johnson, 1974: 6). 
 
This doctrine is reflected in today’s principal documents that govern the 
relationships between ministers, civil servants and the House of Commons. The 
Code of Conduct for Ministers maintains that ministers are accountable ‘for the 
policies, decisions and actions of their departments and “Next Steps” agencies’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2001: 1). Its counterpart for civil servants, the Civil Service 
Management Code, sets out the rules that govern the appointment and 
management of civil servants. The code states that civil servants are 
accountable to the minister of their particular department (Civil Service 
Commissioners, 1995). Civil servants are also accountable to their superiors 
within their own departments or agency ‘for the efficient, effective and 
economical discharge of their responsibilities to their civil service line managers’ 
(Pyper, 1995b: 117). Civil servants are ultimately accountable to the permanent 
secretary of their department and finally to the minister. Successive versions of 
the “Armstrong Memorandum” state that civil servants are responsible for their 
actions to their ministers, whilst ministers are accountable to Parliament (House 
of Commons, 1985; House of Commons, 1987). Civil servants are accountable 
to ministers for the evidence they give when they appear before select 
committees and appear on behalf of ministers. The sole exception to this is the 
Accounting Officer, who is directly accountable to Parliament through the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) for the expenditure of their respective department 
or executive agency (Pyper, 1995b).  
2.3.2 The Trend towards Civil Servant Accountability 
The formal doctrine of accountability is a simple one. However, the ‘reality of 
accountability has come to depart from the formal doctrine’ (Barberis, 1998: 
453) in two distinct ways. First, civil servants are increasingly held accountable 
for the outcome of their actions. A series of political scandals over the last two 
decades have resulted in civil servants being called to account by principals 
outside of the civil service. Lord Scott (1996), in his report on the sale of 
defence and dual-use equipment to Iraq, legitimized ‘the splitting of the 
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constitutional seam between ministers and officials’ (Barberis, 1998 : 452). He 
stated that if ministers were to avoid blame for the export of prohibited goods on 
the grounds of a lack of knowledge, they ought to assist with the provision of 
information, otherwise ‘Parliament (and the public) will not be in a position to 
judge on whom responsibility for what has occurred should be placed’ (Scott, 
1996 : Vol.4, K8.16). This statement clearly moved the burden of accountability 
from the ministers to the civil servants involved. Sir Robin Butler, the Cabinet 
Secretary in his evidence to Lord Scott, differentiated between accountability 
and responsibility. Minsterial accountability, the duty of a minister to account to 
Parliament, could not be delegated (Flinders, 2001; Woodhouse, 2004), 
whereas civil servants were not directly accountable to Parliament for their 
actions, but were responsible for certain actions and could be delegated clearly 
defined responsibilities (Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1994). This has 
become known as the ‘Butler doctrine’ (Flinders, 2001: 47), in which 
accountability is limited to answerability, whereas responsibility now includes 
liability. However, given the distinction I have made between accountability and 
responsibility in Section 2.2.4., under the ‘Butler doctrine’ (Flinders, 2001: 47), 
civil servants are accountable as they are liable. The appearance of Dr David 
Kelly before the Select Committee for Foreign Affairs and the subsequent 
inquiry by Lord Hutton (Hutton, 2004) demonstrated the extent to which civil 
servants can be held to account for the outcomes of their actions.  
 
Second, the doctrine has departed from its original form by changing the nature 
of the subject of an individual civil servant’s accountability. There has been ‘a 
shift from accountability encompassing probity, stewardship and the concept of 
ultra vires to accountability focussing on positive action – managerial 
performance, the effective use of resources and professional and personal 
integrity’ (Hinton and Wilson, 1993: 123). Civil servants are increasingly held 
accountable for the outcomes and outputs of their work.  
 
There have been repeated reaffirmations of the doctrine of ministerial 
accountability over the intervening decades since the doctrine’s inception 
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(Woodhouse, 1994; Winetrobe, 1995; Woodhouse, 2004) and it remains the 
keystone of the relationship between Parliament and the executive (Flinders, 
2001). Despite this, there is a considerable amount of scholarly debate over the 
effectiveness of the doctrine, with some scholars suggesting that ministers 
appear to be less willing than ever to accept responsibility for the actions of their 
departments and executive agencies and hold civil servants accountable 
instead (Finer, 1956; Flinders, 2001), whilst others suggest that this is no longer 
the case (Woodhouse, 2004). Nevertheless, there has been a progressive 
increase in the accountability of civil servants over three decades. Indeed, ‘one 
of the most significant developments during the 1980s and 1990s in relation to 
accountability has been the trend away from the anonymity of officials towards 
civil service accountability’ (Woodhouse, 1994: 288-289). This trend is the result 
of three interrelated changes: the expansion in the role of the state in daily 
economic life since the 1870s, the introduction of the departmental select 
committee system to Parliament in 1979 and the introduction of the ‘Next Steps’ 
agencies in 1988.  
 
The Expansion of the State 
The role of the civil service in the daily economic life of the nation has 
undergone a major expansion since the mid-19th century. The arrival of state 
pensions, labour exchanges as well as health and unemployment insurance 
before the first world war resulted in the ‘mutation of the regulatory to the social 
service state’ (Hennessy, 2001: 57). After the second world war the arrival of 
the Welfare State, the NHS and nationalised industries further expanded the 
scope of the state. For the civil service these changes brought with them a 
whole new range of responsibilities and a more substantial role in the economic 
life of the country (Ling, 1998). This growth in civil service activity was not 
unproblematic for the doctrine of civil servant accountability. ‘It is clear that 
much of the difficulty in respect of definition and enforceability [of accountability] 
can be attributed to the scale and character of the public activities and services 
for which we wish to establish accountability, and to the complexity and novelty 
of the executive structures which have been devised to undertake these tasks’ 
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(Johnson, 1974: 3). Consequently, the meaning of the doctrine of ministerial 
accountability has become much more complex (Woodhouse, 1994). It is no 
longer possible for ministers to directly control the detailed activities of the 
departments and agencies under their control because of the sheer complexity 
and scale of departmental and agency activity. Ministers now carry out a 
supervisory function, with the power to intervene in activity or direct specific 
activities if they so desire. Ministerial accountability has at least become relative 
to the degree of control or supervision exercised by the minister rather than 
being absolute (Flinders, 2001). This being the case, ‘it no longer appears that 
traditional ministerial responsibility for the acts of civil servants provides a 
sufficient measure of accountability to Parliament’ (Turpin, 1994: 123). Given 
this lacuna in the doctrine of ministerial accountability, the accountability of civil 
servants would then appear to be a reaction to the problems of “many hands” 
(Thompson, 1980) and the perception by the public of ‘rule by nobody’ (Arendt, 
1970: 38).  
 
The Parliamentary Select Committee System 
Introduced to the House of Commons in 1979 (Pyper, 1995b), the 
departmentally based select committee system has also contributed to the trend 
towards the accountability of civil servants. The intention behind their 
introduction was to improve the ability of Parliament to ‘scrutinize the executive 
and hold ministers to account’ (Woodhouse, 1994: 177). Select committees 
have the power to send for persons, papers and records, a practice rooted in 
the origins of Parliament as a High Court (Woodhouse, 1994). Civil servants 
regularly appear before select committees to be questioned about their 
activities. The accepted convention is that civil servants appear before select 
committees on behalf of their ministers. There have been some doubts over the 
effectiveness of select committees on the grounds that the “Osmotherly 
Memorandum” in effect gave the civil servant the opportunity to refer questions 
back to the minister. In practice, few civil servants have done so (Pyper, 1995b). 
The cumulative result of the introduction of ‘the post-1979 regime of select 
committees was a challenge to the de jeure non-accountability of officials to 
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Parliament, to the point where a developing de facto accountability could be 
discerned’ (Pyper, 1995b: 125). Therefore ‘there has been a move in the 
direction of a de facto direct accountability of officials to Parliament’ (Pyper, 
1995a: 30). 
 
The “Next Steps” Agencies 
The “Next Steps” agencies were created to carry out the service delivery and 
implementation work that forms the bulk of the work of the Civil Service (Drewry 
and Giddings, 1995). The Next Steps initiative was aimed at providing a 
contractual basis for managing the performance of the operational activity which 
formed the bulk of government work (Talbot, 2001). Policy formation was 
intended to be carried out by a small parent department. The agencies were 
meant to remove the burden of operational activity from ministers, with 
accountability for operational activity being carried by the chief executives of the 
“Next Steps” agencies rather than ministers (Hazell, 1993). No changes in 
ministerial accountability arrangements were envisaged (Pyper, 1995a). In 
practice agency chief executives have appeared before parliamentary select 
committees, provided answers to MP’s parliamentary questions and have 
become public spokespersons for their agencies (Talbot, 2004).  
 
There have been two distinct impacts on the doctrine of accountability as a 
result of the “Next Steps” initiative. First, the split between operational and 
policy matters has caused confusion. In appearances before various select 
committees, the permanent secretaries of parent departments have been asked 
questions about operational matters that were the preserve of agencies; and the 
chief executives of “Next Steps” agencies have been asked questions that 
relate to policy matters that were the remit of parent departments (Massey, 
1995). Some agency chief executives also appear at conferences and deal with 
the media. The end result is that agency chief executives are now accountable 
to the select committees and, in some cases to the public. These are both forms 
of accountability beyond that which is owed to ministers and their civil service 
superiors. 
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Second, the character of the accountability relationship has changed. What had 
previously been an internal civil service issue has become an external matter 
between the chief executive of the executive agency and the minister. Agency 
chief executives have, on occasion, publicly criticized government policy 
(Talbot, 2004). As Jordan observes, ‘in reality it is now accountability to the 
minister by the chief executive rather than accountability of the minister to the 
House of Commons that is on offer: these are different’ (Jordan, 1992: 13). The 
sackings of the chief executives of the Prisons Service and the Child Support 
Agency (Barberis, 1998; Harlow, 1999) and the resignation of the chief 
executive of the Scottish Qualifications Agency (Clarence, 2002) all support this 
thesis. In parallel there has been a move from permanent tenure to 
appointments based on contract (Hood, 1998; Haque, 2000). This has had the 
effect of increasing ministerial control over civil servants, especially at senior 
levels. So there has been an increase in the accountability of senior civil 
servants to ministers, whilst at the same time accountability has been extended 
outside the traditional hierarchical line to the select committees.  
 
2.3.3 The Changing Subject of Civil Servant Accountability 
Under the traditional doctrine, civil servant accountability has been limited to 
due process, probity, equity and transparency in the execution of their work 
(Parker and Gould, 1999). The arrival of a phenomenon known as New Public 
Management (NPM) has changed for what civil servants are accountable. NPM 
is not a uniform phenomenon. Four distinct, but interrelated versions have been 
identified. These include the assertion of cost-driven management control over 
organizations, decentralization in the form of splits between purchasers and 
providers, ideas such as quality, excellence and entrepreneurialism born out of 
the re-inventing government movement (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993) and more 
recently, a focus on the public as citizens and consumers of public services 
(Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, and Pettigrew, 1996). 
 
Despite these variants, NPM places a strong emphasis on the use of what are 
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perceived by the public sector to be the methods and practices of the private 
sector (Hood, 1991; Rhodes, 1994; Rhodes, 1997). In particular, NPM 
emphasizes ‘hands on management, explicit standards and measures of 
performance, managing by results, value for money and more recently, 
closeness to the customer’ (Rhodes, 1997: 48). In effect the public sector has 
engaged in both mimetic and coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) and adopted the language and behaviours of the private sector, despite 
the significant differences between the two. The ‘distinctiveness of the public 
sector lies in its emphasis on social justice and equity in the provision of goods 
and services that meet collectively agreed community needs’ (Lupson and 
Partington, 2005: 8). This contrasts with the private sector, which is focussed on 
meeting the needs of paying customers through the provision of goods and 
services defined by the discipline of the marketplace (Parker and Gould, 1999). 
So NPM, with its emphasis on economy, efficiency and effectiveness, has had 
an impact on the subject of a civil servant’s accountability.  
 
NPM has resulted in a restriction of civil servant accountability to a limited range 
of performance measures, rather than for a wider set of public interests 
(Rhodes, 1994). Whereas accountability has traditionally been for probity and 
due financial process, the emphasis is now on financial performance, where 
accountability is for performance in relation to outputs (Parker and Gould, 
1999). More traditional notions of accountability - such as socio-economic 
progress, law and order, the alleviation of poverty, fairness, integrity and justice 
- have been replaced with notions of increased productivity and efficiency, 
competition and cost effectiveness (Haque, 2000). The subject of an 
accountability relationship has increasingly been expressed in objective terms 
(Stone, 1993), particularly in relation to performance (Paul, 1991) (Glynn and 
Perkins, 1997). In terms of Day and Klein’s (1987) description of managerial 
accountability, traditional public administration was more concerned with fiscal 
and process accountabilities. There is now a much greater emphasis on 
programme or outcome accountability (Day and Klein, 1987). A civil servant’s 
accountability has been extended from a narrowly defined financial concept to a 
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much broader form covering finance, performance and effectiveness (Harlow, 
2002). Accountability within the government is now framed in terms of agreed 
objective outcomes peculiar to a specific relationship (Public Services 
Productivity Panel, 2002). The net result is that the subject of accountability has 
changed from due process to objectives (Hood, 1991).  
2.3.4  The Role of Senior Responsible Owner 
The changes outlined in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 have been felt in all parts of 
the civil service, with the widespread use of individual and organizational 
performance targets (Ferlie et al., 1996), the regular appearance of civil 
servants before parliamentary select committees (Pyper, 1995b) and the public 
removal of civil servants who are perceived to have failed in some way 
(Barberis, 1998; Barker, 1998; Harlow, 1999; Polidano, 1999). At the same time 
under the ‘Butler doctrine’ (Flinders, 2001: 47) (see section 2.3.2), civil servants 
have become accountable for the tasks and actions delegated to them. This 
focus on managerial accountability, performance and discretion (Hood, 1991) is 
clearly reflected in a relatively new role introduced to the civil service in 2000 – 
the SRO. 
 
The role of SRO was introduced in 2000 as part of a package of measures 
designed to improve the government’s track record in information technology 
(IT) projects. The “Modernising Government” White Paper (Cabinet Office, 
1999) set out the new government’s ambitions for improvements in the delivery 
of public services. IT was perceived to be fundamental to the success of these 
ambitions. However, the public sector is littered with examples of IT projects 
that have been delivered late, have exceeded their budgets or have proved 
unsuitable for their intended use. These include projects such as the 
computerised passport processing system, the National Insurance Recording 
System, the Benefits Card Payment project and the Libra project (Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 1999; Comptroller and Auditor General, 2000; Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 2001; Comptroller and Auditor General, 2003). The failure 
of these projects and the consequent negative impacts on the delivery of public 
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services has been widely reported in a regular succession of stories in the 
press. These have been accompanied ‘by high levels of political and public 
concern that the benefits of the projects are lost and that large sums of public 
money are being wasted’ (Lupson and Partington, 2005: 2).  
 
When the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons reviewed 
public sector IT capital projects, it recommended that senior managers be held 
accountable for the ‘specific anticipated benefits from IT projects’ (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 1999: xiv). A comprehensive review 
of public sector IT capital projects found many instances of weak management 
and unclear lines of accountability diffused across committees or multiple 
individuals (Cabinet Office, 2000). The restricted nature of civil servant 
accountability was perceived to be a major contributor to the poor levels of 
project performance. Committee or diffused ownership was also perceived to be 
a contributor to poor project performance as it ‘diluted accountability, diffused 
authority and led to slower, less responsive decision making’ (Cabinet Office, 
2000: 16-17).  
 
The British government introduced a package of measures designed to address 
these criticisms, at the forefront of which was the role of the SRO (Cabinet 
Office, 2000). The role was created to achieve three objectives: first, to improve 
the speed of decision making; second, to improve the clarity of the public 
client’s voice across the project and third, to improve the performance of public 
sector IT projects (Cabinet Office, 2000; Office of Public Services Reform, 
2003). Every mission-critical or high risk project is now required to have a 
designated SRO (HM Treasury, 30/3/2004). SROs are meant to be senior 
figures that have the necessary authority to ensure the project can achieve its 
objectives (Office of Government Commerce, 2007). The SRO should also be 
‘recognized as the owner [of the project] throughout the organization’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2000: 16) and ‘as the owner and end-user, they should be in the best 
position to make judgements…as their business need is driving [the project]’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2000: 16). Further, the SRO provides strategic direction for the 
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project by ensuring that the project is focussed on the needs of the business by 
engaging with stakeholders, that the risks associated with the project are 
‘tracked and mitigated as effectively as possible and by taking the key decisions 
on the project’ (Cabinet Office, 2000: 17). Also, the identity of the SRO should 
remain unchanged for the duration of the project or change ‘only when a distinct 
phase has been completed’ (Cabinet Office, 2000: 18). 
 
The designated SRO is accountable for achieving the project’s objectives 
(Office of Government Commerce, 2002; Office of Government Commerce, 
2003) and ‘has overall responsibility for delivering the business objectives and 
benefits of any programme or project’ (Cabinet Office, 2000: 14). The SRO’s 
accountabilities are to be ‘explicitly included in their personal objectives’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2000: 18) in order to encourage personal ownership of the 
project. Yet SRO accountability is defined by the official literature only in the 
loosest terms: ‘The Senior Responsible Owner has overall accountability for the 
programme’, and is ‘ultimately accountable for the success of the programme’ 
(Office of Government Commerce, 2003: 19). SRO accountability is specific to a 
particular project, and is defined as a set of quantified project objectives, in line 
with published recommendations (Public Services Productivity Panel, 2002). 
These objectives are developed by the sponsoring group of which the SRO is a 
peer member (Office of Government Commerce, 2003). The SRO is 
accountable to the sponsoring group for achieving these objectives. The 
sponsoring group is often an existing senior management group within the 
department or agency, but is sometimes specifically created for the project. 
 
In order to fulfil this role, the SRO needs to be able network effectively, both 
within their own organization and externally. They also need to have a broad 
perspective on the project so that they are aware of the wider issues that may 
impact their project. Further, they need to have the ability to influence and 
negotiate with people, the time to perform the role and be able to be frank and 
open about the project (Office of Government Commerce, 2007). 
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SROs report to the sponsoring group as well as to other senior management 
teams within their organization. Ministers often request briefings from SROs at 
key stages in a project’s lifecycle, when the impact of a failure could have a 
negative impact on public services or generate negative publicity. The SRO is 
also meant to refer serious problems to the sponsoring group, top management 
or ministers as necessary (Office of Government Commerce, 2007). SROs also 
appear before select committees of the House of Commons alongside the 
departmental Accounting Officer to account for failed projects (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2002; House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 30th October 2006). The need for such an 
appearance can have a detrimental effect on an individual’s career (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2002). SROs play a major role in 
Gateway Reviews (Office of Government Commerce, 2004), a review process 
that is used to evaluate projects at key stages. SROs work with the NAO on 
project audits. Yet as with any civil service role, an individual usually occupies 
the position of SRO for a period of one or two years before moving on. 
Nevertheless, poor project reviews, projects that have a negative impact on 
public services or that result in poor publicity can affect an SRO’s performance-
related bonus, career progression and employment status. 
 
The introduction of the role of SRO and the use of project performance targets 
are based on the assumption that these will lead to improved project 
performance. This is consistent with the view taken by the Public Services 
Productivity Panel: ‘clarifying and sharpening accountability will significantly 
improve performance and delivery’ (Public Services Productivity Panel, 2002: 
4). Whether this assumption is correct is open to debate. However, it does pose 
a challenge for the current doctrine of civil servant accountability because ‘it is 
difficult to put such an outcome-based system under legislative scrutiny or 
debate due to the qualitative and controversial nature of public sector outcomes’ 
(Haque, 2000: 609), as a significant part of the outcomes could be outside the 
scope of the SRO’s jurisdiction. The efficacy of this approach, based on a 
mandated combination of individual accountability and objective performance 
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targets, is also open to question on three grounds.  
 
First, it has already been established ‘that the ways people actually work usually 
differ fundamentally from the ways organizations describe that work in manuals, 
training programs, organizational charts and job descriptions’ (Brown and 
Duguid, 1991: 40). So an individual SRO will carry out the role in a manner that 
differs from that which has been proscribed.  
 
Second, despite the use of objective performance targets, there is a risk of 
misinterpretation, for ‘it is at once evident that such agreement can only be 
partial and incomplete, no matter who is involved’ (Friedrich, 1940: 3-4). An 
individual SRO may not fully comprehend the performance targets for which 
they are accountable, potentially leading them to pursue the objectives they 
understand rather than what was intended (Lupson and Partington, 2005). 
Further, the objective performance targets may not fully reflect the totality of the 
desired project outcomes, as individuals tacitly know more than they are able to 
say (Giddens, 1984). 
 
Third, an individual SRO may have a wider or narrower understanding of to 
whom an account must be given. The monolithic Weberian bureaucratic 
hierarchy has been replaced with a ‘differentiated polity’ (Rhodes, 1997: 4). The 
individual civil servant now sits at the centre of an extensive network of private 
sector suppliers, non-departmental public bodies, independent regulators, think 
tanks, citizens, customers, politicians and taxpayers, who must be dealt with. 
This has resulted in an increased number of ‘multiple stakeholders, which is 
inconsistent with the hierarchical relationships expected from the Westminster 
system’ (Parker and Gould, 1999: 119). It is also problematic for the traditional 
doctrine of civil servant accountability. In this context, an individual civil 
servant’s understanding of their accountabilities may be more akin to Spiro’s 
(1969) “multicentric accountability” in that they are accountable not only to the 
sponsoring group, but to other groups, organizations and individuals ‘to different 
degrees, in different ways’ (Spiro, 1969: 98). Therefore, accountability is more 
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likely to be subjectively than objectively defined in this ‘differentiated polity’ 
(Rhodes, 1997: 4). Further, it is likely to consist of more than post ante account-
giving. The SRO might put into effect a broader understanding of accountability 
by taking into account the views of others beyond the sponsoring group 
(Donahue, 1989). Therefore ‘the restriction of accountability to the sponsoring 
group carries with it the risk of unfulfilled accountability relationships and thus 
potentially a perception of a less than satisfactory outcome’ (Lupson and 
Partington, 2005: 10).  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from these limitations: first, that an individual 
SRO’s understanding of what they are accountable for may differ from the 
objectives defined by others for a particular project; and second, that an 
individual SRO’s understanding of to whom they are accountable may differ 
from that defined by others for the particular project. 
 
These conclusions suggest the two principal problems inherent in the objective 
definition of accountability. Individual SROs will have different understandings of 
their accountabilities and will pursue the outcomes they believe will satisfy a 
wider range of parties to whom they understand they are accountable. SROs, 
therefore, take action in the pursuit of the accountabilities they understand, 
rather than solely on the basis of those that have been mandated. These 
conclusions produce the following research question, ‘What are individual 
SROs’ subjective understandings of their accountabilities?’  
 
2.4 Accountability Research 
One way of trying to establish how accountability is understood is to examine 
existing research. Two areas of literature offer the potential to resolve this: 
public administration and psychology.  
 
2.4.1 Accountability Research: Public Administration  
A systematic search of the public administration literature (Lupson, 2003) found 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two                                                         Accountability 
 
that there was little empirical research on accountability in this field. I have 
revisited this search process regularly since 2003 and have updated the results 
accordingly. The results of this process are summarized in Table 2-2 overleaf. 
These show that despite the importance of accountability and the increasingly 
widespread use of the term, the empirical literature on accountability remains 
sparse (Schwartz, 2005). Table 2-2 demonstrates three further points. 
 
First, much of the empirical research in the table is based on individual case 
studies. This research does not answer the question of how individuals 
understand accountability. 
 
Second, much of the research lacks a theoretically-based methodological 
foundation from which conclusions can be drawn about accountability and ideas 
for further areas for research into accountability can be generated. The studies 
by Day and Klein (1987), Romzek and Dubnick (1987), Harlow (1999), Lee 
(2000), Romzek and Ingraham (2000), Klingner, Nalbandian and Romzek 
(2002), O’Connell (2005), Koppell (2005) and Page (2006) do not have a clearly 
stated theoretically based methodological approach.  
 
Third, much of the research is focussed on an organizational level of analysis. 
The studies by Harlow (1999), Johnston and Romzek (1999), Lee (2000), 
Romzek and Ingraham (2000), Flinders (2001), Considine (2002) Klingner, 
Nalbandian and Romzek (2002), Kluvers (2003), Ospina, Grau and Zaltsman 
(2004), O’Connell (2005), Koppell (2005) and Page (2006) focus on problems of 
accountability at an institutional level. The studies listed above represent 14 out 
of the 20 studies listed in Table 2-2. One further study (Roberts, 2002) leaves 
the reader unclear as to whether it is aimed at an institutional or an individual 
level of analysis. The remaining five studies all adopt the individual as the level 
of analysis (Sinclair, 1995; Bundt, 2000; Millar and McKevitt, 2000; Dunn and 
Legge, 2001; Newman, 2004). Of these five, four have either a clearly 
articulated methodology or, where none is stated, I have reviewed the language 
used and made a judgement accordingly.  
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In relation to the question ‘What are individual SROs’ subjective understandings 
of their accountabilities?’ only two of the five studies at the individual level of 
analysis are relevant – Sinclair (1995) and Newman (2004).  
 
Sinclair (1995) explored how the CEOs of 15 state government agencies 
understood and practiced their accountabilities. The study revealed five different 
types of accountability: political, public, managerial, professional and personal. 
This study suffers from two limitations. First, the study focussed on state 
government, a level of government that does not have a direct equivalent in the 
United Kingdom. Second, the study was carried out in Australia. Whilst both the 
United Kingdom and Australia are constitutional monarchies, there are 
substantial differences between the Australian constitution and that of the 
United Kingdom. The Australian system has a federal structure with a significant 
amount of power devolved to the states, whereas government in the United 
Kingdom remains highly centralized, despite devolution. Thus, the findings may 
not offer much insight into how SROs understand accountability in the setting of 
the civil service in the United Kingdom.  
 
Newman examined how a group of public sector managers constructed 
accountability ‘in the ambiguous terrain of network governance’ (Newman, 
2004: 17). The study revealed five different constructions of accountability: 
administrative, managerial, public, personal and local community. However, this 
study has one main limitation. The sample consisted of a wide range of civil 
servants, local government employees and voluntary sector workers, who 
expressed five different constructions of accountability. Due to the varied nature 
of the respondents, the degree to which these can be amalgamated is open to 
question. Civil servants operate within the boundaries that arise out of the 
doctrine of ministerial accountability and the practices of central government. 
Local government officers and the CEOs of charitable organizations do not. 
However, Newman does recognize that not all constructions were given equal 
weight by the respondents.  
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Table 2-2: Empirical Research on Accountability in the Public Sector 
Study     Title Context Level of
Analysis 
 Theoretical 
Basis 
Method Conclusion
Day and 
Klein 
(1987) 
Accountabilities: Five 
Public Services 
UK: Five public 
services 
Organization   None stated Qualitative
interviews 
Accountability is understood in 
terms of accountability to the 
community being served as well as 
sense of personal accountability. 
 
Romzek 
and 
Dubnick 
(1987) 
Accountability in the 
Public Sector: 
Lessons from the 
Challenger Tragedy 
USA: Federal 
agency 
Organization None stated  Single case 
study 
Inappropriate focus on bureaucratic 
and political accountabilities rather 
than on professional accountability 
resulted in the decision to launch 
the Space Shuttle Challenger. 
 
Sinclair 
(1995) 
The Chameleon of 
Accountability: Forms 
and Discourses 
Australia: Public 
sector 
organization 
CEOs 
 
Individual  Social
constructionism  
Qualitative 
interviews 
N=15 
The CEOs constructed five types of 
accountability: political, public, 
managerial, professional and 
personal. 
Harlow 
(1999) 
Accountability, New 
Public Management 
and the problems of 
the Child Support 
Agency 
UK: Executive 
Agency 
Organization None stated  Single case 
study 
Feedback from internal 
accountability procedures may 
improve the administrative process. 
Ministerial accountability to 
Parliament was ineffective, as the 
CSA agency chief executive 
resigned. Parliamentary and judicial 
accountability generated publicity 
but failed to resolve underlying 
policy problems. 
 
Johnston 
and 
Romzek 
(1999) 
Contracting and 
Accountability in State 
Medicaid Reform: 
Rhetoric, Theories 
USA: State 
medical agencies 
Organization   None stated Single
longitudinal 
case study 
Privatization of state resources 
impacts on previous accountability 
arrangements. Public contract 
managers need to develop rigorous 
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Study Title Context Level of 
Analysis 
Theoretical 
Basis 
Method Conclusion 
and Reality accountability mechanisms that 
facilitate monitoring. There are 
tensions between the legal and 
political accountability mechanisms, 
with which the states’ contract 
monitors are concerned, and the 
professional accountability 
mechanisms of the private sector 
case managers. 
 
Bundt 
(2000) 
Strategic Stewards: 
Managing 
Accountability, 
Building Trust 
USA: City 
librarians 
Individual    None stated Qualitative:
structured 
interviews 
Librarians fulfilled their professional 
accountability, and in some cases 
were able to manage their 
accountability to city politicians and 
officials, despite the apparent 
conflict between these different 
forms of accountability. 
 
Lee (2000) The new Hong Kong 
international airport 
fiasco: accountability 
failure and the limits 
of the new 
managerialism 
 
Hong Kong: State 
organization 
Organization None stated  Single case 
study.  
 
Managerial accountability for results 
does not guarantee the efficient 
delivery of results due to the indirect 
nature of public authority and the 
diffusion of responsibility. 
Millar and 
McKevitt 
(2000) 
Accountability and 
performance 
measurement: an 
assessment of the 
Irish health care 
system 
Ireland: Health 
authority 
managers 
Individual  Grounded theory Mixed:
quantitative 
survey and 
qualitative 
interviews 
(N=46) 
Performance measures can assist 
in delivering public accountability if 
the measures reflect the manner in 
which services are received and 
experienced by clients. 
Performance measures can also 
assist in the delivery of public 
accountability.  
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Study Title Context Level of 
Analysis 
Theoretical 
Basis 
Method Conclusion 
Romzek 
and 
Ingraham 
(2000) 
Cross Pressures of 
Accountability: 
Initiative, Command 
and Failure in the Ron 
Brown Plane Crash 
USA: Military Organization None stated Single case 
study.  
Political and hierarchical 
accountabilities conflicted with the 
dictates of legal and professional 
accountabilities.  
Dunn and 
Legge 
(2001) 
U.S. Local 
Government 
Managers and the 
Complexity of 
Responsibility and 
Accountability in 
Democratic 
Governance 
USA: Local 
government 
Individual   None stated Quantitative
survey.  
N = 488 
Accountability and responsibility are 
defined in practice in a more 
complex manner than either 
Friedrich (1940) or Finer (1950) 
would suggest. Responsibility and 
accountability are neither mutually 
exclusive nor paradoxical, but are 
blended to produce a workable 
arrangement. 
 
Flinders 
(2001) 
The Politics of 
Accountability in the 
Modern State 
UK: Government 
department 
Organization None stated Mixed: single 
case study and 
semi-structured 
interviews (N = 
65) 
Political accountability whilst 
effective, is characterized by 
defensiveness. It may also be 
exerting significant strain on an 
organization’s resources. Judicial 
accountability is not a significant 
type of accountability, but will 
increase as European legislation 
takes effect. The introduction of 
managerial accountability has 
created tension as it conflicts with 
traditional forms of political 
accountability.  Increased 
managerial accountability may also 
be contributing to the workload of 
organizations. 
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Study Title Context Level of 
Analysis 
Theoretical 
Basis 
Method Conclusion 
Considine 
(2002) 
The End of the Line? 
Accountable 
Governance in the 
Age of Networks, 
Partnerships and 
Joined-Up Services 
International: 
Australia, 
Netherlands, New 
Zealand, UK: 
Public 
employment 
service 
organizations 
 
Organization   None stated Quantitative
survey 
N = 1164 
Horizontal accountability (outside of 
the traditional top down hierarchical 
line) is a problem when it is 
accompanied by public and private 
agencies competing in the same 
policy fields. 
Klingner, 
Nalbandian 
and 
Romzek 
(2002) 
Politics, 
Administration and 
Markets: Conflicting 
Expectations and 
Accountability 
USA: State 
agency 
Organization None stated Single case 
study  
Privatisation of state foster care 
services increased the complexity 
of public management as a result of 
three competing forms of 
accountability: political, 
administrative and market. 
 
Roberts 
(2002) 
Keeping Public 
Officials Accountable 
Through Dialogue: 
Resolving the 
Accountability 
Paradox 
 
USA: State 
government 
Unclear None stated Single case 
study 
Accountability paradox can be 
resolved through dialogue. 
Kluvers 
(2003) 
Accountability for 
Performance in Local 
Government 
Australia: local 
government 
Organization   None stated Quantitative
survey 
N=330 
NPM has broadened the concept of 
accountability to cover 
performance. However, issues 
remain around asymmetric 
information and imbalanced 
relationships that prevent effective 
accountability for performance. 
 
Newman 
(2004) 
Constructing 
Accountability: 
Network Governance 
UK: Public and 
voluntary sector 
managers 
Individual  None stated:
review suggests 
social 
Qualitative 
interviews 
N=35 
Accountability is constructed and 
reworked to guide everyday 
decision making. There were five 
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Study Title Context Level of 
Analysis 
Theoretical 
Basis 
Method Conclusion 
and Managerial 
Agency 
constructionism types of accountability: 
administrative, managerial, public, 
personal and local community. 
 
Ospina, 
Grau and 
Zaltsman 
(2004) 
Performance 
Evaluation, Public 
Management 
Improvement and 
Democratic 
Accountability 
International: Four 
countries 
National   None stated Quantitative:
data review 
and analysis 
Managerial accountability for results 
does not hinder political and 
democratic accountability, but can 
be used to enhance them. 
O’Connell 
(2005) 
Program 
Accountability as an 
Emergent Property: 
The Role of 
Stakeholders in a 
Program’s Field 
USA: State 
agency 
Organization None stated Single case 
study 
Accountability is a function of the 
activities of the stakeholders in a 
program. Any one stakeholder 
holds some but not all of the other 
stakeholders accountable. 
 
 
Koppell 
(2005) 
Pathologies of 
Accountability: ICANN 
and the Challenge of 
“Multiple 
Accountabilities 
Disorder” 
 
USA: Hybrid 
organization  
Organization None stated Single case 
study 
Organizations may find multiple 
accountabilities difficult to manage. 
Page 
(2006) 
The Web of 
Managerial 
Accountability: The 
Impact of Reinventing 
Government 
USA: Federal 
agencies 
Organization None stated Three case 
studies 
Three hypotheses developed from 
the case studies: the reinvention of 
federal welfare, education and 
environmental programs has 
changed accountability 
arrangements, but not consistently 
across the three cases. 
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At the start of this section, I intended to establish what empirical research had 
been carried out that might offer some insight into how individuals understand 
accountability. Having examined the literature, I draw three conclusions. First, 
there has been little empirical research on how individuals understand 
accountability in the field of public administration. Second, only one study has 
been conducted at an individual level in the United Kingdom (Newman, 2004) 
and third, the mixed nature of the participants in this study suggests that the 
study attempted to answer a question different from ‘What are individual SROs’ 
subjective understandings of their accountabilities?’ 
 
Therefore, in relation to the meaning of accountability for individuals, the public 
administration literature does not offer any clear answers. Both Sinclair’s (1995) 
and Newman’s (2004) work offer only partial answers to the question of how 
accountability is understood by individuals, albeit with significant contextual 
limitations. I shall now turn my attention to a related area that has the potential 
to provide answers to the question of how individuals understand accountability: 
psychology. 
 
2.4.2 Accountability Research: Psychology 
Psychologists take a rather different view of accountability from that adopted by 
scholars of public administration. Accountability is seen by psychologists as a 
bridging element between individual and institutional levels of analysis (Tetlock, 
1999). There has been significant effort by psychologists over the last 20 years 
or so to establish the effects of accountability on individuals. Table 2-3 lists 
some of the principal studies in this field. 
 
From this body of research, a number of findings are relevant to this thesis. The 
psychological consequences of making an individual accountable depend on six 
main factors. These are presented below. 
 
1) If an audience has known views, the accountable individual tends to conform 
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to those views (Tetlock, 1983). By way of contrast, if the views of the audience 
are not known, conformity is not possible. Under these conditions, the 
accountable individual adopts a more integrative and complex mode of thought 
and considers different perspectives on the issue (Tetlock, 1983).  
 
2) Whether an individual is accountable for a process or an outcome. Outcome 
accountability has only negative effects on judgement quality, increasing 
inconsistency and reducing calibration. Process accountability has the opposite 
effect and increased judgement accuracy and calibration (Siegel-Jacobs and 
Yates, 1996).  
 
3) Whether or not a demand for accountability is perceived to be legitimate or 
illegitimate has an impact on accountability. If the demand is perceived to be 
illegitimate, then a negative response (reduced motivation and excessive 
stress) is possible (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999).  
 
4) When an individual learns they are accountable after their decision (post-
decisional accountability), individuals focus more on the justification of earlier 
decisions, an effect known as bolstering. Pre-decisional accountability, in which 
individuals know they are accountable before they take a decision, attenuates 
their commitment, especially when individuals are accountable for the process 
through which they make decisions, rather than the outcomes of their decision 
(Simonson and Nye, 1992; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999).  
 
5) Multiple principals also have an impact on accountability. Accountable 
individuals adopt one of either two coping strategies: they either try to avoid any 
decision at all, or engage in significant cognitive efforts to develop an integrated 
position on the issues that need a decision (Green, Visser and Tetlock, 2000).  
 
 
 
64 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two                   Accountability 
 
Table 2-3: Psychological research on accountability 
Study   Title Conclusions
Tetlock (1983) Accountability and Complexity of 
Thought 
Accountability is not a certain method of encouraging complex and open-minded thought. 
When the views of superiors are known, there is considerable pressure to adopt policies 
that conform to those views. Accountability to an audience with unknown views may 
eliminate some cognitive and judgemental biases. Accountability may reduce 
overconfidence by prompting individuals to look for and consider alternative evidence and 
arguments. 
 
Tetlock, Skita 
and Boettger 
(1989) 
Social and Cognitive Strategies for 
Coping with Accountability: 
Conformity, Complexity and 
Bolstering 
When individuals know the views of the audience and are not constrained by previous 
commitments, they shift their views to those of the audience when being held to account. 
When individuals do not know the views of the audience and are also not constrained by 
past commitments, they think in flexible, multidimensional ways. When individuals are 
accountable for positions to which they are already committed, they tend to expend effort 
on justification of those positions.  
 
Weigold and 
Schlenker 
(1991) 
Accountability and Risk Taking Accountability reduces risk taking for those individuals who do not perceive themselves as 
high risk takers. High risk takers continue to take risks even when they are accountable.  
 
Simonson and 
Nye (1992) 
The Effect of Accountability on 
Susceptibility to Decision Errors 
Accountability reduces errors if decision makers can identify which decision would be 
regarded as more rational. Decision makers desire a favourable evaluation of their decision 
and a decrease in the likelihood of criticism. 
 
 
Siegel-Jacobs 
and Yates 
(1996) 
Effects of Procedural and Outcome 
Accountability on Judgement Quality 
Accountability for process produced increased judgement accuracy and calibration. 
Accountability for outcomes reduced calibration and increased judgemental inconsistency. 
 
 
Gelfand and 
Realo (1999) 
Individualism - Collectivism and 
Accountability in Intergroup 
Negotiations 
Accountability affects negotiators’ psychological states and behaviour and outcomes, High 
accountability enhanced co-operation in groups with high levels of collectivism and also 
enhanced competition in groups with low levels of collectivism. Accountability may have a 
positive effect on negotiators, depending on the level of collectivism. 
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Study Title Conclusions 
Green, Visser 
and Tetlock 
(2000) 
Coping with Accountability Cross-
Pressures: Low-Effort Evasive Tactics 
and High-Effort Quests for Complex 
Compromises 
 
In multiple principal situations, accountable individuals resort to one of two coping 
strategies: either a) decision avoidance, procrastination, buck-passing and leaving the 
situation, or b) engaging in high levels of cognitive effort to produce an integrated complex 
position on the issue.  
 
De Cremer, 
Snyder and 
Dewitte (2001) 
The less I trust, the less I contribute 
(or not)? The effects of trust, 
accountability and self monitoring in 
social dilemmas 
 
Accountability for decisions increases the level of contribution to the discussion of a social 
dilemma. Low trust individuals contribute more when accountability is high. 
Dobbs and 
Crano (2001) 
Outgroup accountability in the 
minimal group paradigm: implications 
for averse discrimination and social 
identity theory 
 
Accountable individuals adopt a more careful thought processing style than those who are 
not accountable.  
Sedikes, 
Herbst, Hardin 
and Dardis 
(2002) 
Accountability as a Deterrent to Self-
Enhancement: The Search for 
Mechanisms 
 
Accountability deters self enhancement. A focus on an individual’s weaknesses in a 
performance domain can lead to lower self-appraisal scores. 
 
De Cremer and 
Bakker (2003) 
Accountability and Co-operation in 
Social Dilemmas: The Influence of 
Others’ Reputational Concerns 
 
Making individuals accountable to others can sustain and increase co-operation levels: this 
applies only when the decision maker believes that others use the social norm of co-
operation as a guideline for their own behaviour. 
Mero, Guidice 
and Anna 
(2006) 
The Interacting Effects of 
Accountability and Individual 
Differences on Rater Response to a 
Performance-Rating Task 
 
Respondents who exhibited high levels of the two traits, conscientiousness and public self-
consciousness, felt a greater need to justify their decisions than those who exhibited lower 
levels of these traits. 
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6) When faced with a social dilemma, accountability for a decision can increase 
the level of contribution from an individual (De Cremer et al., 2001). This also 
leads to increased levels of co-operation when a decision maker believes that 
others use the social norm of co-operation as a guideline (De Cremer and 
Bakker, 2003).  
 
In relation to the question ‘What are individual SROs’ subjective understandings 
of their accountabilities?’ this body of research has two principal drawbacks. 
First, without a common definition of the concept of accountability, it would 
appear that the various scholars were investigating different phenomena. For 
example, Green, Visser and Tetlock define accountability as ‘the social 
pressure to justify one’s views to others’ (Green et al., 2000: 1380), whereas 
Weigold and Schlenker (1991) go further and include the components of 
judgement and sanction. Mero, Guidice and Anna (2006) define accountability 
in terms of answerability for performance in order to fulfil duties, obligations and 
expectations. Lerner and Tetlock (1999) make the point that accountability is 
not a uniform phenomenon but has several distinct variations. These include the 
presence of another (who will observe an individual’s actions), identifiability 
(what an individual says or does will be attributed to them), evaluation (their 
performance will be assessed against some set of criteria) and reason-giving 
(individuals must justify what they have done or said) (Lerner and Tetlock, 
1999). 
 
Second, it is apparent that the range of psychological studies presented here is 
aimed at understanding the effects of accountability on individuals and not how 
individuals understand accountability. Psychologists have sought to understand 
how accountability works, what factors can change it and the impact of a range 
of different types of accountability on other psychological processes. So the 
psychological research does not offer an answer to the question ‘What are 
individual SROs’ subjective understandings of their accountabilities?’  
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2.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have established both the importance and complexity of 
accountability in government through a review of 12 accountability typologies. I 
have also examined five components of accountability and analyzed six 
synonymous terms. Based on this review, I have defined accountability as: a 
social relationship, with resources and responsibilities entrusted to a 
steward for a particular task by one or more principals, with the 
consequent potential for an account to be called for, judgement made and 
remedies and / or sanctions imposed. 
 
I have then traced the development of the doctrine of civil servant accountability 
in the United Kingdom. Civil servants have traditionally been accountable solely 
to their organizational superiors and ultimately to ministers for the execution of 
their duties. Changes in the scale of government, coupled with parliamentary 
reforms and the arrival of NPM, have resulted in changes to the accountability 
of civil servants. Civil servants are now accountable for the outcome of their 
actions to a wide range of policy interest groups, parliamentary committees, 
stakeholders, politicians and the public. Whilst these changes have been seen 
across the civil service, they are clearly illustrated in a relatively new role, that of 
the SRO. The SRO is accountable for the delivery of a project performance 
target to a senior management group within their own organization. However, 
the subjective and cognitive limitations of objective accountability, coupled with 
the apparent wider accountability of civil servants, suggest that an individual 
SRO may have a far wider understanding of both what they are accountable for, 
and to whom they are accountable than the objective definition suggests. 
Therefore my research question is ‘What are individual SROs’ subjective 
understandings of their accountabilities?’ 
 
With regard to this question I have reviewed research on accountability in the 
fields of public administration and psychology and found that little is known 
about how individuals understand accountability. Only two studies (Sinclair, 
1995; Newman, 2004) have the potential to answer the research question. 
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However, both have contextual limitations that mean they do not provide an 
answer to the research question. In the field of psychology, accountability 
research is not concerned with individuals’ subjective understandings of 
accountability, but with the effects of accountability on individuals. Therefore, 
given the paucity of relevant studies in the field of public administration and the 
irrelevance of the psychology research on accountability, empirical research is 
required to answer the research question. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
A key step towards the provision of an answer to the research question 
developed in Chapter 2 is to examine the different theoretical explanations of 
how individuals learn about a social phenomenon (Watkins, 2000). This is a 
question of epistemology, ‘in which attention is directed towards determining not 
only the nature and sources of knowledge, but also the strengths and 
weaknesses of particular ways of knowing’ (Watkins, 2000: 93). My purpose in 
this chapter is to set out the basis for my decision to adopt a particular research 
method. In Section 3.1 I describe four theoretical approaches to learning about 
meaning, review the limitations inherent in each approach and, where previous 
research exists, illustrate its use in the study of accountability. In Section 3.2 I 
present an alternative approach – phenomenography. I trace its development, 
present its philosophical foundations, examine its relationship with 
phenomenology and review the principal criticisms that have been made. In 
Section 3.3 I review how a phenomenographic approach would avoid the 
limitations presented in Section 3.1 and select phenomenography for its ability 
to provide a more comprehensive answer to the research question. I summarize 
the chapter in Section 3.4. 
 
3.1 Four Approaches to Learning about Meaning 
The question “How do we gain knowledge about the world?” has challenged 
philosophers, educationalists, psychologists and academics since Meno 
challenged Socrates. When asked by Meno “Can one be taught virtue?”, 
Socrates suggested that as neither of them knew the answer, both should 
search for it. Meno’s response to this has since become known as Meno’s 
Paradox: ‘How can you search for something when you do not know what it is? 
And if you do not know what to look for and were to come across it, you would 
not recognize it as what you are looking for ?’ (Marton and Booth, 1997: 2). The 
resolution of this question is fundamental to this research, as individuals must 
first gain knowledge of a phenomenon in order to understand it.  
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In Chapter 2 I established that the research question was ‘What are individual 
SROs’ subjective understandings of their accountabilities?’ I also found that 
current research could not answer this question. The question I shall answer in 
this chapter is, ‘How do individuals gain knowledge about, and form a meaning 
of, a phenomenon?’ 
 
Scholars have put forward numerous responses to the question of how 
individuals gain knowledge and develop meaning. These range from the early 
attempts by philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Protagoras and Democritus, 
who suggested that ‘sensation and perception were the only sources of 
knowledge’ (Reynolds, Sinatra and Jetton, 1996: 93), to more recent 
perspectives from scholars such as Skinner, Chomsky, Vygotsky and Greeno 
(Reynolds et al., 1996). Whilst there are significant differences between these 
approaches in a number of areas, I shall follow Watkins (2000) and describe 
four broad approaches that offer the possibility of learning about the meaning of 
a social phenomenon. These are behaviourism, cognitivism, individual 
constructivism and social constructivism. Each of these approaches has a 
distinctive orientation to learning and the self. Each approach also offers 
particular advantages and disadvantages for the study of any given aspect of 
social reality. This categorization is by no means mutually exclusive, as there 
are theoretical overlaps from one approach to another.  
 
In the next four sub-sections, I summarize the central tenet of each position, 
and in relation to accountability review the weaknesses of each position and 
outline any previous research that has been carried out. In conducting this latter 
exercise, I have had to try to establish the particular theoretical basis of a study 
and allocate it to a relevant approach. This has not been difficult where previous 
researchers have been clear about the approach they have adopted in their 
work. However, the researcher’s theoretical stance is not always clearly stated. 
Therefore I have made a judgement on the theoretical position of the research 
based on my understanding of the work.  
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3.1.1 Behaviourism 
Behaviourism is the scientific study of behaviour and has its roots in the writings 
of J. B. Watson and I. B. Pavlov, amongst others (Skinner, 1987). It is based on 
the assumption that individuals gain knowledge and develop meaning from 
repeated sensory stimulation from an external source (Reynolds et al., 1996).  
When this response becomes habitual, the verbal aspects of the response 
produce meaning for the individual (Watkins, 2000). Behaviourism covers a 
range of intellectual perspectives including classical and operant conditioning. 
Classical conditioning is associated with the Russian physiologist I. B. Pavlov 
and takes the view that when an arbitrary stimulus is used with a main stimulus, 
after a number of repetitions the arbitrary stimulus alone will produce the 
conditioned response (Hilgard and Bower, 1966). Operant conditioning is 
associated with the scholar B. F. Skinner. In this, an association is formed 
between a behaviour and a result that reinforces that behaviour (Reynolds et 
al., 1996). The behaviour is then operant or instrumental in producing the result 
(Hilgard and Bower, 1966). The main form of learning is conditioning, in which 
repetition of the sensory experience results in the sensory experience taking on 
meaning for the individual (Marton and Booth, 1997). Learning, in operant 
conditioning, involves a change in the rate of response to a stimulus that 
achieves a beneficial result for the individual (Bredo, 1997). Variations in 
meaning are attributed to changes in reinforcement events, whilst changes in 
meaning are ascribed to changing environmental demands.  
 
As a basis for the study of individuals’ understanding of accountability, 
behaviourism has three weaknesses. The first is the depiction of individuals as 
uncritical, passive recipients of knowledge, ‘incapable of learning through 
insight or conscious thought’ (Bredo, 1997). In this scenario an SRO would 
have to be accountable for a number of projects before accountability for a 
project took on any meaning.  
 
Second, behaviourism can only explain changes in meaning as a gradual 
process, as repeated reinforcement is needed to acquire meaning in the first 
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place. Therefore, individuals would find a new or ambiguous situation difficult to 
respond to, as there was no previous response reinforcement upon which to 
base a response. In this case an individual would adopt a trial and error 
approach and go through their repertoire of responses until the situation was 
resolved (Hilgard and Bower, 1966). For example projects with a European 
dimension would further complicate the generation of meaning by an individual 
SRO, due to the lack of equivalence in meaning. Further, if different 
accountability arrangements were put in place for a particular project, the 
absence of response reinforcement would suggest that an individual SRO might 
find it difficult to respond. 
 
The third is the assumption that stimulus words are universally understood 
within a community. Dubnick (2002) notes that accountability suffers from 
“terminological incommensurability” (Kuhn, 1996) as the term “responsibility” 
(which I have already covered in Chapter 2) is used instead in Italian, French, 
Portuguese and Spanish. This linguistic problem defies the ready translation of 
the concept of accountability from one political and administrative context to 
another; it is often an English import into another language (Harlow, 2002).  
 
3.1.2 Cognitivism 
Cognitivism takes a diametrically opposite position to behaviourism in its claims 
regarding the acquisition of knowledge. The principal focus of cognitivism is on 
mental processes rather than habits. Cognitivism is based on the assumption 
that knowledge is gained from within the mind (Chomsky, 1963; Simon, 1957; 
Scott and Marshall, 2005). An individual makes use of prior knowledge to make 
sense of phenomena that are initially perceived as un-constructed (Hilgard and 
Bower, 1966). Individual acts are explained ‘in terms of an internal 
representation of an external reality’ (Marton and Booth, 1997: 9). An individual 
has a system of symbols which are used to process external stimuli and take 
the appropriate action (e.g. physical action) after processing (i.e. thinking) (Vera 
and Simon, 1993). These internal symbols (or representations) of an external 
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reality are at the core of cognitivism, as their contents are ‘claimed to be the 
basis for determining the meaning of a phenomenon’ (Watkins, 2000: 96). 
Learning is then not based around the acquisition of habits as behaviourism 
would suggest, but rather on the acquisition of mental representations such as 
symbol structures. Changes in meaning are the result of the acquisition of a 
more widely accepted mental representation. Similarly, variations in meaning 
are attributed to the possession of more or less complex representations 
(Watkins, 2000). Cognitivism then places a greater emphasis on individual 
learning when compared with behaviourism. It replaces reinforcement with 
mental representations and moves learning processes from the environment to 
the individual (Bredo, 1997). 
 
In relation to the study of individuals’ understanding of accountability, 
cognitivism has four main drawbacks. First, it does not explain the source of 
mental representations used by an individual to confer meaning to a 
phenomenon. When faced with an unstructured phenomenon, individuals use 
an existing representation to give meaning to it. The question then is ‘Where do 
the contents of the representation derive their original meaning?’ (Watkins, 
2000: 97). Second, there is also the question of how an individual decides 
which representation to use when faced with an unstructured phenomenon 
(Marton and Booth, 1997). Third, cognitivism also assumes that there is a fixed 
way of defining a situation, so ‘it is difficult to establish how individuals acquire 
their own unique representations or negotiate or redefine the contents of their 
representations’ (Watkins, 2000: 97). This suggests that accountability 
meanings are initially defined by virtue of the compliant nature of individuals. 
Fourth, an individual would need a representation to decide to change the 
meaning of a given situation. This raises a question about the basis on which 
individuals decide to retrieve and apply a particular representation (Reynolds et 
al., 1996). 
 
These limitations become more apparent when considering the case of the 
SRO. First, an individual would already have to be in possession of a mental 
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representation of accountability as an SRO before they were appointed. Yet the 
source of this representation is unclear. Second, different mental 
representations of SRO accountability are ascribed to variations in the 
complexity of these representations. Yet no explanation is offered as to the 
source of these variations. Third, changes in the meaning of accountability for 
an SRO are attributed to the acquisition of a more widely accepted 
representation. Again, cognitivism offers no explanation of the representation 
used to identify and process this new representation of accountability.  
 
3.1.3 Individual Constructivism 
Individual constructivists purport that knowledge is ‘constructed by the mind’s 
ability to actively explore and develop its own meaningful accounts of 
phenomena’ (Watkins, 2000: 98). This construction takes place ‘through her 
acts, through her interaction with the environment, by means of the 
complimentary adaptive mechanisms of accommodation and assimilation’ 
(Marton and Booth, 1997: 6). These interactions are transformed into individual 
interpretations that have meaning for the individual. Knowledge then is 
‘individually and idiosyncratically constructed’ (Liu and Matthews, 2005: 387). 
Differences in meaning are primarily the result of, first, variations in conceptual 
abilities between individuals and second, different individual interpretations of 
the same phenomenon (Watkins, 2000). Cognitivists suggest that these 
conceptual abilities may be genetically determined. Changes in meaning are the 
result of individuals adapting their interpretations according to their 
requirements. Major contributions to this approach include genetic epistemology 
(Piaget, 1983), radical constructivism (von Glaserfeld, 1995) and personal 
construct theory, which examines the ways in which individuals construct 
meanings of external phenomena through mental processes (Kelly, 1991). With 
its emphasis on the role of the individual in developing meaning, cognitivism 
offers a defensible basis for the creation of meaning, ‘if one subscribes to the 
primacy of human agency over external or innately determined sources of 
knowledge’ (Watkins, 2000: 98). 
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Individual constructivism can be criticized on three main grounds. First, ‘if 
knowledge of a phenomenon is a product of an individual’s unique 
interpretation, then how is it possible for one individual to truly know what 
another individual means when engaged in the act of communication?’ 
(Watkins, 2000: 98-99). Taken to its logical conclusion, ‘it tends towards a 
denial of the possibility of sharing and communicating knowledge between 
people’ (Fox, 2001: 29), as ‘knowledge is not directly transmittable from person 
to person’ (Liu and Matthews, 2005: 387). Second, individual constructivism 
views all individual meanings of a phenomenon as equal (Ogborn, 1997), which 
does not provide a basis for the critical comparison of different meanings 
(Watkins, 2000). Third, it does not explain how individuals adopt a more 
complex construction whilst still working at a less complex level (Marton and 
Booth, 1997).  
 
These limitations are even clearer when placed in the context of the SRO. How 
can an SRO be accountable if they do not understand for what a principal has 
asked? What meanings of accountability are more useful than others, given its 
widespread misuse and abuse (Dubnick, 2002)?  
 
3.1.4 Social Constructivism 
Social constructivists propose that knowledge is constructed by social groups 
and not just by individuals. Knowledge is then an intersubjective collaborative 
construction and, as such, meaning is based in the specific social context 
(Wittgenstein, 2001). It is gained through participation in the social practices of 
the broad spectrum of groups to which an individual can belong. Knowledge is 
therefore subject to a wide range of social, cultural and historical influences. 
Changes in meaning reflect the continual development of social practice and 
increased levels of individual participation in social groups. Differences in 
meaning are ascribed to variations in social practice as well as to diverse 
normative beliefs in the various social groups (Watkins, 2000). Major 
contributors to this approach come from a ‘range of interesting psychological, 
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epistemological, sociological and historical directions’ (Phillips, 1995: 6-7) and 
include situated learning theorists (Vygotsky, 1978), social constructionists 
(Gergen, 1995) and other scholars (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Kuhn, 1996).  
 
There are three principal criticisms of social constructivism. The first is that 
social meanings take precedence over individual meanings. This emphasis 
denies the role of the individual in gaining knowledge (Ogborn, 1997), thus 
neglecting a potentially important dimension (Hung, 2001; Fox, 2001). Second, 
if the meaning of a social practice in a group changes, then there is an 
assumption that ‘each individual sees these influences and responds to them in 
the same way as the others’ (Watkins, 2000: 200). Third, social constructivism 
does not address how some individuals, who may be part of multiple 
communities, deal with multiple and potentially conflicting social practices, and 
therefore multiple and potentially conflicting meanings (Bredo, 1997).  
 
These limitations can be clarified through an examination of their practical 
meaning in relation to the SRO. From a social constructivist perspective, 
accountability is constructed by participation in the practices of the various 
social groups in a project. As there is no role for individual meaning in social 
constructivism, all SROs would uniformly construct the same meaning in the 
same situation regardless of their own previous experience. Similarly, if a new 
set of accountability arrangements were put in place, all SROs would construct 
a new but identical meaning of accountability.  
 
There is some empirical support for social constructivist explanations of 
accountability in studies by Sinclair (1995) and Newman (2004). Sinclair’s 
(1995) study of the CEOs of 15 Australian public sector agencies is 
representative of the tenets of social constructivism. It locates accountability 
meanings in the socially constructed arena of competing accountability 
constituencies and their associated practices. The study also exhibits the 
limitations of the approach in that all CEOs appropriated the same meanings of 
accountability, and assumed that the individual CEOs responded to the 
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changing, and sometimes conflicting, accountability demands placed upon them 
in the same way.  
 
Newman’s (2004) study of a mix of civil servants, local government officers and 
managers from voluntary sector organizations has similar limitations. 
Accountability is perceived as a ‘socially constructed and contested concept’ 
(Newman, 2004: 17). It is difficult to see how accountability could be anything 
other than a contested concept given the mix of respondents. Despite this, all 
the respondents appropriated in the same way ‘policy discourses, amplifying 
some and marginalising others, coupling them with other discourses in an active 
process of making meaning’ (Newman, 2004: 29). 
 
3.1.5 Limitations of These Four Approaches 
The four approaches I have outlined in the preceding sub-sections all offer 
competing explanations of how individuals develop meanings of a social 
phenomenon. Each approach offers a feasible explanation for an aspect of 
meaning that is not accounted for by the other approaches.  
 
Watkins (2000) suggests that there are four problems common to these 
approaches that are linked to the resolution of questions about meaning. These 
problems can be examined by relating them to individual meanings of 
accountability. First, the results of the application of each approach (see Table 
3-1) do not focus on an individual’s experience of accountability, but rather ‘on 
the researcher’s prescriptive theorizing’ (Watkins, 2000: 101) about how 
individuals might experience a phenomenon, such as accountability, through 
the formation of habits, mental representations, individual interpretations or 
social practices. For example, Sinclair (1995) notes that her five types of 
accountability are derived from administrative and other literature. 
 
Second, these approaches do not reveal individual differences in meaning, but 
rather attribute differences in meaning to variations in reinforcement histories, 
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genetic inheritances, conceptual abilities or group normative beliefs. This point 
is seen in Sinclair’s (1995) study of 15 CEOs of Australian public sector 
agencies, where five different forms of accountability were socially constructed 
by the respondents, but there is no mention of whether there were any 
differences in understanding at the individual level. Newman (2004) notes that 
one accountability discourse – customer accountability – was expressed only 
once. This is attributed to a variation in the respondent’s employment - in this 
case the respondent was a civil servant. However, other civil servants also 
participated in this study and did not express this discourse. Therefore the 
approach taken in this study - social constructivism - would appear to have a 
limited capacity to explain inter-individual differences in the meaning of 
accountability.  
 
The third problem relates to the capacity of the different approaches to explain 
changes in meaning. The principal concern is that the different forms of 
knowledge set out in Table 3-1 ‘can be difficult to change’ (Watkins, 2000: 101) 
and the capacity of these approaches to ‘describe the dynamics of change is 
particularly problematic’ (Watkins, 2000: 101). So in the case of Sinclair’s 
(1995) study, changes in the meaning of accountability for a CEO would be 
attributed to differences in social practices. Although individuals do experience 
change in their social practices, it is not clear how a change in the meaning of 
accountability would take place.  
 
Fourth, all the approaches ‘commit their respective proponents to maintaining a 
philosophical dilemma that has remained unanswered since Socrates first 
grappled with the issue in the Meno some 2,500 years ago’ (Watkins, 2000: 
101). Social constructivism and behaviourism claim that knowledge is gained 
from the outside world, whereas individual constructivism and cognitivism 
maintain that knowledge is acquired from within an individual’s mind. Each 
approach advances one source of knowledge whilst denying the role of the 
other. This raises the question of how an individual gains knowledge from either 
an internal or external source (Marton and Booth, 1997). In each case a 
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significant source of knowledge is left unexamined. In the cases of Sinclair 
(1995) and Newman (2004), the respondents’ participation in social practices 
are advanced as the source of knowledge of accountability, whilst individual 
sources of knowledge of accountability are not considered. It can then be 
inferred that the world and individuals are two separate realities that are 
philosophically incapable of reunification (Watkins, 2000). The four approaches 
are summarized in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Summary of Four Approaches to Learning 
Approach Behaviourism Cognitivism Individual 
Constructivism 
Social 
Constructivism 
Location of 
knowledge. 
 
External to human 
mind. 
Internal to human 
mind. 
Internal to human mind. External to human 
mind. 
Meaning for the 
individual. 
Created through 
repeated 
association of a 
particular 
behavioural 
response with an 
external stimulus. 
 
Developed through 
the use of mental 
representations to 
make sense of 
unstructured 
phenomena. 
Constructed by individual 
through interaction with 
environment. 
Constructed by 
social groups and 
appropriated by the 
individual. 
Descriptions of 
knowledge. 
 
Behavioural 
responses. 
Mental 
representations 
(schema, rules, etc...). 
Individual constructions 
of the world. 
Social constructions 
of the world. 
Changes in 
knowledge by 
individuals. 
The result of 
environmental 
changes. 
The result of learning 
to apply a 
representation to 
similar or dissimilar 
phenomena. 
 
The result of changing 
individual needs. 
Due to the ongoing 
development of 
social practices. 
Differences in 
knowledge 
between 
individuals. 
Due to different 
reinforcement 
histories. 
Due to variations in 
the richness and 
complexity of mental 
representations.  
Due to different 
interpretations and 
different conceptual 
abilities. 
Attributed to 
differences in social 
practice. 
Ontological 
assumptions. 
Dualist ontology – 
person and world 
are distinct entities. 
 
Dualist ontology - 
person and world are 
distinct entities. 
Dualist ontology - person 
and world are distinct 
entities. 
Dualist ontology - 
person and world 
are distinct entities. 
Particular 
limitations. 
Individuals are 
passive uncritical 
respondents to 
stimuli. No 
conscious thought 
required, only 
conditioning. 
Source of 
representations is 
unclear. Means by 
which a particular 
representation 
selected is also 
unclear. 
Individual constructions 
cannot be shared 
between individuals.  
Understatement of 
individual meaning: 
focus on social 
meanings. 
Individuals respond 
to changes in social 
meaning uniformly. 
 
Accountability. Accountability for a 
number of projects 
before any 
meaning acquired 
by the individual. 
Individual SRO would 
require an existing 
model of project 
accountability to 
understand project 
accountability. 
 
Accountability takes on 
meaning through 
interaction of individual 
with social and physical 
aspects of accountability. 
Accountability is 
constructed by social 
groups involved with 
a project. SRO 
appropriates 
meanings.  
(Based on Watkins (2000)) 
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3.2 An Alternative Approach 
The limitations of the four approaches to learning about meaning, which I have 
outlined in the previous section, suggest that there is a need for an alternative 
approach. Such an approach would address the four limitations; it would adopt 
an experientialist perspective, have the ability to recognize variations in 
individual and collective understanding, be capable of revealing the dynamics of 
meaning change and adopt a singular view of the individual-world relationship. 
In this section I shall describe such an approach, known as phenomenography, 
review its philosophical foundations, discuss the relationship between 
phenomenography and phenomenology and review some of the criticisms of 
phenomenography. 
 
3.2.1 Phenomenography 
In etymological terms, phenomenography is derived from the Greek terms 
“phainemenon”, which means that which is manifest, and “graphein”, which 
means to describe in words or pictures (Pang, 2003). Phenomenography is an 
empirical research approach developed in the field of education research in 
Sweden in the 1970s. It is ‘the empirical study of the differing ways in which 
people experience, perceive, apprehend, understand or conceptualize various 
phenomena in, and aspects of, the world around them’ (Marton, 1994: 4425). In 
other words, phenomenographic research attempts to see the phenomenon of 
interest from the perspective of the respondent, what is known as a “second 
order” or experiential perspective (Ashworth and Lucas, 1998). The terms 
experience, conceptualize, perceive and understand together reflect the totality 
of this experiential perspective. As such, phenomenographic research does not 
differentiate between pre- and post-reflective thought. Also, it does not make 
statements about phenomena, but about people’s experience of phenomena 
(Marton, 1986). Therefore, it is aimed at the ‘description, analysis and 
understanding of experiences; that is, research which is directed towards 
experiential description’ (Marton, 1981: 180).  
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Early phenomenographic studies aimed to answer the question ‘Why are some 
people better at learning than others?’ (Marton, 1994: 4424). Researchers 
intended to study learning under the conditions that the student would find 
familiar, based on their prior educational experience, (Marton and Säljö, 1976). 
Students were asked on an individual basis to read a text from a textbook. 
When the task had been completed, the students were told that they would now 
discuss their understanding of the text with the researcher. These interviews 
sought to establish what the student had understood and how they had 
undertaken the task of learning about the text. The interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. Subsequent analysis of the transcripts revealed that ‘a limited 
number of distinctly different ways of understanding the text could be identified’ 
(Marton, 1994: 4424). These qualitatively different ways were then categorized 
according to distinct, significant characteristics that emerged from the data 
(Marton, 1986). A further piece of research identified five distinct conceptions of 
learning. These were i) the increase of knowledge; ii) memorizing; iii) acquisition 
of facts, methods, etc. for retention and practical use; iv) the abstraction of 
meaning and v) an interpretive process aimed at the understanding of reality 
(Saljo (1979) cited in Marton, Dall'Alba and Beaty, 1993). The finding, that an 
aspect of reality was understood in only a limited number of qualitatively 
different ways, has been found to be stable and consistent across a large 
number of studies, within and without of the original educational context 
(Marton, 1994).  
 
These qualitatively different ways of experiencing a phenomenon are known as 
conceptions. A conception can be defined as one of the different ways in which 
people experience or make sense of their world (Sandberg, 2000), or more 
precisely 
 
‘…the relation between man and an aspect of the surrounding 
world. It (the conception) is created by the activity of man. The 
activity implies a delimitation of, a differentiation within and a 
selection and organization of, meaning content of an aspect of the 
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experienced world’ (Svensson cited in Sandberg, 1997: 203). 
 
A conception is an aggregate of a group of individuals’ understandings of a 
phenomenon that have a common selection, organization and delimitation of 
meaning content of a phenomenon. Conceptions are the unit of description in 
phenomenographic research (Marton and Pong, 2005). 
 
Conceptions were found to have a logical relationship with each other (Marton, 
1994). Based on this logical relationship, conceptions can be arranged into a 
hierarchy of increasing complexity, in which ‘the different ways of experiencing 
the phenomenon in question can be defined as subsets of the component parts 
and relationships within more inclusive or complex ways of seeing the 
phenomenon’ (Marton and Booth, 1997: 125). Less complex conceptions can 
be seen as partial experiences of a phenomenon, whilst more complex 
conceptions ‘accord with the ability to discern and hold in awareness more parts 
or more ways of experiencing a phenomenon’ (Watkins, 2000: 103). 
 
This hierarchically ordered set of conceptions, in the educational context, is ‘an 
instrument for characterizing, in qualitative terms, how well learners succeed in 
their learning task’ (Marton, 1994: 4424). For instance, how matter is 
understood is crucial to how students understand chemical reactions 
(Renström, Andersson and Marton, 1990). Understanding the different ways in 
which students understand the principal phenomenon, principles and concepts 
in a knowledge domain is understood to be central to students’ mastery of that 
domain (Bowden, Dall'Alba, Martin, Laurillard, Marton, Masters, Ramsden, 
Stephanou and Walsh, 1992). Table 3-2 overleaf summarizes eight pieces of 
phenomenographic research on learning and research in the educational 
domain. It also demonstrates the stability of the finding that any aspect of reality 
is understood in only a relatively limited number of different ways and how 
richer, more complex conceptions represent more complex and, in educational 
terms, more complete understandings of a phenomenon. 
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Table 3-2: Examples of phenomenographic research on learning and research in education 
Study     Location and
context of 
study 
 Phenomenon
 
Sample
Size (N) 
Conceptions Hierarchical Relationship
Prosser and 
Millar (1989) 
Australia: Higher 
education 
Conceptions of 
tasks involving 
reducing velocity 
 
 
N=16 Conceptions of tasks involving 
reducing velocity were:- 
C1: An external frictional force 
opposite to the direction of 
motion 
C2: An inherent force in the 
direction of motion less than the 
frictional force opposite to the 
direction of motion 
C3: An inherent force in the 
direction of motion greater than 
the external frictional force 
opposite to the direction of 
motion. 
 
The conceptions form a hierarchy in 
relation to the understanding of 
Newtonian physics. Conception C1 is 
correct, conception C2 is partially 
correct and conception C3 is incorrect. 
Renström, 
Andersson and 
Marton (1990) 
Sweden: 
Secondary 
education 
Students’ 
conceptions of 
matter 
N=20 Conceptions of matter were:- 
C1: Matter as a homogeneous 
substance 
C2: Matter as substance units 
C3: Matter as substance units 
with small atoms 
C4: Matter as an aggregate of 
particles 
C5: Matter as particle units 
C6: Matter as systems of 
particles 
 
The conceptions form a hierarchy. In 
conception C1 matter is viewed as a 
substance; in conception C2 matter is 
viewed as a substance that may have 
more than one form; in conception C3 
small particles are introduced; in 
conception C4 infinitely divisible 
particles are introduced; in conception 
C5 these particles are not divisible 
and may have certain attributes; in 
conception C6 the substance consists 
of systems of particles. 
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Study Location and 
context of 
study 
 
Phenomenon Sample 
Size (N) 
Conceptions Hierarchical Relationship 
Samuelowicz 
and Bain (1992) 
UK and Australia: 
Higher education 
Conceptions of 
teaching held by 
university 
teachers 
N=13  Conceptions were:-
C1: Teaching as supporting 
student learning 
C2: Teaching as an activity 
aimed at changing students’ 
conceptions or understanding 
of the world 
C3: Teaching as facilitating 
understanding 
C4: Teaching as the 
transmission of knowledge and 
attitudes to knowledge within 
the framework of an academic 
discipline 
C5: Teaching as imparting 
information 
 
The conceptions form a hierarchy. 
This hierarchy ranges from student 
focussed (conceptions C1 and C2), to 
teacher focussed (conception C3) and 
to knowledge focussed (conceptions 
C4 and C5). 
Dall’Alba, 
Walsh, Bowden, 
Martin, Masters, 
Ramsden, 
Stephanou 
(1993) 
Australia: 
Secondary and 
Higher education 
Students’ 
conceptions of 
acceleration 
N=90 
(Secondary 
education: 
n=60; 
Higher 
education: 
n=30) 
Conceptions of acceleration 
were:- 
C1: Forces – acceleration due 
to gravity and acceleration of 
the ball 
C2: Differences in velocity 
C3: Acts as a force 
C4: Gravity is closely linked but 
not causally 
C5: Rate of change of velocity 
C6: Caused by gravity – rate of 
change of velocity 
 
 
The conceptions form a hierarchy, 
with conception C1 exhibiting the 
highest level of understanding. Levels 
of understanding reduce from 
conception C1 to conception C6 
successively. 
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Study Location and 
context of 
study 
 
Phenomenon Sample 
Size (N) 
Conceptions Hierarchical Relationship 
Marton, Dall’alba 
and Beaty 
(1993) 
UK: Higher 
education 
Students’ 
conceptions of 
learning 
N=29 Conceptions of learning were:- 
C1: Increasing one’s knowledge 
C2: Memorizing and 
reproducing 
C3: Applying 
C4: Understanding 
C5: Seeing something in a 
different way 
C6: Changing as a person 
 
The six conceptions form a hierarchy. 
Conceptions C1, C2 and C3 reflect 
quantitative, external aspects of 
learning, whilst conceptions C4, C5 
and C6 are qualitative and focus on 
internal aspects of learning. 
Boulton-Lewis, 
Marton, Lewis, 
Wilss (2000) 
Australia: Higher 
education 
Conceptions of 
formal and 
informal learning 
of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait 
Islander university 
students 
N=22 Conceptions of formal learning 
were:- 
C1: Acquisition of knowledge 
C2: Understanding 
C3: Personal growth 
 
Conceptions of informal 
learning were:- 
C1: Acquiring skills by 
observation and imitation 
C2: Acquiring cultural and 
social knowledge by 
transmission of information 
from family elders 
C3: Independently developing 
practical skills by active 
problems solving 
C4: Independently seeking 
information in areas of interest 
by finding appropriate 
resources 
These sets of conceptions form a 
hierarchy of increasing complexity and 
awareness of more parts of the 
phenomenon. In the conceptions of 
formal learning, the focus of the 
conceptions moves from memory and 
rehearsal (C1 and C2) to a more 
elaborative based focus (C3). In the 
conceptions of informal learning, the 
conceptions move from elder driven 
learning (C1 and C2) to increasingly 
independent forms of learning (C3 and 
C4).  
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Study Location and 
context of 
study 
 
Phenomenon Sample 
Size (N) 
Conceptions Hierarchical Relationship 
Boulton-Lewis, 
Smith, 
McCrindle, 
Burnett and 
Campbell (2001) 
Australia: 
Secondary 
education 
Secondary 
teachers’ 
conceptions of 
teaching and 
learning 
N=16 Conceptions of teaching were:- 
C1: Transmission of contents / 
skills 
C2: Development of skills / 
understanding 
C3: Facilitation of 
understanding 
C4: Transformation of student 
 
Conceptions of learning were:- 
C1: Acquisition and 
reproduction of content / skills 
C2: Development and 
application of skills / 
understanding 
C3: Development of 
understanding 
C4: Transformation of learners 
 
In each case the conceptions form a 
hierarchy. In the case of teaching the 
focus moves from a teacher / content 
focus (C1), to a teacher / student 
focus (C2), to a teacher / student 
interaction focus (C3) and ends with a 
student focus (C4). 
 
In the case of learning, the focus 
starts from a content focus (C1), to a 
competence focus (C2), to a meaning 
focus (C3) and ends with a growth 
focus (C4). 
Brew (2001) Australia: Higher 
education 
Research in 
higher education 
N=57   Researchers’ conceptions of
research were:- 
C1: domino 
C2: layer 
C3: trading 
C4: journey 
The four conceptions form a hierarchy, 
with C1 treating research as the 
synthesis of separate elements, C2 as 
a process of discovery, C3 as a social 
market for the exchange of products 
and C4 as a personal journey of 
discovery. 
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In phenomenographic research neither the conceptions nor the hierarchical 
relationship are developed from preconceived ideas, existing theories or extant 
research. The conceptions and the relationship between them are developed 
solely from the data. The basic intention of phenomenography is to identify and 
describe the individual conceptions, and the hierarchy of conceptions, with the 
greatest degree of fidelity to individuals’ experience of an aspect of reality 
(Sandberg, 1997). Therefore, phenomenographic research is a process of 
discovery that may reveal new and hitherto unrealized ways people understand, 
conceive and experience particular aspects of reality (Marton, 1986). 
 
From its roots in educational research, phenomenography has evolved into a 
research approach that aims to describe conceptions of the world around us 
(Marton, 1981). Its use has spread from the field of general education research 
to specific educational domains such as medicine, and to other fields such as 
human competence at work. Table 3-3 overleaf summarizes six pieces of 
phenomenographic research from a variety of fields on subjects other than 
learning and research. Table 3-3 also shows that the finding from the original 
field of education research, that any aspect of reality is understood in only a 
limited number of distinctly different ways, is consistent in other knowledge 
domains. 
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Table 3-3: Examples of phenomenographic research on subjects other than learning and research 
Study      Location and
context of study 
 
Phenomenon Sample
Size (N) 
Conceptions Hierarchical Relationship
Lundborg, 
Wahlström 
and Dall’Alba 
(1999) 
Sweden: Medical 
practice 
Asthma 
management 
N=20 GPs’ conceptions of asthma 
management were:- 
C1: Conveying information and 
instructions for the patient to follow 
C2: Informing and explaining so that 
the patient gains knowledge 
C3: Facilitating the patient’s 
understanding 
C4: Listening, giving advice for 
improved / maintained quality of life 
 
The four conceptions form a 
hierarchy. Conceptions C1, C2 
and C3 focus on the disease, 
whilst conception C4 shifts the 
focus to the patient. 
Sandberg 
(2000) 
Sweden: 
Manufacturing 
Engine 
optimization 
competence 
N=20 Engine optimizers’ conceptions of 
competence were:- 
C1: Optimizing separate qualities 
C2: Optimizing interacting qualities 
C3: Optimizing from the customer’s 
perspective 
 
The three conceptions form a 
hierarchy. Conception C1 is based 
on optimizing separate engine 
qualities. In conception C2 work is 
expanded so that it includes 
engine qualities and the 
relationships between them. In 
conception C3 the work is 
expanded further to include the 
relationship between the 
optimized engine and the 
customer.  
 
McMahon 
and Bruce 
(2002) 
Australasia: 
Development projects 
Conceptions of 
information 
literacy needs of 
local staff in 
development 
N=5  Conceptions were:-
C1: Basic literacy skills 
C2: Understanding workplace 
systems 
C3: Communication skills 
The conceptions form a hierarchy 
of increasing complexity and 
awareness of different aspects of 
the local worker trying to compete 
in the dominant system. 
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Study Location and 
context of study 
 
Phenomenon Sample 
Size (N) 
Conceptions Hierarchical Relationship 
projects C4: Accessing information sources 
C5: Understanding the dominant 
society 
 
Åkerlind and 
Kayrooz 
(2003) 
Australia: Social 
scientists 
Social scientists’ 
views of 
academic 
freedom 
N=165 Conceptions of academic freedom 
were:- 
C1: An absence of constraints on 
academics’ activities 
C2: An absence of constraints within 
certain self-regulated limits 
C3: An absence of constraints within 
certain externally-regulated limits 
C4: An absence of constraints 
combined with active institutional 
support 
C5: An absence of constraints 
combined with responsibilities on the 
part of the academic 
 
The conceptions form a hierarchy. 
Conception C1 is modified 
throughout the remainder of the 
hierarchy through controls 
(Conceptions C2 and C3) to 
support for academic freedom 
(Conception C4) and 
commensurate responsibilities on 
the part of the academic in 
conception C5. 
Partington, 
Pellegrinelli 
and Young 
(2005) 
UK: Multi industry 
(aerospace, software, 
pharmaceuticals, 
construction, financial 
services, 
telecommunications, 
public utilities) 
Programme 
management 
competence 
N=15 Programme managers’ conceptions of 
competence were:- 
C1: Delivery of programme scope 
C2: Wider organizational impact of 
the programme 
C3: Achievement of high-level 
programme outcomes 
C4: Development of strategic 
capabilities 
 
The conceptions form a hierarchy, 
with conception C1 focussed on 
the programme. Conception C2 
expands this to include a concern 
for the organizational impact of 
the programme. Conception C3 
expands this further to focus on 
the outcome of the programme, 
whilst conception C4 looks to the 
longer term development of the 
organization through the 
programme. 
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Study Location and 
context of study 
 
Phenomenon Sample 
Size (N) 
Conceptions Hierarchical Relationship 
Chen and 
Partington 
(2006) 
Three conceptual 
levels of construction 
project management 
work 
Project 
management 
competence 
N=30 C1: Project management as planning 
and controlling 
C2: Project management as 
organizing and co-ordinating 
C3: project management as predicting 
and managing potential problems 
 
The conceptions form a hierarchy. 
Conception C1 is focussed on 
construction work on site and 
subcontractors. Conception C2 
expands this to include the 
organization and co-ordination of 
the interfaces in construction 
work. Conception C3 expands this 
again to include the management 
and prediction of potential 
problems.  
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3.2.2 Philosophical Foundations 
Phenomenography is an empirical research approach. It is not derived from a 
system of philosophical theses and assumptions (Svensson, 1997). The 
conceptual structure of phenomenology can be used as a meta-language to 
describe aspects of phenomenography (Uljens, 1996). 
 
Phenomenography adopts a non-dualistic epistemology based on the 
fundamental assumption that both the person and the world are ‘inextricably 
linked through a person’s lived experience of the world’ (Sandberg, 2000: 11). 
In this epistemology, knowledge is neither internal nor external to the individual, 
but is constituted through an individual’s participation in situations in which the 
phenomenon is present. In these situations an individual has social and 
intellectual experiences of the phenomenon and therefore they experience the 
understandings of others as well as their own. As knowledge of a phenomenon 
is based on an individual’s understanding and experience of the phenomenon, 
learning occurs when an individual experiences and understands it in a way that 
is different from their previous experience and understanding. Differences in 
meaning between individuals are due to differences in awareness and 
experience of different aspects of the same phenomenon. Changes in meaning 
reflect changes in the content and structure of an individual’s life-world 
experience of a phenomenon. These changes can be seen as increasingly 
complex layers of experience (Watkins, 2000). Given this experiential 
emphasis, phenomenography is not concerned with making statements about 
the world (a first order perspective), but with making statements about the world 
as experienced by individuals – a second order perspective (Marton and Booth, 
1997). These statements are the object of phenomenographic research. 
 
However, the way in which one individual experiences a phenomenon does not 
constitute the entire phenomenon: it is only one small facet (Marton and Booth, 
1997). So whilst phenomenography takes as its point of departure an 
individual’s experience, it has been developed as ‘an approach for describing 
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qualitative variations in individuals’ experiences of their reality’ (Sandberg, 
1994: 47). It is possible to assume that there are an infinite number of variations 
of experiencing a phenomenon due to our ongoing experience of the world. 
However, our existence is bounded within a common set of social contexts and 
we are unable to be aware of all the possible ways of experiencing a 
phenomenon. This leads to a similar set of experiences of a phenomenon, so 
individuals in a given population can ‘be expected to share an experiential field 
of differentially constituted meanings’ (Watkins, 2000: 103), and thus any aspect 
of reality is discerned in only a limited number of qualitatively different ways 
(Marton, 1981). By virtue of phenomenography’s non-dualist epistemology, 
conceptions are functional entities, ‘they are the ways in which the individual 
may see or understand a phenomenon when actually engaged in seeing or 
understanding it’ (Marton, 1990: 613). A conception represents ‘the indissoluble 
relation between what is conceived (the conceived meaning of reality) and how 
it is conceived (the conceiving acts in which the conceived meaning appears) 
(Sandberg, 2000: 12).  
 
Conceptions are similar to the phenomenological notion of “life-world”, which is 
our existing, day to day world of experience and action that is always present 
(Uljens, 1996). In this life-world, we are bounded within our lived experience of 
the world and ‘because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002: xxii). Our life-world is created through the intentional 
nature of consciousness (Sandberg, 1994). This means that ‘human 
consciousness is always directed towards something other than itself’ (Uljens, 
1996: 106), for ‘we do not merely love, we love somebody; we do not merely 
learn, we learn something; we do not merely think, we think about something’ 
(Marton, 1986: 40). It is the intentional nature of consciousness that enables us 
to attain meaning of a phenomenon. Conceptions of accountability, as 
individuals’ life-world experiences of accountability, are therefore intentionally 
constituted. Given that individuals can only fulfil their accountability when they 
conceive their accountability with particular meaning, conceptions of 
accountability precede and form the basis for each of its aspects. So knowledge 
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of accountability presupposes a meaning for accountability that is ‘delimited, 
distinguished and organized’ (Sandberg, 1994: 53). This further implies that 
essential aspects of accountability, or attributes of accountability used by 
individuals in fulfilling their accountability, are also intentionally constituted 
through individual experience. So intentionality ‘characterizes the basic 
meaning structure of a conception in terms of a conceived meaning and a 
conceiving act’ (Sandberg, 1994: 53). Intentionality is then an a priori correlation 
rule (Ihde, 1986), as it correlates both meaning and act in a conception. So the 
meaning accountability has for an individual is correlated with the conceived 
act, i.e. the act in which the meaning of accountability appears. A conception 
will rarely appear in a single act, but will rather be constituted by a number of 
conceiving acts which form a meaningful whole.  
 
The acts and meanings that together form a conception take place within a 
boundary or horizon. This horizon represents the limit of conceived meaning: in 
a general sense it denotes the zone of human activity, but also a limit which 
cannot be reached, yet also frames the region within which man works 
(Sandberg, 1994). This horizon acts as the boundary within which all 
accountability meanings and actions take place. The hierarchy of conceptions 
can be viewed as a nested set of horizons, with the richer, more complex 
conceptions offering a more complete meaning of the phenomenon.  
 
3.2.3 Phenomenography and Phenomenology 
Phenomenography (a research approach) has been confused with 
phenomenology (a philosophy). Phenomenography does have a relationship 
with phenomenology through phenomenography’s roots in Gestalt psychology, 
which also has its origins in phenomenology (Uljens, 1996). Initially, 
phenomenographers thought that phenomenology offered a philosophical basis 
for phenomenography (Marton, 1986). A phenomenological approach to the 
problem of learning has been developed by some scholars, e.g. Giorgi (1999). It 
is worth briefly reviewing the characteristics of phenomenology in order to 
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distinguish it from phenomenography. 
 
Phenomenology is a philosophy and was initially developed by Husserl (2001). 
It aimed to ‘achieve pure understanding, liberated from the relativism of 
historical and social entanglements’ (Blaikie, 1993: 33) and is characterized by 
its focus on how objects and events appear to the consciousness of the 
beholder and is descriptive in nature (Giorgi, 1999). Phenomenological analysis 
aims to establish the relationship between acts, objects and meanings. 
Phenomenology can also be used to describe the essential features of 
phenomena, that is ‘that without which the phenomenon could not be what it is’ 
(Giorgi, 1999: 81). Husserl did not develop an approach to ‘phenomenological 
science’ (Giorgi, 1999: 80), but a philosophy. However, an approach based on 
phenomenological philosophy has been developed over many years. 
 
The phenomenological approach ‘seeks to obtain the essence of various lived 
experiences that are of psychological interest’ (Giorgi, 1999: 80). Variations in 
experience are seen as part of the process of improving the clarity of the 
essence of a phenomenon. To obtain this essence, that is, ‘the most invariant 
meaning for a specified context’ (Giorgi, 1999: 81), requires the analysis of 
descriptions obtained from others ‘from within the perspective of the 
phenomenological reduction which teases out the psychological essential 
meanings of the experiential descriptions through a process of free imaginative 
variation’ (Giorgi, 1990: 65). These descriptions are obtained from individual 
life-world experiences of the phenomenon, that is, the way the phenomenon is 
lived and experienced in the everyday world (Giorgi, 1990). These descriptions 
are then reduced in order to find the essence of the phenomenon. This 
reduction requires the bracketing off of the analyst’s own experience and 
knowledge of the phenomenon as far as it is possible. This does not require 
‘total conditionlessness’ (Giorgi, 1990: 80), but rather the ‘transcending of the 
many forces that modify subjectivity’ (Giorgi, 1990: 80).  
 
It is clear then that there are similarities and differences between a 
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phenomenological research approach and phenomenography. Both take an 
individual’s life-world experience of a phenomenon as the point of departure, 
acknowledge that there are different ways in which a phenomenon is 
understood and have a descriptive orientation (Giorgi, 1999). Both also use six 
further features: the intentionality of consciousness, the “bracketing off” of 
researcher preconceptions in the data collection and analysis stages, the 
concept of a distinguishable phenomenon, the correlation between the meaning 
object and the meaning act, the concept of a limiting horizon and the use of 
“data reduction” to achieve their respective research objectives (Uljens, 1996; 
Giorgi, 1999).  
 
However, there are four key differences. First, phenomenology aims to establish 
the psychological essence of a phenomenon, whereas phenomenography is 
focussed on the different ways of experiencing it (Marton and Booth, 1997). 
Second, phenomenology distinguishes between conceptual thought and pre-
reflective experience, whereas phenomenography does not (Barnard, 
McCosker and Gerber, 1999). Third, phenomenology adopts a first order 
perspective in which the world is described as it is, whereas phenomenography 
adopts a second order perspective in which the world is described as it is 
experienced. Fourth, phenomenological analysis leads to the identification of 
meaning units, whereas phenomenographic research results in the identification 
of a number of qualitatively different conceptions of the phenomenon (Barnard 
et al., 1999). So phenomenology, whilst similar to phenomenography in some 
respects, is distinctly different in others. I have summarized both the common 
areas and differences in Table 3-4 (overleaf). 
 
3.2.4 Criticism of phenomenography 
Phenomenographic research is not without its critics. These criticisms can be 
grouped into two broad types: theoretical and methodological. The theoretical 
criticisms are two-fold: first, that differences in conception can be attributed to 
variations in the interpretation of the researcher’s interview questions (Säljö, 
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1996), and second, that the development of a conception results in the loss of 
the individual’s voice in the research (Bowden, 2000). I shall answer these in 
turn.  
Table 3-4: A Comparison of Phenomenography and Phenomenology 
Common Areas 
• Concept of life-world 
• Intentionality of consciousness 
• “Bracketing off” of researcher preconceptions 
• A distinguishable phenomenon of interest 
• Correlation between the meaning object and the meaning act 
• A limiting horizon of meaning 
• The use of data reduction in the analysis phase 
• Descriptive in nature 
 
Areas of Difference 
Phenomenography 
• Aim: Establish qualitatively different 
ways of experiencing a phenomenon 
• Conceptual thought and pre-
reflective experience are not 
distinguished 
• Adopts a second order perspective 
• Results: Conceptions of 
phenomenon 
 
Phenomenology 
• Aim: Establish essence of a 
phenomenon 
• Conceptual thought and pre-reflective 
experience are distinguished 
• Adopts a first order perspective 
• Results: Identification of meaning 
units 
 
In relation to Säljö’s (1996) criticism, there are two points: first, 
phenomenographic research does not take place in a vacuum. Respondents 
agree to participate in research and therefore there is a prior notion of what the 
research interview will be about. From the researcher’s perspective, the focus is 
the phenomenon of interest and it is the respondent’s interpretations of this 
phenomenon in which the researcher is interested. 
 
Second, phenomenographic research seeks to establish the variation in the 
meaning of a phenomenon for a group of individuals. Therefore, variations in 
the interpretation of the researcher’s interview questions form part of the basis 
upon which phenomenographic research is conducted. In relation to the loss of 
an individual’s voice in the research (Bowden, 2000), ‘phenomenographic 
research aims to explore the range of meanings within a sample group, as a 
group, not the range of meanings for each individual within the group’ (Åkerlind, 
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2005: 323). Therefore, it is aimed at a collective level rather than the individual 
level of understanding. So these theoretical criticisms of phenomenography are 
based on a misunderstanding of the nature of phenomenography.  
 
The methodological criticisms are threefold. First, there are clear 
methodological requirements for the study of an individual’s life-world and it is 
not clear whether these have always been met by some phenomenographic 
research (Ashworth and Lucas, 1998; Ashworth and Lucas, 2000). Entry into a 
respondent’s life-world requires bracketing off, or the ‘setting aside of prior 
assumptions about the nature of the thing being studied’ (Ashworth and Lucas, 
1998: 418). This is not the Husserlian notion of the detachment of the 
consciousness (Husserl, 2001), but rather Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) notion of the 
intention to put to one side existing assumptions and theories in order to 
engage with lived experience. Ashworth and Lucas (1998) suggest that there 
are eight types of prior knowledge that require suspension. These are listed in 
Table 3-5.  
Table 3-5: Types of Prior Knowledge that Require Suspension in Phenomenographic 
Research (Based on Ashworth and Lucas (1998) 
Types of Prior Knowledge 
1. Theories or findings from earlier research 
2. Other ‘authoritative’ evidence 
3. The researcher’s own personal knowledge and beliefs 
4. Prior interpretive categories and hypotheses 
5. Any prior assumptions with regard to specific research methods 
6. Any assumptions on the ordering or prioritization of conceptions 
7. Questions as to the source or cause of particular conceptions 
8. Questions on the relationship between the conceptions and objectivity 
 
Some phenomenographic research has explicitly failed to bracket off previous 
research (Ashworth and Lucas, 1998). For example, Laurillard (1979) based her 
phenomenographic study of student learning on the results of earlier work 
carried out by Ference Marton (Ashworth and Lucas, 1998). More recently 
Alsop and Tompsett (2006) have questioned the relationship between a set of 
conceptions and their objectivity (Point 8, Table 3-5). The comparison of a set of 
conceptions and the notion of an objective reality is founded on a 
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misunderstanding of phenomenography. The misunderstanding is based on the 
assumption of an objective epistemology (Kvale, 1979), whereas 
phenomenography is based on a subjective epistemology. 
 
Second, phenomenographic research has also been criticized for a lack of 
transparency, particularly in relation to interview practice (the avoidance of 
leading questions, the bracketing off of researcher preconceptions) and in 
relation to the data analysis process (the bracketing off of researcher 
preconceptions, the lack of a clear audit trail in the process) (Francis, 1996). 
Further, Francis notes ‘that it is important to know more of the setting up of the 
interview, what sort of prompts were in fact used’ (Francis, 1996: 38) in 
interviews. In a similar vein, she also observes that ‘the point of making 
procedural and decision criteria as explicit as possible is that the reader of the 
research report will be able to judge on what grounds and in what sense they 
can accept that the final categorisation is the most satisfactory’ (Francis, 1996: 
44). 
 
Third, there is also a considerable degree of variation in practice amongst 
phenomenographic researchers, particularly in three key areas. These are the 
extent to which each transcript is considered in the analysis process, the 
process of analyzing a large amount of data and the development of a logically 
related set of conceptions (Åkerlind, 2005). 
 
In response to these methodological criticisms, a consensus is starting to 
emerge amongst scholars as to how phenomenographic research can be 
carried out (Ashworth and Lucas, 1998; Ashworth and Lucas, 2000; Bowden 
and Walsh, 2000; Åkerlind, 2002; Åkerlind, 2005; Bowden and Green, 2005). 
This consensus suggests that the methodological criticisms are being 
addressed by the research community. 
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3.3 The Selection of a Research Approach 
In Section 3.1 I reviewed four approaches that offered the possibility of learning 
about the meaning of accountability. These are behaviourism, cognitivism, 
individual constructivism and social constructivism. In Section 3.1.5 I presented 
four limitations that limit the ability of these four approaches to provide a 
comprehensive answer to the research question ‘What are individual SROs’ 
subjective understandings of their accountabilities?’ These limitations are 
summarized in Table 3-6. 
Table 3-6: Summary of Limitations of Four Approaches 
Advancement of one source of knowledge at the expense of the other 
Previous literature or researcher’s own ideas as source of unit descriptions of knowledge 
Limited ability to account for change in meaning 
Limited ability to explain inter-individual differences in meaning 
(Based on Watkins (2000)) 
 
Based on the limitations in Table 3-6 and the discussion of phenomenography 
in Section 3.2, it is worth considering how a phenomenographic approach to the 
research question would avoid these four limitations.  
 
First, phenomenographic research adopts a non-dualistic epistemology. It is 
based on the fundamental assumption that both the person and the world are 
‘inextricably related through a person’s lived experience of the world’ 
(Sandberg, 2000: 11). Individual knowledge of accountability is assumed to be 
gained through participation in situations in which accountability is present. 
Through this participation, SROs experience their own understandings of 
accountability (as proposed by cognitivists and individual constructivists) as well 
as the understandings of others (as proposed by behaviourists and social 
constructivists) (Watkins, 2000).  
 
Second, phenomenographic enquiry is not based on the researcher’s 
preconceived theories or notions developed from previous empirical research 
on accountability, but is aimed at the ‘description, analysis and understanding of 
experiences; that is, research which is directed towards experiential description’ 
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(Marton, 1981: 180). So the focus of phenomenographic research into 
accountability is an individual’s experience of accountability.  
 
Third, in relation to changes in meaning, phenomenographic enquiry posits that 
changes in the meaning of a phenomenon reflect, and are responsive to, 
changes in individuals’ life-worlds (Watkins, 2000). Changes in an individual’s 
life-world can be understood as layers of experience that reflect progressively 
more complex ways of experiencing the phenomenon. So changes in the 
meaning of accountability reflect the accumulation of successively more 
comprehensive experiences of accountability.  
 
Fourth, phenomenographic research does not attribute individual differences in 
the meaning of accountability to either social or individual factors. Instead, 
differences in meaning between individuals ‘correspond with changes in 
individuals’ ways of seeing the individual-world relationship’ (Watkins, 2000: 
103). So different conceptions of accountability are based on different individual 
experiences of accountability. 
 
Therefore, phenomenographic research into accountability enables the 
researcher to view SROs as the bearers of different experiences of 
accountability. Phenomenographic research into accountability would 
complement both the social constructivist’s and behaviourist’s concern with 
external sources of knowledge of accountability, and the individual 
constructivist’s and cognitivist’s interest in internal sources of knowledge of 
accountability. A phenomenographic approach would also distinguish and 
illustrate a limited number of experiences of accountability amongst a sample of 
SROs. These descriptions would illuminate the arrangement of meanings of 
accountability in varying patterns of temporal awareness and reveal how 
experiences of accountability could be ordered according to their complexity. All 
five approaches are summarized in Table 3-7. A phenomenographic approach 
to answering the question ‘What are individual SROs’ subjective understandings 
of their accountabilities?’ would avoid the drawbacks summarized in Table 3-6 
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and would give the researcher the opportunity to provide a more comprehensive 
answer to the research question. Therefore I have decided to adopt 
phenomenography as my research method. 
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Table 3-7: A Summary of Five Approaches to Individual Understanding. (Based on Watkins (2000)). 
Approach Behaviourism 
 
Cognitivism  Individual
Constructivism 
 
Social Constructivism Phenomenography 
Location of 
knowledge. 
 
External to human mind. Internal to human mind. Internal to human mind. External to human mind. Individual life-world. 
Meaning for the 
individual. 
Created through repeated 
association of a particular 
behavioural response with an 
external stimulus. 
 
Developed through the use of 
mental representations to 
make sense of unstructured 
phenomena. 
Constructed by individual 
through interaction with 
environment. 
Constructed by social groups 
and appropriated by the 
individual. 
Gained though participation in 
situations in which 
phenomenon is present. 
Descriptions of 
knowledge. 
 
Behavioural responses. Mental representations 
(schema, rules, etc...). 
Individual constructions of the 
world. 
Social constructions of the 
world. 
Meaning structure of lived 
experience. 
Changes in 
knowledge by 
individuals. 
The result of environmental 
changes. 
The result of learning to apply 
a representation to similar or 
dissimilar phenomena. 
 
The result of changing 
individual needs. 
Due to the ongoing 
development of social 
practices. 
Changes in the content and 
structure of life-world 
experience of a phenomenon. 
Differences in 
knowledge between 
individuals. 
Due to different reinforcement 
histories. 
Due to variations in the 
richness and complexity of 
mental representations.  
Due to different 
interpretations and different 
conceptual abilities. 
Attributed to differences in 
social practices. 
Due to differences in 
awareness and experience of 
different aspects of 
phenomena. 
 
Ontological 
assumptions. 
Dualist ontology – person and 
world are distinct entities. 
 
Dualist ontology - person and 
world are distinct entities. 
Dualist ontology - person and 
world are distinct entities. 
Dualist ontology - person and 
world are distinct entities. 
Non-dualist ontology – person 
and world are a single entity.  
Particular 
limitations. 
Individuals are passive 
uncritical respondents to 
stimuli. No conscious thought 
required, only conditioning. 
Source of representations is 
unclear. Means by which a 
particular representation 
selected is also unclear. 
Individual constructions 
cannot be shared between 
individuals.  
Understatement of individual 
meaning: focus on social 
meanings. Individuals 
respond to changes in social 
meaning uniformly. 
 
Limitations of accessing an 
individual’s life-world 
experience. Only their 
statements can be accessed.  
Accountability. Accountability for a number of 
projects before any meaning 
acquired by the individual. 
An SRO would require an 
existing model of project 
accountability to understand 
project accountability. 
Accountability takes on 
meaning through interaction 
of individual with social and 
physical aspects of 
accountability. 
Accountability is constructed 
by social groups involved with 
a project. SRO appropriates 
meanings.  
The meaning of accountability 
is created from the individual 
life-world experience of 
accountability. 
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3.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have reviewed four approaches to learning about meaning 
(behaviourism, cognitivism, individual constructivism and social constructivism) 
and established that these four approaches suffer from four limitations that limit 
their ability to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question. I have 
also reviewed an additional approach – phenomenography, an empirical 
research approach developed in the field of education research. I have traced 
the development of phenomenography, examined its relationship with 
phenomenology and reviewed the principal criticisms that have been made. In 
relation to the research question, phenomenographic research would focus on 
an individual’s experience of accountability and use a set of collective 
experiences of accountability as the basis for the generation of a group of 
different conceptions of accountability. This focus on experience, coupled with 
phenomenography’s non-dualistic epistemology, suggests that a 
phenomenographic approach would produce a more comprehensive 
understanding of how individuals understand accountability than the four 
approaches examined earlier.  
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Chapter Four: Method 
This chapter has five sections in which I describe my research design and my 
approach to data collection and analysis. In Section 4.1 I describe how I gained 
access to the sample. Section 4.2 consists of my pilot study, the interview 
process and the lessons I learned. I present the main study and the revised 
interview process in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 I describe my method of data 
analysis. The issues of reliability and validity are examined in Section 4.5.  
 
4.1 Sampling 
My intention was to obtain my sample from the population of SROs across 
central government (i.e. government departments and executive agencies, 
excluding non-departmental public bodies). I decided to seek volunteers from as 
wide a range of government departments and executive agencies as possible, 
so that the relationships uncovered in the data taken from a sample would be 
generalizable to the whole population (Johnson and Harris, 2002). This 
approach would also ‘stretch the diversity of the data as far as possible’ (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967: 61) and thus maximise the probability of achieving 
theoretical saturation. Previous phenomenographic research suggests that 
theoretical saturation is reached at a sample size of between 20 and 30 
(Alexandersson, 1994; Åkerlind, Bowden, and Green, 2005), after which no 
further conceptions emerge from the data. The target size of my sample was 30 
SROs. 
 
In order to recruit a sample appropriate to the target population, I used two 
criteria to select interviewees: 
• Respondents were to be from government departments and executive 
agencies only.  
• Respondents were formally appointed in the role of SRO and were 
carrying out the role at the time of interview. 
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4.2 Access 
I gained initial access to the SRO population via an employee of the Office of 
Government Commerce (OGC) who was attending a research meeting at 
Cranfield School of Management. The OGC is responsible for providing project 
management and procurement support to public sector organizations (Office of 
Government Commerce, 2006) and consequently has access to SROs across 
government. My request was circulated within OGC together with a set of 
ground rules I developed for the research interviews. These rules were:- 
 
• The interview would be conducted under the “Chatham House” rule (the 
interviewee could be quoted but not identified); 
• Only I would have access to the recording and the transcript; 
• I would make a return visit to the interviewee and share the results with 
them. 
 
The OGC provided me with the contact details of SROs in the House of 
Commons, Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Her 
Majesty’s Land Registry (HMLR), the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the 
Home Office. My contact at the OGC provided me with either the telephone 
number or email address of the SRO, together with a message saying that the 
SRO was expecting me to get in touch. I then contacted the SRO (although 
invariably I dealt with the SRO’s assistant or secretary first) and set up a 
suitable date and time for the interview. This was normally 5-6 weeks after first 
contact. I then sent a short email to the SRO reiterating the purpose of the 
research, the ground rules for the interview and confirming its time, date and 
location. 
 
Whilst I was dealing with the OGC, I was also able to establish that the nature 
of the relationship between the OGC as a central department of government, 
and other departments and agencies, was variable. As a result of this some 
departments and agencies were more willing than others to provide volunteers. 
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I decided that I needed to use other routes to gain access to my target 
population and used five other means to gain access. 
 
First, I was able to gain access to respondents in the Department for Education 
and Skills (DfES) and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) through 
my supervisor’s contacts in these departments. I got in touch with the individual 
concerned and sent them a short email setting out the purpose of the research, 
my request to interview a number of SROs in the department, the ground rules 
that applied to the interviews and my contact details. I was then sent the contact 
details of SROs in the respective departments. The contact routine for setting 
up an interview with a respondent was the same as I have set out previously.  
 
Second, I made use of Cranfield School of Management’s alumni database. I 
searched it for individuals who worked in departments and agencies where I 
had previously not been able to gain access. I emailed them to set out the 
purpose of my research, stating that I was looking for SROs to interview, the 
ground rules for the interview and the selection criteria. A reply email followed 
giving either names of individual SROs who had agreed to be interviewed or 
giving the name of another individual whom I should approach for access. It 
was through this approach that I was able to gain access to the Department of 
Health (DOH) and the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA). Again, the contact routine for setting up the interview with the SRO 
was repeated. 
 
Third, whilst I had access to one SRO in the Home Office via my OGC contact, I 
gained further access through the alumni as I have described above. However, I 
was asked to first meet with a senior manager and set out the benefits of the 
research to the Home Office, the confidentiality regime and provide evidence 
that I was a bona-fide student. I was able to provide satisfactory answers and 
shortly afterwards I was granted access to a further four Home Office SROs. 
 
Fourth, I gained access to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) through a member of 
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Cranfield’s staff. After a brief conversation on the purpose of my research, he 
wrote letters of introduction to two SROs in the department. I was then able to 
make contact with them. 
 
Fifth, I gained further access through what Arber (2001) describes as network or 
snowball sampling, where access is gained through personal recommendation 
of the interviewer to another member of the population of interest. This is 
normally used to obtain samples in numerically small groups or where group 
members are engaged in sensitive activities. Given that SROs typically occupy 
senior management positions in their organizations and the political sensitivity 
that surrounds many government projects, I was aware of a certain amount of 
scepticism surrounding my intentions. However, at the end of an interview I 
always asked if they were aware of any other SROs who would be willing to 
participate in the research. Most interviewees, having been interviewed, were 
willing to assist with further access to fellow SROs who worked in the same or 
other organizations in government. Using this approach I was able to gain 
additional access to SROs in the FCO, DEFRA, DfES and DOH. 
 
Despite the clarity of my selection criteria and my unstinting efforts to achieve 
them, some compromise was necessary. One SRO was from the House of 
Commons, the legislature, rather than the executive. Further, two of the DOH 
SROs were on secondment from Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) to the 
DOH for a particular project. These compromises were necessary given the 
difficulty in getting access and the time constraints of the PhD. 
 
In all, the final sample consisted of 30 SROs from 12 different departments and 
executive agencies. A summary of the sample is set out in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. 
In order to assure the anonymity of the respondents, I have only used the 
names of the parent departments, rather than those of the specific executive 
agencies and have not linked specific respondents to particular departments. 
 
 
 
108 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four                    Method 
 
Table 4-1: Sample Summary by Department 
Department Number of SROs in the sample 
DEFRA 2 
DfES 4 
DOH 3 
DWP 3 
ECGD 2 
FCO 3 
Home Office 5 
House of Commons 1 
HMRC 3 
HMLR 2 
NIO 1 
MOD 1 
TOTAL 30 
 
Table 4-2: Sample Demographic Data 
Respondent 
 
 
Age    (years) 
 
 
Educational 
Attainment 
 
Length of time 
in civil service 
(years) 
Length of time 
in senior civil 
service (years) 
R1 48 U 27 8 
R2 47 U 26 9 
R3 42 M 18 7 
R4 57 P 1 1 
R5 49 M 28 17 
R6 37 M * 3 
R7 59 A 41 19 
R8 61 U 37 4.5 
R9 44 M * 4 
R10 49 U 27 4 
R11 50 U 16 5 
R12 46 U 7 6 
R13 48 U 28 * 
R14 54 U 30 16.5 
R15 43 U 21 * 
R16 49 M 25 14 
R17 54 M 29 14 
R18 46 P 20 11 
R19 53 U 30 15 
R20 55 M 15 2 
R21 48 A 28 2 
R22 43 U 19 9 
R23 50 U 8 4 
R24 50 M 8 2.5 
R25 52 M 20 12 
R26 43 U 21 10 
R27 56 U 35 * 
R28 53 U 30 14 
R29 48 M 0.75 0.75 
R30 48 M 25 2 
Key: *  = Respondent did not provide the data; A = “A” levels; U = undergraduate degree;  
M = masters degree; P = doctorate 
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4.3 Data Collection 
The purpose of this section is to describe the design of the interview protocol 
and the pilot study and main data collection phases. In section 4.3.1 I describe 
the development of the initial interview protocol. I then conducted a pilot study 
which is depicted in Section 4.3.2. Section 4.3.3 sets out the main study phase 
of the fieldwork. 
 
4.3.1 The Interview Protocol 
The dominant method of collecting data in phenomenographic research is the 
research interview (Francis, 1996). The main aim of a phenomenographic 
interview is to encourage interviewees to reveal ‘through discussion, their ways 
of understanding a phenomenon, that is, to disclose their relationship to the 
phenomenon under consideration’ (Laurillard, 1979: 9). This emphasizes the 
importance of the interviewee’s experience of the phenomenon in question, 
rather than any preconceptions held by the interviewer. As a result, questions 
are open-ended ‘in order to let the subjects choose the dimensions of the 
question they want to answer’ (Marton, 1986: 42). In this type of interview, 
follow-up questions are used throughout the interview process to clarify 
meaning, improve the researcher’s understanding of what the interviewee has 
said and to seek examples from the interviewee’s experience of the 
phenomenon of interest. 
 
Empathy can also assist in engaging with the interviewee’s experience of the 
phenomenon of interest (Ashworth and Lucas, 2000). It ‘requires a detachment 
from the researcher’s life-world and an opening up to the life-world of the 
[interviewee]’ (Ashworth and Lucas, 2000: 299). It therefore assists in the 
process of bracketing off the interviewer’s preconceptions and focuses the 
interviewer on the world that is being described by the interviewee.  
 
I developed the preliminary interview protocol from ten sources. These were the 
guidelines set out by Ashworth and Lucas (1998; 2000), Äkerlind (2002; 2005), 
Bowden and Walsh (2000), Bowden and Green (2005) as well as a review of 
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phenomenographic research methods (Francis, 1996) and previous 
phenomenographic research (Bowden et al., 1992; Sandberg, 1994; Barnard et 
al., 1999). The preliminary interview protocol is set out in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3: Preliminary Pilot Study Interview Protocol 
• Personal Statement by the Interviewer 
• Interview Outline 
• Biographical Information 
– Age 
– Highest level of education 
– Time in Senior Civil Service (SCS)* 
– Current projects as SRO 
– Information: budget, technology, status 
 
• Primary Questions 
– What does your work as an SRO involve?  
– Based on this project and any previous experience as an SRO, what does 
accountability for this project mean to you? 
 
• Follow-up Questions 
– Can you give me an example? 
– What do you mean by that? 
– Please can you explain that further? 
* Created in 1996, The Senior Civil Service consists of all civil servants at Assistant Secretary 
(old Grade 5) or above and forms the senior management of a department or executive agency. 
 
The primary questions in the protocol were intended to elicit what the SRO 
conceived as their accountability, whilst the follow-up questions were meant to 
establish how they conceived it through examples drawn from their experience. 
My objective was to continue this dialectic process until no further progress 
could be made.  
 
The use of open-ended questions in the protocol and the emphasis on empathy 
with the interviewee reflect two key dimensions of phenomenographic 
interviewing: a confidence and an object dimension (Sandberg, 1994). The 
confidence dimension relates to the need for the researcher to develop and 
sustain a relationship with the interviewee (Sandberg, 1994). I considered this 
important, because it is ‘a prerequisite for maintaining an efficient object 
dimension’ (Sandberg, 1994 :81), as without it interviewees may not be willing 
to co-operate with the interviewer. I tried to build confidence in three ways. First, 
my previous experience of project management generally, and of project 
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management in government in particular, provided me with the opportunity to 
develop a sound social relationship with the interviewee early on in the interview 
process. I decided to initially establish the relationship by making a brief 
statement about my experience and background. This would establish my 
credentials in the field of project management. A copy of this statement can be 
found in Appendix A. Second, previous personal experience had taught me that 
the collection of the demographic data at the start of the interview was a 
relatively easy way of building up rapport. Third, outlining the structure of the 
interview would also help build a more confident relationship between the SRO 
and myself.  
 
The object dimension relates to the need to keep in focus the interviewee’s lived 
experience of the aspect of reality of interest (accountability) to the researcher 
(Sandberg, 1994). The key here was to give the interviewee the opportunity to 
talk about the project and its progress. Through this process I would then be 
able to identify situations where they as the SRO for a project were being 
accountable. This approach ensured that meaning would be grounded in the 
particular context of the project, as meaning is bound to the social context in 
which it takes place through “language games” (Wittgenstein, 2001). I could 
also challenge any less well grounded statements by asking for an example, 
which is reflected in the interview protocol (Table 4-2). This dialectic approach, 
taking social praxis as the starting point for the follow-up questions, would also 
enable me to assess the pragmatic validity of an SRO’s statements and my 
interpretation of them (Sandberg, 1994).  
 
Whilst these two dimensions are interrelated, they are reflected in different parts 
of the interview protocol: the confidence dimension is mainly reflected in the first 
part of the interview protocol and the object dimension in the second part. I shall 
now turn my attention to the pilot study, in which I used the protocol for the first 
time. 
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4.3.2 Pilot Study Fieldwork 
I tested the protocol by interviewing two SROs in June 2004. The course of 
events prior to each interview was as follows. When I received the contact 
details of each individual SRO from the OGC, I made contact by email or 
telephone according to the details with which I was provided. I contacted the 
SRO’s assistant or secretary, who usually disclaimed all knowledge of who I 
was and did not know the purpose of my request for an interview, but agreed to 
speak to the SRO. The SRO’s assistant usually contacted me again within 24 
hours. At this time I requested a one hour interview at a date and time to suit 
the SRO’s diary and made it clear that I would attend the SRO’s office for the 
purpose. The date was usually set some four to six weeks later. About a week 
before the interview, I sent a short email to the interviewee, setting out the 
purpose of the interview, the confidentiality regime and confirmation of the date, 
time and location. I also provided my mobile telephone number so that I could 
be contacted should the need arise for the date to be moved at short notice. In 
this week, I also visited the organization’s website and tried to find out what post 
the interviewee occupied, the main issues that the organization was dealing 
with at the time and also, if possible, the projects that were being undertaken. 
This background work gave me a useful insight into the interviewee’s 
organization and improved my ability to build confidence with the interviewee. 
 
On the day of the interview I allowed plenty of time for my journey and arrived at 
the location about one hour earlier than the agreed interview time. Once I had 
found the organization’s building, I then found a suitable place nearby to wait 
and focus my mind on the protocol and the interview ahead. This focussing also 
helped me to prepare to engage in ‘empathetic listening to hear the meanings, 
interpretations and understandings’ (Ashworth and Lucas, 2000: 302) of the 
statements to be made by the interviewee. I then returned to the location 
approximately ten minutes before the interview was due to allow time to get 
through security and arrive at the SRO’s office. I was usually escorted from 
reception to the location for the interview by a member of the SRO’s team. Each 
pilot interview took place in the SRO’s own private office.  
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The first interview took 31 minutes. I was escorted to the SRO’s office some ten 
minutes after the scheduled start time for the interview and after being 
introduced, the SRO told me that due to a problem with a project, he would 
have to terminate our discussion fifteen minutes earlier than the scheduled 
finish time. I then conducted the interview in line with the interview protocol 
(Table 4-2). Despite the limited time, I was able to cover the areas of interest 
that arose. The second interview did not suffer from any time constraints and 
took 40 minutes to complete.  
 
I then reviewed the interviews to see how the protocol worked in practice and to 
consider where I needed to further develop my interviewing skills. I found two 
areas where I needed to adapt my approach. The first was in the sheer volume 
of field notes I had taken. I had used these notes as an aide-mémoire in the 
course of the interview, so that I could refer back to points that the interviewee 
had made and seek clarification or practical examples. I decided that I would 
henceforth formalize these notes and chose to use parts of Richardson’s (2000) 
note format. These were Observation Notes (notes on the interview 
environment, the interviewee and points raised for further exploration in the 
interview) and Methodological Notes (notes on where I thought that I had 
deviated from the interview protocol or talked excessively). I deliberately 
decided not to write any Theoretical Notes during an interview in case I 
introduced concepts that were not part of the interviewee’s experience and 
would thus no longer “bracket off” personal preconceptions or ideas 
(Richardson, 1999; Ashworth and Lucas, 2000; Åkerlind, 2002). With regard to 
Richardson’s (2000) Personal Notes, I already kept a research journal in which I 
recorded these, so again I opted not to make notes of this type during an 
interview. 
 
The second area arose out of my review of these first two interviews. I 
assessed the interviews using Kvale’s interview quality criteria (Kvale, 1996) 
and found that I had followed the protocol and had let the interviewee speak at 
length. However, I needed to be more prepared to follow up in areas where I did 
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not fully understand what was being said, and seek further explanation and 
examples where necessary. These points were related to my confidence as a 
novice interviewer, rather than there being any fault with the protocol. I resolved 
that in future to bear in mind the need to check understanding and seek 
examples when necessary. To this end I wrote up this review of the first two 
interviews and included it with my copy of the interview protocol as an aide-
mémoire. A copy of the review can be found in Appendix B. 
 
On the basis of my review of these first two interviews, I decided to proceed 
with the pilot study and to use these first two interviews in the research, rather 
than dismissing them as interview practice. The pilot study consisted of a further 
eight interviews of SROs from six organizations and was conducted between 
June and November 2004. The aims of the pilot study were twofold: first, to test 
the methodology; second, to generate a set of results for use in the School’s 
second PhD review (the first being concerned with literature and the research 
question).  
 
An issue arose in the course of the pilot study. This was the loss of the 
recording of one interview, which was held in a small meeting area in the middle 
of an open-plan office. The noise generated from other individuals in this office 
area reduced the audibility of the interview to a point where I could not hear 
speech on the recording. Despite efforts to improve the quality of the recording, 
I lost that set of data. I also decided that I could not repeat the interview, for two 
reasons. First, it would damage my credibility as a researcher in the SRO 
population and, second, one of the ontological assumptions of 
phenomenography is that a respondent’s experience of a phenomenon is both 
time- and context-sensitive (Marton, 1981). There may have been differences in 
the respondent’s experience of accountability between the time of the initial 
research interview and at any repeat. As a result, I decided in future to ask in 
what type of room the interview was going to be held. If the answer was an 
open-plan office, I subsequently asked if the interview could be moved to a 
meeting room.  
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I also reviewed the quality of these later interviews again using Kvale’s quality 
criteria (Kvale, 1996) as the study progressed and by the sixth interview, I 
decided to incorporate a final question to close off the interview. This was, ‘Is 
there anything else you would like to say about your accountability?’ This is 
reflected in the final pilot study protocol (Table 4-4).  
Table 4-4: Final Pilot Study Interview Protocol 
• Personal Statement 
• Interview Outline 
• Biographical 
– Age 
– Highest level of education 
– Time in SCS 
– Current projects as SRO 
– Information: budget, technology, status 
 
• Primary Questions 
– What does your work as an SRO involve?  
– Based on this project and any previous experience as an SRO, what does 
accountability for this project mean to you? 
 
• Follow-up Questions 
– Can you give me an example? 
– What do you mean by that? 
– Please can you explain that further? 
– Is there anything else you would like to say about your accountability? 
 
4.3.3 Pilot Study Analysis 
My first step in the analysis process was to transcribe the interviews myself. I 
initiated the analysis by developing an open coding scheme (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) through the use of memos. I read the first two transcripts a couple 
of times to get a thorough understanding of what had been said. I then wrote a 
memo under each statement made by the interviewee, questioning what they 
had said about accountability. Using this method I was able to develop a 
preliminary set of attributes of accountability. However, I could not see any 
substantial difference in how these first two respondents conceived 
accountability. 
 
Next, I applied this approach to two more interview transcripts. However, 
different conceptions of accountability became more apparent from the data as I 
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analyzed more interviews. I then followed the ‘intentional analysis’ (Sandberg, 
1994: 85) approach, which seeks to interpret, in this case, what the SRO 
conceives as their accountability and how they conceive their accountability. 
Whilst this is an ongoing, iterative process, there are four distinguishable 
phases (based on Sandberg, 2000): 1) transcript familiarisation, 2) what an 
SRO conceives as their accountability, 3) how an SRO conceives their 
accountability, 4) the “collapse” of the what and the how an SRO conceives 
their accountability into a single description of the SRO’s conception of their 
accountability. As a result of my analysis, I was able to identify five different 
attributes of accountability at three different levels of conception. These are set 
out in Table 4-5. I presented these results at a research conference (Lupson, 
2005).  
Table 4-5: Pilot Study Results 
 Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception Subject Principal(s) Fulfilment Time Horizon Consequences 
 What the 
SRO 
understands 
they are 
accountable 
for. 
 
To whom the 
SRO 
understands 
they are 
accountable. 
  
How the SRO 
understands 
they fulfil their 
accountability. 
When the SRO 
understands 
they will be 
held to 
account. 
What the SRO 
understands to 
be the 
consequences 
of being held to 
account. 
 
3 The delivery 
of a benefit 
to or 
outcome for 
the public. 
 
Themselves 
and fellow 
professionals. 
 
Advocacy, 
criticism and 
being the 
driving force. 
 
When the 
outcomes or 
benefits are 
apparent. 
 
Personal 
achievement or 
personal failure. 
 
 
2 An aspect of 
their 
department 
 
 
The public, 
official review 
bodies (NAO, 
PAC) and 
stakeholders 
external to 
own 
organization. 
 
Questioning, 
influencing 
and 
negotiation. 
 
Potentially: if 
failure is 
apparent. 
 
 
Damage to an 
aspect of the 
department. 
 
1 Project 
targets and 
project 
management 
 
Individuals 
and groups 
within own 
department. 
 
As co-
ordination and 
reporting. 
 
During the 
implementation 
of the project. 
Loss of job, 
personal 
reputation and / 
or bonus: 
damage to 
future career.  
 
 
 
 
117 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four                    Method 
 
These findings are limited by the small size of the sample (ten). Previous 
phenomenographic research suggests that theoretical saturation occurs at a 
sample size of around 20 (Sandberg, 2000). I would need to carry out further 
investigation in order to refine and fully develop these results. Nevertheless, the 
pilot results suggest the existence of a number of different attributes of 
accountability and three different conceptions of accountability, although these 
are not particularly robust. These results and my more practiced approach to 
conducting phenomenographic interviews provided me with a sound foundation 
for the main study ahead. 
 
4.4 Main Study 
In this section I describe the main study which I carried out between April 2005 
and March 2006. I continued to use the interview protocol I had developed in 
the pilot study. However, early on in the main study interviews with two SROs 
resulted in my making changes to the tried and tested pilot study protocol. First, 
one of the SROs I interviewed was not a member of the Senior Civil Service 
(SCS). I was surprised by this, as previous interviewees had all been in the 
SCS. The OGC guidance is clear that an SRO ‘must have enough seniority and 
authority to provide leadership to the programme team and take on 
accountability for delivery’ (Office of Government Commerce, 2003: 19), which 
would suggest that the SRO should be a senior civil servant. As a result, I 
revised my interview protocol to cover this point (see Table 4-6 overleaf). 
 
The second issue related to recording. In the pilot study I had kept the matter of 
recording the interview deliberately low-key. After my personal statement I 
sought the respondent’s permission to record the interview. This was normally 
given without any further comment. However, one respondent in the main study 
refused to be recorded under any circumstances. Given that I did not want to 
damage future prospects for access within that organization, I carried out the 
interview regardless. I have not included it in my data as my notes did not 
capture the full richness and complexity of this respondent’s answers. Given 
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this course of events, I modified my approach. When I sent the initial email 
asking for an interview, accompanying the information on the purpose of the 
interview and the confidentiality regime, I now incorporated a request to record 
the interview for future transcription. A copy can be found in Appendix C. I also 
reminded the respondent that I would need to record the interview in the 
confirmatory email I sent a week or so before the interview. On the day of the 
interview itself, I again sought verbal permission. After this change in approach, 
I had no further problems with recording interviews. 
Table 4-6: Final Main Study Interview Protocol 
• Personal Statement 
• Interview Outline 
• Biographical 
– Age 
– Highest level of education 
– Time in the Civil Service 
– Time in the SCS 
– Current projects as SRO 
– Information: budget, technology, status 
 
• Primary Questions 
– What does your work as an SRO involve?  
– Based on this project and any previous experience as an SRO, what does 
accountability for this project mean to you? 
 
• Follow-up Questions 
– Can you give me an example? 
– What do you mean by that? 
– Please can you explain that further? 
– Is there anything else you would like to say about your accountability? 
 
In the main study I interviewed a further 26 respondents from nine 
organizations. I discarded data from six interviews for two reasons: first, as I 
have already stated, one respondent refused to be recorded and second, five 
respondents did not meet the criteria I had laid down. This gave me a final 
sample size of 30 (Table 4-7). 
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Table 4-7: Summary of Interviews Conducted 
Stage Respondents Contribution to the research
Pilot Study 12 Respondents 
(Data from two interviews was 
discarded, one due to 
recording problems, one 
respondent was not an SRO) 
10 interviews 
Main Study 26 Respondents 
(Data from six interviews was 
discarded: one respondent 
refused to be recorded, five 
respondents did not meet the 
sample criteria) 
20 interviews 
Total for the study 38 Respondents 30 interviews 
 
4.5 Analysis 
In this section I set out how I analysed the data from the main study. I detail the 
interview transcription process in Section 4.5.1. In Section 4.5.2 I present how I 
analyzed the data.  
4.5.1 Interview Transcription 
I first transcribed the interviews. Whilst I attempted to do this immediately after 
each interview, I found that inevitably some time elapsed between an interview 
and the completion of the transcript. I transcribed each interview in five stages. 
First of all I generated a face-sheet (Lofland and Lofland, 1984), that set out the 
interview number, the name of the respondent, the date of the interview, and 
information about the respondent’s organization as well as the demographic 
information I collected (see Table 4-5). Second, I played back the recording of 
the interview at a slow speed and typed the words into the computer. I then 
played back the interview with a printed copy of the transcript in front of me, 
making corrections by hand. Occasionally I found that I had inserted phrases 
into the transcript that the interviewee had not used. When I had completed this 
process, I corrected the transcript on the computer. To complete the process, I 
played the recording back again and checked the transcript for any remaining 
errors. The transcript was then complete. It took approximately 12 hours to 
transcribe each interview using this process. 
 
 
120 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four                    Method 
 
I found this process useful as I became familiar with the data. This 
familiarization had three distinct advantages. First, I often highlighted particular 
phrases that stood out in a transcript for later reference. Second, on occasions 
theoretical insights occurred to me that I subsequently noted down in my 
research journal. Third, I found that it enabled me to continue to reflect on my 
performance as an interviewer and to improve my interview technique, a point 
made by Ashworth and Lucas (2000) in their guidelines for the conduct of 
phenomenographic research. 
 
4.5.2 Analysis 
I then started to analyze the transcripts. I pursued the ‘intentional analysis’ 
(Sandberg, 1994 :85) approach that I used in the latter stages of the pilot study. 
This is an iterative process in which there are four distinguishable phases 
(based on Sandberg, 2000). I have set these out in the following four 
paragraphs. Whilst the theoretical process is linear, clear and precise, in 
practice it was highly iterative and disordered as I restarted the analysis 
whenever I added new transcripts, or picked up the analysis at a convenient 
point from where I had halted the previous day. 
 
First, I read each transcript a few times in order to understand each SRO’s 
conception generally. I then grouped each transcript according to this general 
conception. As a result I had four preliminary groups of conceptions, albeit 
these were very imprecise and unclear at this stage. These conceptions had a 
project, organizational, public and personal focus respectively. With regard to 
the data I had gathered from the pilot study, I analyzed the transcripts again 
rather than reusing my existing analysis. I considered that there was a risk that 
the pilot study analysis might not contain all the conceptions or attributes and 
that I might have neglected some aspect of accountability because of the small 
sample size. 
 
I then systematically searched the transcripts for statements about what the 
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SRO conceived as their accountability focussing not only on the statements 
themselves, but also the meaning of each statement in the context that it was 
made. I noted down on the face sheet of each transcript what conception was 
expressed in that particular interview and regrouped the transcripts accordingly. 
I compared conceptions across transcripts, first within each group and then 
between groups. This resulted in some movement between the groups as I 
improved the definition of each conception. 
 
At this point I shifted my focus from what the SRO conceived as their 
accountability to how the SRO conceived their accountability. How statements 
are based on acts, so I systematically searched each transcript for statements 
about how SROs delimited and organized accountability. To do this I marked 
each statement with a different coloured highlighter according to its subject 
matter. This search resulted in five different attributes of accountability (see 
Chapter 5). I then organized the statements by attribute by cutting and pasting 
them into a table complete with the surrounding text which gave meaning to the 
statement. I re-organized the table according to the four conceptions and then 
attempted to produce a preliminary definition of the attributes. At the end of this 
process I first compared the statements in each conception with each other, first 
within each attribute and then between attributes. This produced some 
movement between the different conceptions and attributes. I then compared 
the statements for each attribute across the four conceptions. This also resulted 
in some movement between the different conceptions and attributes. 
 
I then re-read the transcripts, attempting to focus simultaneously on what and 
how each SRO conceived their accountability. This did not change the 
groupings, but further refined and stabilised the definition of the conceptions 
and attributes. I compared the various statements that I had grouped in each 
attribute within a conception with each other and then compared them with 
statements for the same attribute in other conceptions. I found that the table 
made this task easier, as it was some 70 pages long compared with the 
transcripts, which amounted to over 750 pages. I was able to improve the clarity 
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and definition of the conceptions and attributes by repeating this final stage of 
the process a number of times. As a result of this process, whilst there were no 
changes in the numbers of respondents in each conception, I did make small 
changes to the definitions of both the attributes and conceptions. I continued 
this process until the definitions of the attributes and the conceptions were 
stable and consistent with the data.  
 
My final step was to review the results against Marton and Booth’s (1997) three 
criteria for judging the quality of the results of phenomenographic research. 
These are:- 
• Each conception reveals a distinct aspect of how a phenomenon is 
understood; 
• The conceptions are related in a logical manner, usually in the form a 
hierarchy of nested relationships; 
• The variations in experience in the data are represented in as few 
conceptions as possible – i.e. the conceptions were parsimonious. 
 
The use of these criteria did not result in any changes to the results. 
 
4.6 Data Validity and Reliability  
A key indicator of the quality of qualitative research is its credibility. This can be 
developed further into questions around validity and reliability (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, and Lowe, 2002). The meaning of these words depends on the 
epistemological and ontological position of the research. As already set out in 
Chapter 3, I have adopted a phenomenographic approach which is based on 
the fundamental assumption that an individual and the world are ‘inextricably 
related through a person’s lived experience of the world’ (Sandberg, 2000 :14). I 
have adopted an approach to the questions of validity and reliability consistent 
with this assumption. These questions are dealt with in the next two sections. 
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4.6.1 Validity 
Validity is a ‘“limit question” in research, one that repeatedly resurfaces, one 
that can neither be avoided nor resolved’ (Lather, 1993 :674), but nevertheless 
must be tackled. In social science, validity has often been based on ‘a 
correspondence theory of truth within the context of positivist epistemological 
assumptions’ (Kvale, 1995: 22). In such research validity is defined as ‘ a term 
to describe a measurement instrument or test that accurately measures what it 
is supposed to measure’ (Vogt, 1999: 301). Most common validity criteria in the 
social science field have been uncritically adopted from psychometric research 
(e.g. concurrent, predictive, logical, content and construct validity) (Kvale, 
1979). Psychometric research is part of the science of psychological 
assessment (Rust, 2004). It uses measures of either knowledge or personality 
to establish human abilities and characteristics normally in the context of 
employment through the use of constructs. The measurement of constructs 
suggests that psychometric testing has an objective view of knowledge and this 
is not an appropriate approach in interpretive research. 
 
Other validity strategies include various forms of triangulation (e.g. data 
triangulation, investigator triangulation and methodological triangulation) (Flick, 
1992). These normally require further data sources, multiple investigators and 
multiple methods respectively. However, triangulation results in the subject 
under study becoming ‘necessarily objectivated’ (Flick, 1992: 179). Therefore, 
again it is not an appropriate approach in interpretive research. 
 
Sandberg (2005) describes three different forms of validity and a number of 
different actions that a researcher can take in pursuit of achieving validity in 
interpretive research. These are summarized in Table 4-8 (overleaf). 
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Table 4-8: Summary of Three Interpretive Approaches to Validity (Based on Sandberg, 
2005) 
Form of Validity Supporting Action 
Communicative Validity • Form a community of interpretation 
• Treat the interview as a dialogue 
• Develop coherent interpretations 
• Discussion of results 
Pragmatic Validity • Use of examples 
• Observe interviewee reaction to 
interpretation 
• Engage in participant observation 
• Develop implications for practice 
Transgressive Validity • Search for contradictions and 
differences 
 
Communicative Validity 
Communicative validity entails ‘testing the validity of knowledge claims in a 
dialogue’ (Kvale, 1996: 244). Sandberg (2005) sets out four different means of 
achieving communicative validity (Table 4-8). I shall address each of these in 
turn. In the fieldwork phase I established a community of interpretation (Apel, 
1972) in two ways: first, at the start of each interview, by setting out my 
experience in project management both generally and within the public sector, 
thus establishing some common ground; second, from first contact, through my 
subsequent confirmatory emails and at the start of the interview, I reminded 
each respondent that my purpose was to discuss their experience of 
accountability in the role of SRO. This engagement at the start of the interview 
developed a basis for mutual understanding, for as Sandberg notes, ‘the 
production of valid knowledge claims presupposes an understanding between 
researcher and research participants about what they are doing’ (Sandberg, 
2005 : 54). 
 
Kvale observes that ‘valid knowledge is constituted when conflicting knowledge 
claims are argued in a dialogue’ (Kvale, 1996: 244). I conducted the interviews 
as a dialogue, using questions to gain access to the respondents’ experiences 
of accountability, listening carefully to the responses and using follow-up 
questions to improve my understanding. This dialectic approach ‘conveys an 
openness toward the research object’ (Sandberg, 2005: 55). I used two primary 
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questions to encourage respondents to describe and identify what they 
conceived as their accountabilities (Table 4-5). I dialectically used three follow 
up questions to help improve my understanding of the respondents’ ways of 
conceiving accountability (Table 4-5). This small number of questions enabled 
me to stay focussed on the respondents’ experiences of accountability and thus 
achieve high levels of communicative validity. 
 
Communicative validity can also be achieved by striving for coherent 
interpretations in the analysis phase. This is based on the idea of the 
hermeneutic circle, which seeks to achieve coherence such that ‘the parts of a 
text fit in with the whole and the whole must fit the parts’ (Sandberg, 2005: 55). 
This is particularly apposite as ‘communication is a dialogical relationship [in 
which] the hermeneutic circle assumes a community of meaning shared by the 
speaker (or author) and the hearer (or reader)’ (Blaikie, 1993: 29). In this case, I 
sought to create a community of meaning between myself, as the researcher, 
and the transcript. In the analysis phase, I strove to make interpretations of 
respondents’ statements that were consistent with both the interview transcript 
as a whole and with the context in which the statement had been made. I also 
sought coherence when I grouped the SROs transcripts according to 
conceptual level, and again when I compared transcripts both within and 
between conceptions.  
 
Communicative validity can also be achieved through discussion of the results 
with fellow researchers and relevant professionals. I have shared the results of 
the pilot study with other researchers in the field of accountability (Lupson, 
2005) and as such this is one source of communicative validity (Åkerlind, 2002). 
I have also agreed to share the results with the respondents on an individual 
basis (as the quid pro quo for participation) and with the OGC, although these 
events have not been arranged at the time of writing. I have deliberately not 
sought to check the results with respondents prior to completion. Åkerlind 
(2002) notes that phenomenographic research has been criticized for not using 
this means of ensuring communicative validity. There are three reasons why it 
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is not appropriate. First, the results are developed from a group of 
understandings, not those of any one individual, and as such the classification 
of a particular interview cannot be seen outside the context of the entire set. 
Second, whilst the respondent may be explicit about the research subject at the 
time of the interview, the interviewer’s interpretation of the transcript may go 
beyond that and reveal hitherto implicit meanings with which the respondent 
may disagree. Third, one of the ontological assumptions of phenomenography 
is that a respondent’s experience of a phenomenon is both time and context 
sensitive. There may be differences in a respondent’s experience of a 
phenomenon between the time of a research interview and any review of the 
analysis of the interview. A review of the interview analysis by the respondent 
may again result in disagreements in the light of new experience.  
 
Pragmatic Validity 
Pragmatic validity is concerned both with the usefulness of the research 
outcomes (Åkerlind, 2002) and with the capture of knowledge in action 
(Sandberg, 1994). It goes further than communicative validity as it is based on 
actions rather than words, and as such ‘it represents a stronger knowledge 
claim than agreement through a dialogue’ (Kvale, 1996: 248). Seeking 
pragmatic validity also focuses on practical knowledge, rather than what Argyris 
and Schön (1996) have described as “espoused theories”. Sandberg (2005) 
describes four methods of achieving pragmatic validity: seeking responses from 
a respondent’s experience; the misrepresentation of a respondent’s statement; 
observation of participants in situations where the phenomenon of interest was 
present and the use of the results of the research in practice. 
 
Pragmatic validity can be achieved through the use of follow-up questions that 
seek to place a respondent’s statement in a concrete situation. In the fieldwork I 
sought to ground the interviewees’ replies in their experience by stating in my 
outline of the interview process that I would like them to provide examples from 
their experience, and when a statement was not supported by an example, I 
used the follow-up question ‘Can you give me an example of that? For 
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example:- 
 
A: The fact is that the programme is a partnership, that’s what’s in its 
name, managing information across partners so there is an expectation 
by the partners that the Department will actually drive this forward. They 
have committed time to it, we are committing time to it, so there is 
accountability to them to actually deliver too. 
 
Q: Can you give me a concrete example of where that’s happened, 
based on your experience?  
 
A: Well, it’s happening in the programme. 
 
Q: Can you give me an example where this has happened? 
 
A: I think about an example like [Person A], he’s the Chief Executive of 
[An Agency] and he has committed an awful lot of time to the 
programme, he comes to the Programme Boards, he goes to quite a 
few Project Boards, he actually since last year when we reconfigured 
and consolidated our work and actually set up a piece of work called 
Common Data Definitions. He’s actually led that as a project. So these 
organizations have given a huge amount of their time to actually make 
this happen and they’re driving it forward. So the Department and 
myself, as SRO for the programme, needs to recognise that and 
celebrate that and also say well, you doing that is putting me under 
even more account to actually make sure this happens, because we’re 
sharing the load and we can’t just waste people’s time and effort, so we 
must take it forward.  
 
Pragmatic validity can also be achieved though the misrepresentation of a 
statement made by a respondent. In the fieldwork phase I occasionally 
paraphrased what I understood to be the meaning of a statement. Interviewees 
usually responded quickly to this and clarified or confirmed the meaning of the 
statements I had paraphrased. For example:- 
 
Q: So taking the views of others into account? Those others? 
 
A: Do you mean do I take them all into account to the same degree? 
 
Q: No. But as a summary phrase, to sort of put a bracket round it, would 
that be a fair description of what you're doing? 
 
A: No, I don't think it is actually, I don't think it is.  
 
 
Sandberg (2005) also notes that pragmatic validity can be achieved through 
 
128 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four                    Method 
 
observation of the respondents in situations where the phenomenon of interest 
is present. However, the sensitive nature of many government projects and the 
seniority required for the SRO role meant that it was highly improbable that I 
would be granted permission to sit in on meetings with ministers or with senior 
management groups in an SRO’s organization. Also, the SRO role is usually 
taken on in conjunction with a senior role in the SRO’s organization, such as 
Director of Finance. I thought that it was most unlikely that if I engaged in 
observation I would be present when a discussion relevant to their SRO role 
occurred. I therefore decided not to attempt to carry out observation.  
 
Pragmatic validation can also be achieved through the use of the results in 
practice. This is ‘a particularly pertinent validity check for phenomenographic 
research’ (Åkerlind, 2005: 14). To this end I have discussed the practical 
implications of the work with a senior civil servant. I also set out the implications 
for practice and outlined my recommendations for future research in Chapter 7. 
I have also made the pilot study findings available to both researchers and 
practitioners through a presentation at a conference (see Lupson, 2005). 
Further conference papers and journal articles are planned. I have also agreed 
to share the overall findings with the OGC and the Home Office, with the 
intention of assisting in the future selection and development of SROs.   
 
Transgressive Validity 
Sandberg (2005) notes that both communicative and pragmatic validity ‘tend to 
encourage the researcher to search primarily for consistent and unequivocal 
interpretations of lived experience’ (Sandberg, 2005: 57). The aim of achieving 
transgressive validity forces the researcher to address ambiguous and complex 
data and become aware of their own perspectives.  
 
One way to achieve transgressive validity is not to search for coherence in lived 
experience, but rather to look for contradictions and differences. To achieve 
this, at points in the analysis where I grouped or re-grouped the transcripts (see 
Section 4.5.2), I intentionally searched for contradictions and differences in the 
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transcripts. After I had initially grouped them according to conception, I 
examined the transcripts in each group, looking for data that did not fit or was 
not coherent with my interpretation of that particular conception. This process 
helped me to improve the clarity and definition of each conception, as it resulted 
in either the move of a transcript from one conception to another or the 
redefinition of an attribute or conception. 
 
Together, these three forms of validity have different strengths and weaknesses 
that complement and correct each other. These are summarized in Table 4-9.  
 
Table 4-9: Summary of Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of Three Interpretive 
Approaches to Validity (Based on Sandberg, 2005) 
Validity Strength Weakness 
Communicative • Focus on meaning 
coherence 
• Does not deal with 
action based data 
• Cannot deal with 
contradictory data 
 
Pragmatic • Focus on action 
based data 
• Cannot deal with 
contradictory data 
 
Transgressive • Focus on 
contradictory data 
• Cannot deal with 
meaning coherence 
 
 
4.6.2 Reliability 
Reliability in social sciences is often defined as replicability of results 
(Sandberg, 1994). This definition can be subdivided into either the replication of 
the conceptions (e.g. a coder reliability check or dialogic reliability check) or an 
interjudge reliability check (Åkerlind, 2002). This definition is derived from ‘a 
positivist approach to research that attempts to study an objective reality’ 
(Åkerlind, 2005: 329). This approach to reliability is inappropriate for two 
reasons. First, it focuses on what the researcher has done, rather than ‘the 
extent to which the categories of description are faithful to the individuals’ 
conceptions of reality’ (Sandberg, 1997: 206). Second, it is based on an 
objective epistemology, where reality is external to and separate from the 
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individual. It attempts to establish ‘the extent to which the categories of 
description are stable and correspond accurately to the objective reality under 
investigation’ (Sandberg, 1997: 207). As I have noted in Chapter 3, I have 
adopted an interpretive epistemology in this research in which both the person 
and the world are ‘inextricably related through a person’s lived experience of the 
world’ (Sandberg, 2000: 11). In summary, ‘reliability of results relating to 
objective reality falls outside the domain of interest’ (Sandberg, 1997: 209). 
Instead, consistent with the interpretive approach and non-dualistic ontology I 
have adopted in this research, I shall adopt “reliability as interpretive 
awareness” (Sandberg, 1997; Sandberg, 2000; Sandberg, 2005).  
 
“Reliability as interpretive awareness” means ‘acknowledging that researchers 
cannot escape from their own interpretations but must explicitly deal with them 
throughout the research process’ (Sandberg, 2000: 14). One approach to this is 
phenomenological reduction, in which the researcher withholds their 
preconceived ideas, theories and prejudices in the course of the research 
(Ashworth and Lucas, 2000). Sandberg (1997; 2005) defines five steps that can 
be used to achieve phenomenological reduction. These steps, together with the 
supporting practical actions that I took in the course of the research, are 
summarized in Table 4-10 (overleaf). I attempted to follow these steps 
throughout my research and I shall deal in turn with each of these five steps and 
the practical actions I took. 
 
In order to be attentive to the complexities and variations in the respondents 
lived experience of accountability I did two things. First, prior to each interview I 
arrived early so that I could focus my mind on the forthcoming task. I found that 
this helped me concentrate on listening carefully to what the respondent said. 
Second, in the interviews I tried to listen intently to what the respondent said 
and to take note of all aspects of their experience. I then followed up these lines 
of enquiry so that I could understand the subtleties and nuances of their 
experience of accountability. 
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Table 4-10: Summary of Five Steps of “Reliability as Interpretive Awareness” using 
Phenomenological Reduction (Based on Sandberg, 1997, 2005) 
Step Action 
Researcher orientation to the 
phenomenon and how it appears in the 
research process 
• Being attentive and open minded to the 
complexities and variations of lived 
experience 
 
Researcher orientation towards 
description of the phenomenon 
 
• Use of “how” and “what” questions 
Horizontalization in data collection and 
analysis 
• Treating all aspects of lived experience 
equally 
 
Search for structural features • Repeated testing of interpretations 
against data until stability is achieved 
 
Use of intentionality as a correlational rule • Identification of what the individuals 
experience as reality 
• Identification of how individuals 
experience reality 
• Integration of how individuals experience 
reality with what individuals experience as 
reality 
 
 
In order to focus on describing accountability, I made extensive use of “how” 
and “what” questions, as I have set out in the interview protocol (Table 4-5). I 
found that this tended to focus the respondents on describing in detail what 
accountability meant to them. I also found that my focus on descriptions of lived 
experience of accountability helped me to analyze the data. I checked the 
various conceptions I developed from the data during the analysis by repeatedly 
asking myself “What does the data say?” or “Is this supported by the data?” 
This approach helped me to suspend any theoretical perspectives I had 
become aware of in the course of the research. 
 
I strove to achieve horizontalization in three ways. First, in the interviews I tried 
to treat all respondent statements as equally important. I was concerned that 
there was some subtle aspect of the respondents lived experience of 
accountability that I might miss, so I made extensive use of the follow-up 
questions to obtain practical examples and clarify my own understanding. 
Second, in the analysis phase I tried to give equal weight to all statements 
made by the respondents. Third, in relation to the four conceptions, I initially 
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made no assumptions about whether one conception was “higher” than another, 
but rather treated them equally.  
 
I searched for structural features in the data in two ways. First, when I 
developed a preliminary interpretation of the data, I compared the interpretation 
with the data and adopted it accordingly. This process refined the definition of 
the attributes and the conceptions (see Chapter 5). Second, having developed 
the various conceptions, I then established how these formed a hierarchy 
through a comparison of the conceptions with the interview data.  
 
A conception’s fundamental structure is the intentional correlation between what 
the SROs conceived as accountability and how they conceived it (Sandberg, 
1994). I used intentionality as a correlational rule throughout the analysis phase. 
First, I read each transcript a few times (typically around four) to get a sound 
grasp of the SROs’ understanding of accountability. As I have previously set out 
in Section 4.5.2, I then systematically searched the transcripts for what each 
SRO understood as accountability, and then repeated the exercise by 
systematically searching for how each SRO understood accountability. I 
repeated the exercise, trying to focus simultaneously on what and how each 
SRO understood accountability. I then transcribed and analyzed the transcripts.  
 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have set out the basis for my selection of the role of the SRO as 
a means to study individual accountability. The sample was drawn from as wide 
a range of central government departments and their executive agencies as 
was feasible, given limitations on access. I have set out the basis upon which 
my sample was selected, my research design and the various practical issues 
that occurred as I conducted the field work. I have described the analysis of the 
data I undertook, both in the pilot and main studies, in order to achieve logically 
related, parsimonious and stable conceptions. Finally, I have discussed the 
concepts of validity and reliability as they apply to interpretive research and 
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have set out the measures I took to achieve both validity and reliability in the 
research. In Chapter 5 I describe the results of my research. 
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Chapter Five: Results 
In this chapter I set out in five sections the results of the research. In the 
Section 5.1 I illustrate each of the four conceptions of accountability. Sections 
5.2 and 5.3 respectively describe the structure of accountability in each of the 
conceptions and the hierarchical relationship between these conceptions. 
Possible sources of variation in the conceptions of accountability are examined 
in Section 5.4. The findings are summarized in Section 5.5.  
 
5.1 Four Conceptions of Accountability 
Based on my analysis of the interview transcripts, accountability was conceived 
in four qualitatively different ways. Each civil servant interviewed conceived 
accountability in one or more of these different ways. The four conceptions are 
summarized in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: Four Conceptions of Accountability 
Conception Description 
Conception C1 Intra-organizational accountability 
Conception C2 Inter-organizational accountability 
Conception C3 Public accountability 
Conception C4 Individual responsibility 
 
The respondents organized and delimited their accountabilities in terms of five 
common attributes. These are presented in Table 5-2 (overleaf). These 
attributes were common to each conception but therein took on different 
meanings. Figure 5-1 (overleaf) illustrates the relationship between five notional 
attributes and a notional conception, which is labelled CX. This labelling 
scheme is used in the next four sub-sections, in which I describe the four 
conceptions, outline their principal features and illustrate the meaning of the five 
attributes within each one and their different principal foci. 
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Table 5-2: Five Attributes of Accountability 
Attribute Description 
To whom To whom the SRO understands they are accountable 
Subject For what the SRO understands they are accountable 
Fulfilment How the SRO understands they fulfil their accountability 
Timeframe When the SRO understands they will be accountable 
Consequences What the SRO understands to be the consequences of being held to 
account 
 
Figure 5-1: General Attribute / Conception Relationship 
CONCEPTION
ATTRIBUTE CX A1
CX
CX A1 CX A5CX A4CX A3CX A2
 
 
5.1.1 Conception C1: Intra-Organizational Accountability  
The defining characteristic of this conception is its focus on accountability for 
the SRO’s project within the boundaries of their own agency or department. The 
attributes of this conception are elaborated below, with examples of typical 
statements drawn from the data. The relationship between the attributes and 
conception C1 is presented in Figure 5-2. Further data examples can be found 
in Appendix D. 
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Figure 5-2: Conception C1: Attribute / Conception Relationship 
CONCEPTION
ATTRIBUTE CX A1
C1
C1 A1 C1 A5C1 A4C1 A3C1 A2
 
 
Attribute C1A1: To whom the SRO understands they are accountable  
SROs understood that they were accountable to their superiors, various 
management groups and ministers within their own organization. To whom the 
SRO was accountable was not expressed in singular terms. SROs understood 
that they were accountable to more than one principal within their organization. 
For example:- 
 
I am answerable to the board and to ministers, who I have dealt with a 
fair amount on this project… R2 
 
As an SRO I am responsible to ensure that I can account to our 
ministers and to our perm sec, and through them, or directly to, 
ministers. R3 
 
So I think that’s where the accountability, I mean ultimately it’s to the 
management board and permanent secretary… R24 
 
I have to be clear who, within my organization at official level, 
particularly accounting officers and who within my organization at 
ministerial level, I am reporting to and engaging with on the progress of 
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discharging that programme that I’ve been tasked to lead its delivery of. 
So it’s about an accountability chain that inevitably links both the 
political factors around big programmes and they’ve all got big risks 
obviously, these two certainly have, and the formal sort of “Have we 
spent the money wisely?” to the accounting officer bit. R26 
 
Attribute C1A2: For what the SRO understands they are accountable 
SROs understood they were accountable for four different aspects of the 
project. These were meeting targets associated with the project (such as the 
budget, project completion dates and system performance targets), the 
provision of information, ensuring the project had adequate resources and 
delivering the project. Meeting project targets was sometimes expressed in very 
specific terms:- 
 
I mean, this system I’ve got at the moment has still got some 
performance problems. Now, I’ve got a performance target that I know 
how many milli-seconds each transaction is supposed to take, and that 
is very hard-edged and I will know myself and my team will know, 
whether or not we’ve succeeded. R2 
 
…the performance metrics on that are very much linked to achieving 
specific milestones at specific times. R10 
 
So I think you know I do feel accountable and responsible for bringing in 
this project on time and on budget - absolutely. R12 
 
I am accountable to the Group Investment Board for delivering within 
the envelope that they have set me. I’m accountable to my line manager 
for delivering the outcomes and managing within the budget, and 
headcount and other requirements. R27 
 
These performance targets were also incorporated into personal performance 
plans, against which an individual was appraised:- 
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So my own performance targets, are to basically develop and deploy 
the [system] solution to our 50 pilot users and get a positive result from 
the evaluation at the end of that to say they basically like the solution, 
it’s, that is the thing on which I will be judged. R9 
 
These targets were, however, not always achieved:- 
 
…one of my targets was actually to bring [the project target] off last 
December, which we missed… R14 
 
The provision of information is the second part of this attribute:- 
 
I'm responsible for regular reporting of all of these things. I'm 
responsible for myself and other people knowing how far we’ve got, 
what resource we’re hitting, how we’re managing them. I'm responsible 
for ensuring that our ministers are up to speed and when they have their 
monthly stock-takes on policy, their monthly stock-takes on 
implementation, we have the messages that don't hide anything, that 
actually sort of prioritize and explain what we’ve got up to and what we 
haven't got up to. R3 
 
Making sure that the project is properly organized is the third part of this 
attribute:- 
 
…so I’m responsible for negotiating the resources both in staffing, 
headcount terms and in money terms, making sure that we’ve got the 
right enablers in terms of decent HR or IT or legal advice, or actuaries 
or whatever, you can get that stuff, so I’m responsible for getting our 
house in order. I’m responsible for the good management of my team 
so that I’ve got appropriate level leaders and team size, that they work 
in a physical environment which is decent and conducive to work, that 
they know how to get the access to the training and the skills, and the 
mentoring and anything else that they need R3 
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This aspect is ongoing throughout the project lifecycle:- 
 
I have always felt accountable to the team for helping to clear the way 
or for explaining to them why the way can’t be cleared. And it might be 
because of bigger priorities than what they are doing at that point in 
time. But I’m also accountable for ensuring that they got that kind of 
service from the person who isn’t usually, not always, but from the 
senior person involved in the project. R17 
 
The fourth part of this attribute relates to the delivery of the project. SROs 
understood they were accountable for the delivery of the project:- 
 
I’m there to make sure that the programme is going in the right direction 
and will fulfil its deliverables and meet its objectives. R21 
 
It means I’m responsible for getting it delivered. R25 
 
Attribute C1A3: How the SRO understands they fulfil their accountability 
SROs understood that they fulfilled their accountability in two ways. First, 
through reporting to their superiors within the organization and second, by 
working with their superiors and other senior managers within their own 
organization to ensure support for the project. For example:- 
 
On programme [name] I saw ministers every week for two years. I 
brought them up to date with the progress, covered the hot spots, 
listened…heard what they were thinking about it, what the political 
dimensions were, what they thought would be happening on the floor of 
Parliament, handling that. On the others, the smaller ones, the less 
sensitive ones, I tend to go perhaps every couple of months, and we will 
try and find an hour which is quite a long time with a minister, try and 
find an hour when I would get the team to explain where we are and 
how it is going and we will try to get in advance most of the questions. 
R17 
 
 
140 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five                    Results 
 
Well, I see him [the overall programme SRO] over a period of two days 
every month at something that they call a ‘top team’ meeting, which is 
him and his [project name] directors for all parts of [the department] and 
all of the [departmental agency] chief execs. R20 
 
So, we have a lot of reporting responsibilities in terms of fairly detailed 
monthly reports to the permanent secretary and to various other forums. 
R24 
 
At particular times in the project life cycle, these reports can become more ad-
hoc and personal in nature:- 
 
And [the minister] had me in, twice I think, because he had been very 
badly burnt by ICT projects in [a previous department] and broadly he 
said to me, well, you know, I want to know is this going to work, 
because I’m not going to agree to it going live unless you can persuade 
me. R2 
 
Working with other senior managers and ministers within the organization to 
ensure their support for the project is the second part of this attribute:- 
 
…so managing outwards into the senior stakeholder community, 
managing upwards to the very top of the shop to make sure you’ve got 
the, if you like, the, as complete a buy-in as we can, keeping the seniors 
abridged of what’s going on, and drawing from them – if I need it – 
whether it’s championing the cause at the board level, which obviously 
people like the second permanent secretary and the [senior manager] 
do from time to time on my behalf, but also accounting to the, for 
example the [named management] group and to the board how we’re 
getting on… R10 
 
…we’d pulled together all the findings, developed a proposal and went 
and sold it round this building and in London, to ministers, signed up 
lots of people to it, signed up our stakeholders to it and had a proposal 
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that we could actually take forward. R21 
 
There’s an influencing, decision makers, key influencing the decision 
makers responsibility around the SRO, whatever it is, you need to 
explain, it’s not that difficult to do because most ministers have either 
been singed when something went seriously wrong and they do not 
want to be in charge of the next project that fails, the next big IT cock-up 
so that’s good, they’ve been educated by that experience and you can 
put the fear of God into them to some extent. R22 
 
Attribute C1A4: When the SRO understands they are accountable 
Within this conception, the timeframe for being accountable was conceived as 
being within the project lifecycle. For example:- 
 
I just put my business case together and it went to the change board 
last week. And I said to [the permanent secretary] on the telephone, 
“What is it you want me to do, do you want a presentation or what?”, 
and he said, “About 20 minutes, have you got it together now?” And I 
said, “Pretty well. Let’s talk about it then.” “Alright, well send it all into 
me, and then come in a couple of days afterwards.” So I thought, “Half 
an hour”. He actually gave me an hour and a half… R4 
 
I mean, when it comes to the [monthly] board I am required to brief the 
board on where the programme’s at, what the issues are, what the 
challenges are and they quiz me on what we are doing about it and in 
some cases how they could help. R10 
 
I have to give a monthly report to the department – to the overall senior 
responsible owner, [name]. R20 
 
…you have whatever reporting arrangements you have in place. There 
are a number in the [department name], which culminate in the report, 
which goes monthly from each major report to the Group Executive 
Board in which I, as SRO, have to sign off what I believe the status of 
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my project to be. R27 
 
Attribute C1A5: What the SRO understands to be the consequences of 
being accountable 
SROs conceived the consequences of being accountable in five ways: first, as a 
reduction in their financial rewards; second, as a difficult session with their 
senior manager; third, as damage to their career prospects; fourth, as damage 
to their own reputation within their own organization and fifth, as the loss of their 
job. For example in relation to a reduction in financial rewards:- 
 
It probably would have led to some loss of bonus I suppose, but frankly, 
bonuses are so small around here that’s not really a significant factor in 
our thinking, I don’t think. R2 
 
I am the Senior Responsible Officer both for the policy and delivery of 
these things. It’s in my work, job description, it’s the basis upon which 
my performance is appraised and my reward determined. It matters in 
quite practical terms, therefore, that I am successful at what I do. It 
matters because I’ve got a husband and 5 children to feed, you know, 
that sort of thing. R3 
 
I mean, it’s also linked to my reward basis as well. R5 
 
Practically, it means that written into my personal objectives is a 
successful outcome for both of those two projects as specific objectives. 
Now, that means that I’m appraised against those set of objectives and 
my pay and overall reporting, sorry, overall performance marking is 
based on how I do in achieving those objectives amongst the others, 
the others that I have. So that’s what it means at a practical, at a 
practical level. R9 
 
Second, the consequences of being accountable were also understood as a 
difficult meeting with senior management:- 
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I would be hauled over the coals, I suppose, by the Accounting Officer 
for failing to live up to my responsibilities in this area. R6 
 
You often have a budgetary responsibility because, in the end, there’s 
this much for solving this problem, and again the project manager has 
day to day responsibility for that, quite often the money nonetheless is 
coming out of your budget at a higher level, and therefore, someone will 
want to know why you’ve used up more of your budget than you’d 
planned to, and therefore the opportunity cost that you haven’t got that 
money to spend on something else, so you have got a properly rigorous 
conversation to have with somebody more senior about why that 
project, for which you’re the SRO, either hasn’t happened on time, or 
ended up causing a problem or cost a lot more money that it should 
have done. R18 
 
…life is made pretty uncomfortable, probably quite rightly, if you do 
something and it goes wrong, and you are culpable for what goes 
wrong… R23 
 
Third, some individuals also thought that career opportunities might be limited if 
the project went wrong:- 
 
…that if I don’t deliver project [name] adequately, then I have failed and 
that I should carry a penalty. Now, whether that penalty is in terms of 
career whatever the opposite of advancement is, retrogression…. R2 
 
I think the worst that would happen to me is that I wouldn’t be asked to 
take on SRO roles in future and as I’m not being offered any at the 
moment it’s no real hardship… R15 
 
In practice what does my accountability mean? Almost the worst that 
could happen is “You’re the wrong person to be doing this, we don’t 
want you to be SRO any more, off you go to run our pay service in 
Bootle” or something career developmental of that sort. R25 
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Fourth, SROs were also concerned about the impact of the project on their own 
reputation:- 
 
I personally would have taken it very badly because one of the things 
which matters most in the civil service, in my experience, is your 
reputation, that's what you have in the civil service after 25 years. That’s 
all you’ve got is your reputation, for either being somebody who can get 
things done and make them work, or somebody who is, you know, a bit 
sloppy and lets the catches slip. It would have hurt me personally in 
terms of how I regard my position within the organisation and, I think, 
how my colleagues see me, if this thing had been a complete Horlicks 
and I’d rolled it out and caused people an immense amount of trouble 
and then would have had to pull it. So there is accountability in that 
sense. R2 
 
I feel accountable to the chairman, success or failure there would have 
a significant impact on my status... not my status but my reputation, my 
future prospects and all those sorts of things. R16 
 
Fifth, other individuals also understood that they would lose their jobs:- 
 
What does it mean to me is I get sacked if we don’t deliver, that’s what it 
feels like. R10 
 
I think in the end it does mean that if either the thing goes down in 
flames or it takes a little bit longer that it should have done for no good 
reason, you are in the firing line because your job is to make sure that 
the project manager is good enough and is getting there and has the 
support, whether that’s in resource terms or because the interactions 
have been sorted and the supporting people are in place to do it, so in a 
sense you’re quite clear, you’ve failed in ensuring that the project 
manager has the expertise, or the support or whatever to keep the show 
on the road. R18 
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In reality, if they say “Jump,” I jump. My career prospects are very much 
led by my relationship with that team, and also if we’re not delivering in 
[the project], ministers will get involved and I will come under 
considerable pressure to deliver or do the other thing. R20 
What’s the other thing? (Interviewer) 
Well, go! R20 
 
If you mean, do I get the sack for it, well, it would have to be fairly 
extreme before I got the sack. R23 
 
This, however, does not always happen when the project goes awry:- 
 
So I put it up, notified it [the project status] as a red, justified, you know, 
what, why I was marking it as red and waited for the sun, you know for 
the roof to fall in and the thunder clouds to clap and all this kind of stuff. 
Not a sausage, not a sausage. R13 
 
5.1.2 Conception C2: Inter-Organizational Accountability 
Civil servants who expressed this conception organized and delimited their 
accountability more widely than in conception C1. Accountability in this 
conception is conceived at an organizational level across, but also within, the 
boundaries of government. Civil servants who expressed this conception also 
expressed conception C1, intra-organizational accountability (see Appendix D). 
The relationship between the attributes and conception C2 is presented in 
Figure 5.3 (overleaf). The attributes remain unchanged but have 
correspondingly different foci. These are elaborated below. 
 
Attribute C2A1: To whom the SRO understands they are accountable  
At this level of conception SROs understood that they were accountable to two 
further distinct groups of organizations: first, to organizations external to their 
own but within the boundaries of government; and second, to Parliament and its 
supporting organizations. For example:- 
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Figure 5-3: Conception C2: Attribute / Conception Relationship 
CONCEPTION
ATTRIBUTE CX A1
C2
C2 A1 C2 A5C2 A4C2 A3C2 A2
 
 
I think it’s if you look at other government departments, you know we 
have a relationship with [another department], that’s the clearest one 
there...and there is an accountability there… R5 
 
Also in dealing with the [another department] in the sense of managing 
their expectations on occasion, or being warned that potentially we are 
not going to get a green light from [another department], we are going 
to get an amber, because we haven’t got certain elements of the project 
quite right. R6 
 
The other important part is the representation, that’s something that’s 
very big in any area but particularly in this one, where our stakeholders 
are many and various, I mean this is not just [my department] talking to 
[other departments], this is [my department] talking to [department 1], 
[department 2], the [external] agency. R22 
 
In this case, probably, it’s mainly the [department] family, i.e. 
[department] policy, and the [executive] delivery agencies that respond. 
R23 
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SROs also understood they were accountable to central government 
organizations. For example:- 
 
Well, the most important stakeholders are our ministers and Treasury, 
Treasury being a sense, the shareholder in a corporate analogy, they 
have the power of life and death in that sense… so yes, you feel 
accountable to these people, you feel, you know, if I don’t deliver my 
piece of this jigsaw, lots of other people are going to be pretty 
disgruntled about that. R12 
 
I found there the way, what was helpful was there was talk to Treasury 
first, you know, get Treasury on our side and then ventilate it internally 
in the office, and once the Treasury was on our side it was much easier 
in the office because, basically in [my department] the service is 
provided… R14 
 
I feel accountable to them [OGC] as a police person. They are the 
police, I mean the joke, well it is not a joke, it is the old cliché. You know 
the OGC, anybody at the centre, the Cabinet Office, they’re here to 
help, oh yeah, actually they are not here to help. R16 
 
I feel accountable in some respects to the Cabinet Office/OGC/central 
government because the degree of central government, Cabinet Office 
sort of process… R22 
 
Parliament and the organizations that support the Parliamentary audit and 
accountability processes are the second part of this attribute at this level of 
conception:- 
 
I take the National Audit Office seriously. I think that they do try and 
arrive at good and clear judgements. R2 
 
He [the permanent secretary] said, and that's the key thing about this, 
and by the way, just to make sure you really understand all this, there is 
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a Parliamentary Accounts Committee, and your organization is named 
and your modernization programme which you’ve just closed down, so 
you will be a witness with me. R4 
 
Significant amounts of public money were involved, questions in 
Parliament, emergency debates, Public Accounts Committee and it had 
to get the select committee very rapidly involved and the senior 
responsible officer of the time, the accounting officer, the permanent 
secretary, very, very unhappy indeed about the pretty tough time at the 
Accounts Committee where the first question was, ‘So, [accounting 
officer name], are you going to resign?’ R18 
 
Attribute C2A2: For what the SRO understands they are accountable  
At this level of conception an SRO conceived that they were accountable for 
two different aspects of their organization: its reputation and the benefits to the 
organization of the project. SROs conceived that they were accountable for the 
reputation of the organization. For example:- 
 
There is an accountability there [to the National Audit Office] in terms of 
the reputation of the department, which is important to me. I've worked 
here for a long time and the way in which the department is profiled 
publicly matters to me and it matters to my colleagues, and I would feel 
I've let the organization down if I ran a project which then was so awful 
that the National Audit Office, quite rightly, came in and ripped it to 
shreds. I would feel we'd let ourselves down. R2 
 
I mean, reputational risk is not only important in a personal context, it’s 
to everybody. It’s very important in the context of these big visibility 
programmes to the reputation of the enterprise, and I think that is 
something that you’re aware of becoming increasingly sensitive to with 
these big change programmes, because it’s not just the department’s 
reputation, it’s the reputation of the, of what that contributes to the 
reputation of the public sector as a whole. R9 
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…this department has a reputation with the Treasury of being a 
competent place, and not because the more they think we know what 
we’re doing, the less they bother us. R18 
 
…the fact is that if I make a mess of it, then that reflects back on the 
department. R21 
 
Reputation is crucial … [the department] has not had a great deal of 
confidence in its own ability to deliver projects, and it was extremely 
important to us that we delivered this project on time and on budget, 
because it showed that the [the department] could do that. What we 
actually did was to deliver our project on time, on budget. R27 
 
Organizational benefits were conceived as new organizational configurations 
and improved administrative efficiency and effectiveness. For example:- 
 
So these all are activities which are designed to make us into a slightly 
different shaped organization, but where there are quite a lot of linkages 
and dependencies. R1 
 
…we’re going with the pilot training fund. By definition I have some 
accountability for that decision, some responsibility to make sure it 
happens. R12 
 
That I have all things delegated to me that the permanent secretary has 
on his shoulders, but just for this agency, which is about financial 
efficiency, probity and all those sorts of things. R4 
 
…it’s also that the products that they deliver at the end of the day 
deliver the business benefits that we are taking forward and they may 
be efficiencies within the operating business. R5 
 
[The project] is substantially about the ‘virtual’ environment. It’s about 
the way that we manage and handle information, it’s about efficiency 
with which we do that, it’s about our ability to move to electronic working 
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properly, as against just, sort of, word processing. It’s about improving 
the efficiency in our ability to deliver the [the department’s] objectives 
and it’s also about ensuring that we are able to meet our government 
objectives for freedom of information and for the handling of information 
more generally. R27 
 
Attribute C2A3: How the SRO understands they fulfil their accountability 
For this attribute at this level of conception SROs understood that they fulfilled 
their accountability in four ways: first, by questioning the continuing relevance of 
the project to the organization; second, by actively raising the profile of the 
project externally; third, by engaging with the stakeholders external to their own 
organization; and finally, by answering the questions of the PAC. For example:- 
 
I am representing all of us, come on, is it actually going to deliver the 
thing we need for the department or have we redefined it out of 
existence? R16 
 
It’s making sure that what we’re developing fits within that bigger 
picture, so that’s an important way of making sure that we have a senior 
commitment to it. R21 
 
One is, you have to be able to step outside of your sectional enthusiasm 
for your project and take the wider view… R22 
 
The active marketing of the project outside of the SRO’s own organization but 
within government is the second part of this attribute at this level of conception:- 
 
I have had to sell [the project] and actively market it. Not just as meeting 
this particular need, but we can go beyond it and achieve this. R6 
 
I think there’s quite a lot of work with my colleague [external 
organization] chief executives who, if it’s this is a part time job for me, 
it’s even more of a part time job for them, and it’s important to enthuse 
them with what this programme can do for them and get their 
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commitment to attend the [project] board meetings which we have, 
which since I’ve been in post I’ve moved around from being fairly 
operational, led by the chief information officers, largely because they’re 
the full time guys in each [project area], to being led by the chief 
executives on what we want to discuss in terms of what are the 
strategic goals, aims, what’s the vision for this programme in the 
[project area] and what can we do to maximize the benefit out of this 
programme? R20 
 
Engaging with stakeholders external to their own organization but within 
government is the third part of this attribute at this level of conception:- 
 
It means working upwards and outwards, both within the business and 
across Whitehall to a degree… R2 
 
I was responsible for making that happen, not personally, I didn't draft 
everything you'll be glad to know, but for pulling the levers, internally, for 
pulling the levers in quite a lot of other places across Whitehall. I did 
some things myself which only my position or my knowledge or 
whatever, were able to do… R3 
 
I’m the chairman of the [government activity] board in [an area] which 
has all the agencies on it, so that was a natural position from which to 
give them this vision, and to raise it with them and work through any 
problems they had, and to get an agreement on it and we formed a 
separate sponsor group for [the project], which is really just the 
[government activity] board wearing different hats, it’s the same people, 
it’s the director of [executive agency 1], the director of [executive 
agency 2], the director of [executive agency 3] and so on, so it’s people 
with whom I have quite a strong relationship anyway for a whole wider 
range of business reasons… R14 
 
Providing answers to the PAC is the fourth part of this attribute at this level of 
conception:-  
 
152 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five                    Results 
 
…my accountability is to be able to answer any of their [the PAC] 
questions about decisions I have taken in the course of a programme 
about levels of investment, particularly on the risk management. What 
analysis has been done, what actions have been taken about the, you 
know, what contingency has been built in, about advice that’s been 
sought, about sourcing decisions that might have been taken. R5 
 
At the end of the day you ought to be able to explain to ….the Public 
Accounts Committee, it may be Parliament .….. “What the hell’s going 
on here?” And that ‘accountability’ (in inverted commas) is just never far 
out of your mind, or it’s not far out of my mind anyway. R29 
  
Attribute C2A4: When the SRO understands they are accountable 
Timeframes at this level of conception were expressed as a potential, i.e. if the 
project had succeeded or not:- 
 
But I was very conscious, whilst I was doing that that, I had to have 
enough of an audit trail that if there was a public accounts hearing I 
would be able to say yes, we did look at the question of liability, I did 
assure myself as to how much I genuinely thought it was our fault, or 
their fault and what the contract said. R2 
 
But I suppose I would think about it in terms of the PAC. If I was asked 
why I'd done this, I would say because it has a major benefit, not a 
marginal benefit just for a few people. We spend that money, does it 
really have a significant effect? And it would be avoiding what happens 
at the moment, which is money being wasted. R4 
 
…if the system is falling over every day, the general public are unhappy 
because their [public service] is being delayed because of us. That is 
something the minister needs to be aware of, because he may be asked 
a Parliamentary Question on it by an angry citizen… R6 
 
Ministers are seized of the fact that it’s happening and believe it’s a 
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good thing and would want to know if it suddenly crashed, so I’m 
accountable there. R14 
 
If it goes belly up, it’s me who has to justify it. R23 
 
Attribute C2A5: What the SRO understands to be the consequences of 
being accountable 
SROs understood the consequences of being accountable at this level of 
conception as a negative impact on the organization:- 
 
And there was a very big impact on the organisation, because actually 
those savings are going to be put into our bottom line by the Treasury. 
And therefore our budget will reflect the assumption they’re being made, 
if they’re not being made, someone somewhere is going to have less 
money. R1 
 
…if I ran a project which then was so awful that the National Audit 
Office quite rightly came in and ripped it to shreds, I would feel we'd let 
ourselves [the organization] down. R2 
 
…that was a very tough time for the department politically and 
managerially, because these were things that we should’ve seen 
coming and on the whole didn’t. R18 
 
…the fact is that if I make a mess of it, then that reflects back on the 
department. R21 
 
5.1.3 Conception C3: Public Accountability 
In this conception accountability is conceived as accountability to the public for 
the delivery of benefits at some point in the future. SROs who expressed this 
conception also expressed conceptions C2 and C1 (see Appendix D). The 
relationship between the attributes and conception C3 is presented in Figure 
5.4. The five attributes are elaborated overleaf. 
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Figure 5-4: Conception C3: Attribute / Conception Relationship 
CONCEPTION
ATTRIBUTE CX A1
C3
C3 A1 C3 A5C3 A4C3 A3C3 A2
 
 
Attribute C3A1: To whom the SRO understands they are accountable  
SROs holding this conception understood they were accountable to the two 
distinct groups: the public (although other terms were used, such as taxpayer or 
citizen) as well as charities and professions. For example, in relation to the 
public:- 
 
It will be a good outcome for the public good, the UK citizenry, if by 
2050 the generation that is retiring then, okay, work out therefore that it 
is our children, has throughout its educational and working life, 
understood the importance of planning for retirement both through 
working and saving… R3 
 
I feel accountable to the taxpayer because there’s a lot of money 
entrusted to us… R5 
 
I feel most accountable to the public because, as a public servant, I 
mean all, the whole of the public service is about making life better for 
citizens. That might sound all too altruistic but, I mean, surely that is at 
the essence of what we’re all trying to do?… R7 
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…my SRO proposition involves the effective use of large amounts of 
public funds and the benefits are of direct interest to a large proportion 
of the average punting population… R29 
 
SROs also understood that they were accountable to charities or specific 
professions. For example:- 
 
…it’s still Mrs Bloggs and such like, but also it’s a service to [a charity] 
or [another charity] or people like that, who might be acting on their 
behalf. R5 
 
it’s a very wide-ranging programme, a large range of stakeholders that 
…we’ve got the [name] profession…we’ve got [name] agents, we’ve got 
[a profession], most importantly we’ve got Joe Public … R7 
 
I do feel accountable to them [several professions].  I do feel a lot of my 
input into this board is to keep people aware that the systems we need 
to deliver, and deliver them in a way in which these people want to use 
them, are those systems, which make a difference to their job. And 
those are the decision support, the order of [products], the results 
reporting, the PAX system, the electronic transmission of [output], which 
is different to electronic [output] writing. Those sorts of systems are 
really, really important to [several professions]. R20 
 
Attribute C3A2: For what the SRO understands they are accountable 
At this level of conception SROs conceived they were accountable for a public 
benefit. For example:- 
 
It will be a good outcome for the public good, the UK citizenry, if by 
2050 the generation that is [activity] then, okay, work out therefore that 
it is our children, has throughout its educational and working life, 
understood the importance of planning for [activity] both through 
working and saving… R3 
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I am very proud of the fact that for [government product] that by March 
this year we had taken an extra million people out of poverty. And that’s 
what gets me up in the morning. R5 
 
So what we, the focus has changed. If you look at our strategy you’ll 
see the main focus is on benefits for the [a particular public group] 
bringing greater certainty and clarity to the process of [activity by the 
public].  R7 
 
I might be asked by lots of people before that, but at the end of the day 
this is public money being invested for public benefit and therefore, 
ultimately, you need to plan on being able to account in the normal way 
that an accountable officer does. R29 
 
Attribute C3A3: How the SRO understands they fulfil their accountability 
At this level of conception SROs understood that they fulfilled their 
accountability by questioning whether the project would deliver a benefit to the 
public. For example:- 
 
It would be getting, I can't quite remember what the expression is, 
getting the most for my bucks? If I have that amount of money to do, to 
use within those parameters, how can I get the best bang for my bucks? 
So, how can I get some things at the end of the day? It is a system by 
which individuals can seek redress for not being awarded [government 
product]. So, how can I make that system work in the best way 
possible? So, if I spent a million quid so that they can pick up the 
telephone, that sounds good. But is that actually the best way of 
spending that million quid or is there something else we could've done 
which would make it much more effective and make it much more likely 
that it was a fair system? So, working out the best ways of using that 
money would be really important for me. R4 
 
…so its actually ensuring that we reach a decision you take, that you 
know what it’s contributing to the overall successful delivery of the 
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programme and taking a judgement about whether that’s value for 
money and actually is providing value and contributing to the success of 
the programme. R5 
 
I have to say, not everybody has a strong consciousness of “is this a 
good use of taxpayers money?” and I have always had a very strong 
sense of “I could have travelled first class, but I’ll be perfectly 
comfortable in second class,” which I think the taxpayer would rather I 
did that actually, than threw their money about. R16 
 
Attribute C3A4: When the SRO understands they are accountable  
For this attribute at this level of conception, SROs understood they were 
accountable when the benefits of the project become apparent. For example:- 
 
It will be a good outcome for the public good, the UK citizenry, if by 
2050 the generation that is [public activity] then, okay, work out 
therefore that it is our children, has throughout its educational and 
working life, understood the importance of planning for [public activity] 
both through working and saving. R3 
 
So, like at the moment, the end of last month, [the public] are being 
offered choice from the end of last month. R20 
 
Attribute C3A5: What the SRO understands to be the consequences of 
being accountable 
At this level of conception SROs understood the consequences of being 
accountable as the potential loss of benefits to the public if the project failed. 
For example:- 
 
That accountability to me means the difference between … outcomes 
for the public good, and not outcomes for the public good, less excellent 
public outcomes, if I can put it like that. R3 
 
I think there’s a real governance issue - in clinical terms – for you as a 
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patient who might pitch up in a hospital, having had an accident, and 
might also have a rare condition being treated in another hospital, and 
the hospital you pitch up at won’t know that. And unless you’re 
conscious and capable of telling them, they might not discover it. R20 
 
5.1.4 Conception C4: Individual Responsibility 
In this fourth and last conception, the individual SRO understood that they were 
no longer accountable to an external agent. Instead they were accountable to 
themselves. In line with the definition I set out in Chapter 2, I have described 
this as individual responsibility. SROs who expressed this conception also 
expressed conceptions C3, C2 and C1 (see Appendix D). The relationship 
between the attributes and conception C4 is presented in Figure 5.5. The 
attributes at this level of conception are described below. 
Figure 5-5: Conception C4: Attribute / Conception Relationship 
CONCEPTION
ATTRIBUTE CX A1
C4
C4 A1 C4 A5C4 A4C4 A3C4 A2
 
 
Attribute C4A1: To whom the SRO understands they are accountable  
At this level of conception SROs understood that they are accountable to 
themselves. For example:- 
 
So it's very personal, it matters to me, that's what my job is designed 
around, to deliver those things. R3 
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Well, to myself I suppose, in some ways, you know. You want to do 
things, you want to make sure that it’s successful so there’s a personal 
pride, isn’t there? You’re accountable to yourself. R12 
 
I hold myself to account as well for it, I suppose in that sort of sense. 
R21 
 
 
Attribute C4A2: For what the SRO understands they are accountable  
At this level of conception SROs understood they were accountable for making 
the project a success and hence making a difference:- 
 
It's my opportunity to make a difference, in a tangible way through what 
I am and what I do. Sometimes it means governancey sort of things 
which I loathe, I have to say, but a necessary evil. Sometimes it means 
seeing something happen as a result of something I’ve instigated and 
supported. And that's it, it's personal pride in the job in the end. R3 
 
You want to do things, you want to make sure that it’s successful, so 
there’s a personal pride, isn’t there? R12 
 
I’m totally committed to making sure this happens. R21 
 
Attribute C4A3: How the SRO understands they fulfil their accountability  
At this level of conception SROs understood that they fulfilled their 
accountability by trying to do the right thing to ensure the success of the project 
by taking personal ownership of the project and committing to it:- 
  
So you wanted to switch it from a pull from the consumer to a push to 
the consumer in terms of this sort of environment. And so that was 
something that I took quite passionately and personally, as an example 
of where we were going to make this happen, because it mattered. It 
was a bit sort of peripheral to departmental concerns four years ago. It 
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is now mainstream. R3 
 
It took quite a lot of effort and quite a lot of pushing and the sort of 
personal, you know - we can make this happen, there is nothing to stop 
it except organizational bureaucracy, it’s not high enough up anybody's 
priorities, there is nothing physically stopping us. R3 
 
Have you done enough, have you done all the right things? There’s a 
list of things I haven’t done right, an absolute litany. Well, there’s a few 
things I’ve probably done right too, and on balance I think we’re where 
we are. R12 
 
So there is an inner commitment to it, isn’t there? R21 
 
Attribute C4A4: When the SRO understands they are accountable  
At this level of conception SROs understood that they were accountable when 
they were making a difference. This occurred at different points in time. For 
example, one respondent stated:- 
 
I was responsible for bringing in the [government product], the 
[government product], okay, back in 2001 and I think the thing that 
made me proud about that was we did in fact make a difference to the 
market in [a policy area]. R3 
 
Another respondent stated:- 
 
Yeah, next week when the family go off on holiday and I don’t - sorry, 
the week after next. Where do I feel I should be? Here, always here, so 
I’ve made that decision. R12 
 
Attribute C4A5: What the SRO understands to be the consequences of 
being accountable 
At this level of conception SROs understood the consequences of being 
accountable as being able to live with themselves through achieving personal 
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success, or being unable to do so through personal failure:- 
 
That accountability to me means the difference between personal 
achievement and personal failure. R3 
 
But could you live with yourself sitting on the beach? I personally 
couldn’t, it’s a personal thing. R12 
 
5.2 The Structure of Accountability 
In the preceding section I have described the four conceptions of accountability 
at the attribute level using data from the interviews. The quotations exemplify 
the meaning of each attribute within each conception. These meanings are 
consistent with each other and together form a distinctive structure of 
accountability within each conception. This distinctive structure of accountability 
at each level of conception is elaborated below and summarized in Table 5-3 
(overleaf). 
 
Conception C1: Intra-organizational accountability is characterized by its 
focus on the project within the respondent’s own organization. Civil servants 
who expressed this conception reported regularly on various aspects of the 
project to their superiors and the various management groups within their 
organization. This covered areas such as progress against plans and budgets, 
the degree of progress on the achievement of performance targets and 
decisions that needed to be taken. Consistent with this was a strong emphasis 
on the provision of regular reporting on these matters to the various principals 
within the timescales dictated by the project plans and the organizational 
governance arrangements. The consequences of being accountable were 
understood as consequences for the individual – the loss of their performance 
bonus, the limitation of future career prospects, damage to their reputation 
within the organization and even loss of their own job. These consequences are 
consistent with the regular reporting of project progress to superiors within the 
organization. Together these understandings are internally related to each other 
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and form a consistent set of understandings. In summary, the focus is on the 
individual being accountable within the boundaries of their own organization. 
 
Conception C2: Inter-organizational accountability is characterized by its 
additional focus on organizational aspects of accountability. Individuals were not 
only accountable to their masters within their own organization (conception C1), 
but were also accountable to organizations within government and to 
Parliamentary bodies for the reputation of their own organization and the 
resulting organizational benefits. This was achieved through questioning the 
relevance of the project to organizational objectives and marketing the project 
across government by engaging with the relevant organizational stakeholders. 
The SRO also fulfilled this accountability by answering questions put forward by 
the PAC if a hearing was called. The SRO was accountable when, or if, the 
project went wrong. The consequences of being accountable were understood 
as damage to the reputation of their organization and the loss of the 
organizational benefits if the project went awry. This can be summarized as 
inter-organizational accountability.  
 
Conception C3: Public accountability is characterized by its additional 
emphasis on the public. Civil servants who expressed this conception 
articulated a further accountability beyond that expressed in conception C2 and 
understood that they were accountable to the public, charities and professions 
for the delivery of a public good. This was achieved by individuals judging 
whether the result of a project would deliver an improvement to some aspect of 
public life, and they would be accountable when these benefits were delivered 
to the public, which was in some cases many years in the future. The 
consequences of being accountable were understood as less desirable 
outcomes for the public. This conception can be characterized as public 
accountability. 
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Table 5-3: The Structure of Accountability: Conceptions and Attributes 
Attribute of conception of accountability  
 Principal(s) 
To whom the 
SRO is 
accountable 
Subject(s) 
For what the SRO is 
accountable 
Fulfilment 
How the SRO fulfils their 
accountability 
Timeframe 
When the SRO 
is accountable 
Consequences 
What the SRO 
understands to be the 
consequences of being 
accountable 
C1: Intra-organizational 
accountability 
Superiors and 
management 
groups within 
own 
organization 
Project objectives, 
project targets, the 
provision of 
information, project 
resources and project 
delivery 
Regular reporting, 
answering questions and 
obtaining support for the 
project within their own 
organization 
Within project 
timeframes 
Loss of bonus, damage to 
promotion prospects and 
individual reputation, loss 
of employment 
C2: = C1 + Inter-
organizational 
accountability 
Other 
organizations 
within 
government 
Organization 
reputation and the 
benefits to the 
organization of the 
project 
Questioning project 
relevance, project 
marketing, inter-
organizational engagement 
and answering PAC 
questions  
If or when the 
project goes 
wrong 
Damage to the reputation 
of their organization, loss 
of organizational benefits 
C3: = C2 + Public 
accountability 
The public or 
the taxpayer, 
charities and 
professions 
An outcome for the 
public good, a public 
benefit 
Questioning whether the 
project would deliver a 
public benefit and 
engaging with the public, 
charities or professions 
When the 
benefits are 
realized (or not) 
Less excellent outcomes 
for the public good 
C4: = C3 + Individual 
responsibility 
Themselves  Programme / project
success  
Doing the right thing Always Personal pride (or failure). 
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Conception C4: Individual responsibility is characterized by its focus on the 
additional focus on the self. SROs who expressed this conception understood 
that not only were they accountable to their political and managerial superiors 
(conception C1), their own organization (conception C2) and the public 
(conception C3), but that they were accountable to themselves. In Chapter 2 I 
differentiated accountability from responsibility. Accountability involves an 
external principal, whereas responsibility does not (Mulgan, 2003). 
Accountability implies the potential to be called to account for actions by 
someone else, whereas responsibility ‘refers to internal aspects of action’ 
(Mulgan, 2003 :15) where an individual acts on the basis of free choice and in 
line with their obligations but without concern for external scrutiny. I have 
therefore characterized this conception as individual responsibility. Those who 
expressed this conception took personal pride in making a difference and 
fulfilled this responsibility by doing what they understood to be the right thing. 
They conceived that they were personally associated with the potential success 
or failure of that project. As a result, they understood that they were perpetually 
accountable – it did not occur within a particular timescale.  
 
5.3 The Hierarchical Nature of the Four Conceptions of 
Accountability 
The four conceptions of accountability I have described in the previous section 
are different understandings of accountability. Each successive conception 
builds on its predecessor to form a hierarchy of increasing complexity and 
richness. In the following section I put forward the basis for this hierarchical 
nature, and in the subsequent section I describe how this hierarchical aspect of 
the results is reflected in the attributes. 
 
5.3.1 A Hierarchy of Conceptions of Accountability 
Within conception C1, accountability was focussed on the specific project for 
which the SRO was accountable within the boundaries of their agency or 
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department. Individuals who expressed this conception talked extensively about 
the reporting regimes with which they had to comply. Conception C2 was 
concerned not only with the accountabilities expressed in conception C1, but 
also with the SROs own organization. SROs expressed a need to be aware of 
what was going on in other organizations and events that potentially could 
impact their own project. This wider perspective was matched with a greater 
degree of pro-activity from the SRO, with an emphasis on asking questions of 
other organizations within government and actively marketing the project across 
government. Conception C3 took an even wider view, so that accountability not 
only the accountabilities of conceptions C1 and C2, but also covered 
accountability to the public, charities and professions for the delivery of a public 
benefit. Conception C4 included all of the aspects of conceptions C1, C2 and 
C3 but expanded accountability further to include individuals being responsible 
to themselves for doing the right thing.  
 
In Table 5-4 (overleaf) I present a summary of the interview data arranged 
according to the level of conception from all respondents. This table 
demonstrates that the conceptions are cumulative in nature. SROs who 
expressed conception C2 also expressed conception C1 (but not vice versa), 
those SROs who expressed conception C3 also expressed conception C2 (but 
not vice versa) and those SROs who expressed conception C4 also expressed 
conception C3 (but not vice versa). In summary, SROs who expressed the more 
complex conceptions also expressed the least comprehensive ones, but not 
vice versa. This reflects the notion, from phenomenography, that experiences 
can be ordered according to their increasing complexity and completeness 
(Marton and Booth, 1997). More detailed data, in the form of typical quotes from 
each interviewee arranged by conception, can be found in Appendix D.  
 
5.3.2 The Hierarchy of Conceptions of Accountability within the 
Attributes 
Each conception had the same attributes, but with different meanings at the 
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different levels of conception. The variation in meaning of the attributes is 
outlined in the next five sections. 
Table 5-4: Summary of Interview Data Arranged by Conception 
 Conception 
Respondent Conception 
C1 
Conception 
C2 
Conception 
C3 
Conception 
C4 
R1 √ √   
R2 √ √   
R3 √ √ √ √ 
R4 √ √ √  
R5 √ √ √  
R6 √ √   
R7 √ √ √  
R8 √    
R9 √ √   
R10 √ √   
R11 √    
R12 √ √  √ 
R13 √    
R14 √ √   
R15 √    
R16 √ √ √  
R17 √    
R18 √ √   
R19 √    
R20 √ √ √  
R21 √ √ √ √ 
R22 √ √ √  
R23 √ √   
R24 √    
R25 √    
R26 √    
R27 √ √   
R28 √    
R29 √ √ √  
R30 √    
Key: √= Data 
 
Principals 
In conception C1 the attribute to whom the SRO was accountable was 
conceived in terms of superiors, management groups and ministers within the 
SRO’s own organization. In conception C2 this understanding was expanded 
further to include accountability to organizations external to their own but within 
the boundaries of government and Parliament. This included other departments, 
executive agencies and Parliamentary organizations such as the NAO. SROs 
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understood that they needed to engage with other organizations to establish the 
possible impacts of initiatives in other organizations that could potentially impact 
their project. They also understood that if the project went wrong, potentially 
they would have to account for the project to the NAO, the PAC or the relevant 
Parliamentary select committee. 
 
Conception C3 expanded this understanding further and added accountability to 
the public and organizations external to government, such as charities and 
professions. SROs understood that if they were to deliver what they conceived 
as a public good, they would have to engage with the public, or with those 
charities and professional bodies that would be interested in the welfare of the 
public. In conception C4 SROs developed this understanding further and 
understood that they were responsible to themselves for doing the right thing. 
 
Subject 
The subject of an SROs accountability was conceived in terms of budget, 
project milestones and performance targets in conception C1. This was 
expanded to include the reputation of their organization and the organizational 
benefits of the project in conception C2, as SROs recognised the organizational 
impacts of the project and further understood that if the project went awry, the 
reputation of their organization would be damaged by the ensuing NAO report 
and PAC hearing. As such, limiting their accountability to performance targets, 
project milestones and budgets was insufficient.  
 
Conception C3 expanded this meaning further and added an outcome for the 
public good. Neither a focus on the time, budget and performance targets of 
conception C1, nor the reputation of their own organization and the 
organizational benefits of the project in conception C2 were sufficient to meet 
this objective. In conception C4 the meaning was developed further: individuals 
understood that they were responsible for the success of the project.  
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Fulfilment 
In conception C1 the attribute how an SRO understood they fulfilled their 
accountability was expressed as regular reporting to superiors within their own 
organization and answering any questions from their superiors. In conception 
C2 this was not sufficient when it came to being accountable to other 
organizations within the boundaries of government. Instead, a more proactive 
approach was adopted and the meaning was expanded to include questioning 
the relevance of the project to organizational objectives, marketing the project 
across government by engaging with the various organizational stakeholders 
and, if the project went awry, answering questions from the PAC. Conception 
C3 expanded the meaning still further. Accountability to the public was 
understood to be fulfilled by questioning whether the project would deliver a 
public benefit and by engaging with the public or proxies for the public, such as 
professions or charities. In conception C4 individual responsibility was fulfilled 
by doing what was conceived to be the right thing.  
 
Timeframe 
The timeframe attribute also had different meanings according to the level of 
conception. Consistent with the intra-organizational focus of conception C1 was 
an emphasis on timeframes within the project lifecycle, i.e. the next board 
meeting or a ‘go live’ date for the project. Conception C2 also included this, but 
placed an additional emphasis on being accountable when the project had 
failed in some way, which was generally understood to be a possibility at some 
point in the future. Consistent with being accountable to the public, charities and 
professions, conception C3 extended the meaning of the timeframe attribute 
through the SRO being accountable when the expected benefits of the project 
be realized. This is an expansion of conception C2, as if the project has not 
failed in some way, it would then go on to deliver the anticipated benefit to the 
public. Conception C4 expanded the meaning of the attribute to cover all 
aspects of time, as the individual SRO was always responsible for doing the 
right thing. 
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Consequences 
The consequences of being accountable also had different meanings according 
to the level of conception. In conception C1 this attribute was understood as a 
possible reduction in financial rewards, a difficult session with a senior 
manager, damage to the SRO’s reputation and ultimately the loss of 
employment. At this level of conception SROs reported to various individuals 
and management groups within their organization, some of which would play a 
significant role in individual performance reviews and the assessment of an 
individual’s future prospects. Conception C2 expanded this meaning further. 
SROs understood that their own organization could be damaged if the project 
went wrong. The reputation of their organization in government, or operational 
aspects of their organization such as performance or budget, could all be 
negatively impacted in these circumstances. 
 
Conception C3 developed this understanding further. Consistent with being 
accountable to the public, SROs understood that the public would be impacted 
by the failure to deliver the project. In conception C4 SROs understood the 
consequences of being accountable as either personal success or failure.  
 
5.3.3 Attributes, Conceptions and Accountability 
Figure 5-6 is a graphical representation of the relationship between the 
attributes, the conceptions and the concept of accountability. The cumulative 
nature of the conceptions across the attributes is reflected in the diagram. 
Conception C1, represented by the smallest circle, is the least complex 
conception and as such it represents a partial representation ‘in which fewer 
parts or fewer ways of experiencing the phenomenon are discerned in 
awareness’ (Watkins, 2000: 103). Conceptions C2, C3 and C4 represent 
successively more complex representations that ‘accord with the ability to 
simultaneously discern and hold in awareness more parts or more ways of 
experiencing the phenomenon’ (Watkins, 2000: 103). 
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However, the most complex conception, conception C4, does not represent a 
complete understanding of accountability. The conceptions represent ‘an 
experiential field of differentially constituted meanings’ (Watkins, 2000: 103) 
within a common social context – the civil service in the United Kingdom. As I 
established in Chapter 3, a common social context results in a limited number of 
qualitatively different ways of experiencing a phenomenon. However, 
accountability is a feature of many other social contexts. So other groups of 
individuals in other contexts may have different conceptions that do not form 
part of the results of this research. 
Figure 5-6: Accountability, Conceptions and Attributes: The Relationship  
C1
C2
C3
C4
ACCOUNTABILITY
To Whom?
For 
What?
Fulfilled?
Consequences?
When?
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5.4 Possible Sources of Variation 
I have described the four conceptions of accountability and the hierarchical 
relationship between them. The question ‘What are the possible sources of 
variation?’ has not been addressed so far. There are two possible sources of 
variation: (1) project demographics and (2) the project rationale. These are 
explained in the next two sections. 
 
5.4.1 Project Demographics 
As part of the data gathering process, I asked the respondents to provide 
general information about the project for which they were accountable (see 
Table 4-3). The respondents provided me with information on the nature of the 
project and the approximate project budget. I shall deal with each of these 
aspects in turn. 
 
All respondents were accountable for IT enabled business change projects, that 
is, projects that used IT as the basis for changing an aspect of a respondents’ 
business area. Some projects involved multiple business areas such as finance, 
human resources and procurement, whilst others involved only one business 
area. The quality of information provided varied considerably between 
respondents, as some respondents were accountable for politically sensitive 
projects, whilst other respondents were not. However, all projects had this 
common foundation, albeit across a range of different business areas. 
Therefore variations in conception cannot be attributed to differences in the type 
of project. 
 
Project budgets were a contentious issue for most respondents. Some were 
able to provide detailed information about the size and source of their budget, 
whilst other respondents declined to answer on the grounds that the information 
was confidential. However, all projects were financed directly from public funds 
rather than being funded from the private sector through PFI (private finance 
initiative) or PPP (public-private partnership) arrangements. As there was no 
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variation in funding sources, variations in conception cannot be attributed to 
differences in funding arrangements. 
 
5.4.2 Project Rationale 
Whilst carrying out the fieldwork I became aware of a variety of different 
rationales that were used to justify the various projects for which the 
respondents were accountable. These ranged from achieving compliance with 
Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, efficiency savings, the delivery of new 
organizational capabilities and the delivery of policy objectives. When 
questioned on this, SROs often replied that projects had multiple rationales. I 
also discovered that SROs often justified their projects through the use of 
relatively recent rationales (such as the achievement of efficiency savings 
arising out of the Gershon Review (2004)) even though the project was initiated 
at an earlier time. Frequently I was unable to obtain a clear unambiguous 
answer from a respondent. I therefore abandoned this line of investigation due 
to the highly variable nature of the answers from the respondents on this 
question. 
 
5.5 Summary  
Based on my analysis of the data, accountability is conceived in four 
qualitatively different ways. Conception C1 is concerned with accountability for 
the project to senior managers and management groups within the SROs own 
organization. SROs who expressed this conception fulfilled their accountability 
within the timeframe of the project by reporting regularly to their superiors and 
understood the consequences of being accountable as damaged promotion 
prospects and loss of financial benefits. Conception C2 expands this 
understanding further and is focused on accountability for the organization’s 
reputation and benefits to other organizations within the realm of government. 
SROs who expressed this conception fulfilled their accountability through 
question the relevance of the project to organizational objectives, engaging with 
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other organizations within government and answering questions if the project 
went wrong. They also understood that they were accountable if the project 
went wrong, in which case both their organization and its reputation would be 
damaged. Conception C3 develops this understanding further and is concerned 
with accountability to the public for a public good. SROs who expressed this 
conception fulfilled their accountability by questioning whether the project would 
deliver a benefit to the public and engaging with the public, charitable 
organizations or professions. These SROs also understood that they were 
accountable when the benefits of the project were realised. Conception C4 
enlarges this understanding. SROs who expressed this conception understood 
that they were not accountable to anyone, but rather were responsible to 
themselves for the success of the project. They fulfilled their accountability by 
doing what they understood to be the right thing and understood that they were 
always accountable to themselves 
 
These conceptions do not stand in isolation from each other, but form a 
hierarchy of increasing complexity. SROs who expressed conception C4 also 
expressed conceptions C3, C2 and C1, SROs who expressed conception C3 
also expressed conceptions C2 and C1 and SROs who expressed conception 
C2 also expressed conception C1. Those SROs who only expressed 
conception C1 only expressed this conception.  
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Chapter Six: Discussion 
This chapter has eight sections. In Section 6.1 I summarize the research aims, 
methods and results. In Section 6.2 the results of the research in relation to my 
definition of the concept of accountability are discussed. I compare the results 
to existing literature on individual conceptions of accountability in Section 6.3. In 
Section 6.4 the results are compared and contrasted with other typologies of 
accountability. I examine the results in relation to the NPM view of 
accountability in Section 6.5. In Section 6.6 I outline how accountability 
functions in the ‘differentiated polity’ (Rhodes, 1994: 4). In Section 6.7 the 
results are discussed in relation to the paradox of accountability. I summarize 
the chapter and the contributions to knowledge in Section 6.8.  
 
6.1 Research Outline 
This research questions the assumption of a singular understanding of 
accountability that is inherent in the mandating of accountability for the SRO. 
My review of the literature on accountability in the field of public administration 
demonstrates that, due to the subjective nature of human understanding and 
the complex environment in which senior civil servants operate today, there are 
theoretical grounds for the existence of a range of understandings of 
accountability. The same literature review found that empirical research on how 
individuals understand accountability was limited; psychological research dealt 
with the impacts of accountability on individual behaviour, whilst the public 
administration literature had only two relevant studies. These two studies 
suffered from contextual and methodological limitations that raised questions 
over their relevance to the role of the SRO in the civil service. The paucity of 
current literature on individual understanding of accountability, coupled with the 
failure of the current approach to SRO accountability to recognize the subjective 
and cognitive limitations of human understanding, results in the creation of two 
linked paradoxes. First, individual civil servants known as SROs have been 
made accountable for the objectives of public sector projects, yet little is known 
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about how individuals understand accountability. Second, a singular objective 
understanding of accountability has been assumed, yet there are theoretical 
grounds for the existence of a range of understandings of accountability. Taken 
together, these produce the following research question:- 
 
What are individual SROs’ subjective understandings of their 
accountabilities? 
 
In this research a conception means ‘people’s ways of experiencing or making 
sense of their world’ (Sandberg, 2000: 12).  
 
In line with Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) notion of theoretical saturation, I 
selected a sample of 30 SROs from as broad a range as possible of civil service 
departments and executive agencies. Following the traditions of my chosen 
research approach (phenomenography), I collected data through in-depth 
interviews using an open-ended question protocol. I then transcribed and 
analyzed the interviews using ‘intentional analysis’ (Sandberg, 1994: 85), an 
iterative approach that alternates between a focus on what the SROs conceived 
accountability as, and how they conceived it.  
 
From this analysis I identified four conceptions of accountability (see Table 5-3). 
These are:- 
 
 Conception C1: Intra-organizational accountability 
 Conception C2: Inter-organizational accountability 
 Conception C3: Public accountability 
 Conception C4: Individual responsibility 
 
Each conception has the same five attributes - principal, subject, fulfilment, time 
frame and consequences, but the attributes had different foci according to the 
particular conception. The conceptions reflect four qualitatively different 
understandings of accountability in the United Kingdom’s civil service. Some 
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SROs had richer and more complex conceptions. Based on the data, each 
successive conception builds upon and expands the meaning of its 
predecessor, starting from conception C1. The conceptions then form a 
hierarchy of increasing complexity and richness in conceiving accountability.  
 
6.2 The Results and the Definition of Accountability 
In Section 2.2.5 I defined accountability as a social relationship, with 
resources and responsibilities entrusted to a steward for a particular task 
by one or more principals, with the consequent potential for an account to 
be called for, judgement made and remedies and / or sanctions imposed. I 
also outlined the five components that make up the concept of accountability: a 
relationship, a subject, the provision and seeking of information, judgement and 
sanctions. In this section I discuss the results in relation to the above definition 
and the five components. 
 
6.2.1 The Conceptions and the Definition of Accountability 
In conception C1 the SRO is accountable to superiors and management groups 
within the organization for the achievement of project targets. In conception C2 
the SRO is accountable to other organizations for the reputation of the SRO’s 
own organization and the benefits to the organization of the project. In 
conception C3 the SRO is accountable to the public for the delivery of a benefit 
to the public. In conception C4 the SRO is accountable to him or herself for 
doing the right thing. So all four conceptions are consistent with the definition of 
accountability which I developed from the literature, but in different ways 
 
There are, however, three subtleties that distinguish the formal definition from 
the conceptions. First, in conception C1 the SRO not only has formally defined 
principals who delegate to the SRO the accountability for the project, but also 
subjectively defined principals whose support is vital to the achievement of the 
project’s objectives. As such, these principals are defined by the SRO, unlike 
the formal principals who are imposed on the SRO. In this conception 
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‘accountability is the formation or enactment of informal and formal mechanisms 
for dealing with expectations and experience’ (Dubnick and Justice, 2004: 9). 
The subjective definition of additional principals by the SRO increases 
progressively through the other conceptions. In conception C2 accountability is 
not only to the formal principals of the NAO and the PAC, but also subjectively 
to other peer organizations in the civil service. In conception C3 the SRO is 
accountable to the public, which is again a principal subjectively defined by the 
SRO. These subjective principals do not entrust resources and responsibilities 
to the SRO, but are a ‘reflection of the legitimized “certainties” within a 
community – certainties that accompany beliefs about how the world (including 
social relationships and causality) is organized’ (Dubnick and Justice, 2004: 10). 
In conception C2 the SRO is also accountable for the organizational benefits of 
the project, as well as the reputation of their own organization to other 
organizations within government and also to Parliament. This reflects two 
legitimized certainties. The first is that organizations must benefit from a project 
and the second is that organizational reputation is important within government 
and in dealing with Parliament. In conception C3 the SRO is also accountable to 
the public for a public benefit or good. This reflects a wider perspective in which 
the legitimized certainty is that the purpose of the civil service is to improve the 
public lot. The addition of these subjectively defined principals is the first 
difference between the definition of accountability I have derived from the 
literature and the results.  
 
Second, the formal definition of accountability is focussed around the steward 
giving an account to the principal. Conceptions C2 and C3 both reflect a wider, 
more subjective view of accountability, that of taking the views of others into 
account (Donahue, 1989). They also reflect a complex task environment, in 
which accountability as both giving an account to others and taking the views of 
others into account, ‘is a means for managing an otherwise chaotic situation’ 
(Dubnick and Justice, 2004: 10). This wider view of accountability, as taking the 
views of others into account, is the second difference between the formal 
definition of accountability and the results. 
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Third, conception C4 is focussed around the individual being accountable to 
their own self for doing the right thing. Given that there is no external steward, 
either explicit or implicit, to hold the SRO to account, this relationship is no 
longer accountability, but rather the similar concept of responsibility. This 
conception reflects ‘an internal dimension….in which the individual takes into 
account the consequences of his actions and the criteria which bear on his 
choices’ (McKeon, 1957: 5) and as such carries with it the notion of 
incontestable authorship of an event (Sartre, 2003). This internalization of 
accountability to become responsibility is the third difference between the formal 
definition of accountability and the results.  
 
The conceptions can then be seen as a continuum ranging from a defined and 
externally imposed accountability with some subjective aspects in conception 
C1, through increasingly subjective forms of accountability in conceptions C2 
and C3, to an entirely subjective, internal responsibility in conception C4. 
Conceptions C1, C2 and C3 retain the core concept of the definition of 
accountability as a social relationship between a principal and a steward for a 
particular task, but in an increasingly subjective manner. In conception C1 the 
SRO is accountable for the delivery of the project as defined by a performance 
target. The forums in which the SRO is held to account are the formal ones with 
senior managers and management groups in the SRO’s own organization. In 
addition to the formal sanctions of loss of bonus or employment, the results of 
these meetings could influence the subjective opinion of senior management on 
the individual SRO and therefore have an impact on the SRO’s own reputation 
within their own organization. The progressive nature of the higher conceptions 
means that an increasing degree of subjectivity is added to conception C1 
throughout the hierarchy. In conception C2 the SRO is also accountable for the 
reputation of their organization, which is a subjective matter, as well as for the 
objective benefits of the project to the organization. Further, the SRO is also 
accountable to two mandated principals, the PAC and NAO, whilst also being 
accountable to a subjectively defined set of other peer organizations. The 
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regular exchanges of views between SROs in different organizations can be 
seen as a more subjective approach to accountability, with the SRO taking the 
opinions of others into account. So conception C2 has both objective (the formal 
aspects of conception C1 plus the organizational benefits of the project, the 
NAO and PAC) and subjective components (the reputation of their own 
organization, the opinions of other organizations). Conception C3 adds further 
to the degree of subjectivity. There are no further defined principals, subjects or 
consequences. Instead, the SRO is accountable for a public good and engages 
with those bodies that represent interested parties, who are presumed to act on 
behalf of the public and represent their views. In doing so the SRO further 
increases the degree of subjectivity when compared with conceptions C1 and 
C2. In conception C4 responsibility is an entirely subjective affair, with the SRO 
acting in accordance with his or her own internalized values and norms to do 
the right thing to make the project a success, and so be able to live with his or 
her self. So the conceptions represent a hierarchy of increasingly rich, complex 
and subjective understandings of accountability. The four qualitatively different 
conceptions and their hierarchical relationship are two contributions that arise 
from this research. 
 
6.2.2 The Attributes and the Components of Accountability 
In Chapter 2 I outlined the five components that make up the concept of 
accountability: a relationship, a subject, the provision and seeking of 
information, judgement and sanctions. In this section I compare these 
components with the five attributes discovered in the data.  
 
Relationship 
The results showed that there was always a relationship between the SRO and 
various principals at all levels of conception. In conception C1 these are 
primarily formal, defined relationships between the SRO and senior managers 
and management teams within their own organization. There are also subjective 
elements in that the SRO has to seek additional support for the project from 
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other senior managers within their own organization. In conception C2 
additional formal, objective relationships are limited to those between the SRO, 
the NAO and PAC. The principal additional relationships are subjective ones 
between SROs and other peer organizations within government. In conception 
C3 the only additional relationships are subjective ones between SROs and 
public interest groups, charities and professions. In conception C4 there is only 
one further relationship, a purely subjective one that is internal to the SRO. So 
the nature of the relationships across the four conceptions change from the 
primarily objective in conception C1, to more subjective relationships in 
conceptions C2 and C3, to a subjective internal relationship in conception C4.  
 
Subject 
The results showed that there was always a subject to an accountability 
relationship, in other words the SRO was always accountable for something. In 
conception C1 these were the project target, the provision of information, 
project resources and the delivery of the project. These objectives were defined 
by others. In conception C2 the SRO was also accountable for the reputation of 
their organization and the organizational benefits of the project. These reflect an 
increased degree of subjectivity (organizational reputation) whilst retaining 
some objectivity (organizational benefits). In conception C3 in addition to what 
the SRO was accountable for in conception C2, the SRO was also accountable 
for a public benefit. This is an entirely subjective notion, as it depends on what 
the SRO understood to be a public benefit. In conception C4 the SRO was 
accountable for the success of the project. This again is a subjective notion, as 
it is the SRO alone who defines project success. So the subject of the SRO’s 
accountability ranges from the project performance targets in conception C1, 
with the addition of the subjective subjects of organizational reputation and a 
public good in conceptions C2 and C3, and the inclusion of a purely subjective 
notion of project success as perceived by the SRO in conception C4.  
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Provision and Seeking of Information 
The provision and seeking of information component is reflected in the fulfilment 
attribute. However, the specific means of fulfilment varies across the 
conceptions. In conception C1 the SRO fulfils their accountability through 
regular reporting, answering questions and obtaining support for the project 
from within their own organization. This changes in conception C2 to 
questioning the relevance of the project, marketing the project by engaging with 
other peer organizations and, if required, answering the questions of the PAC. 
In conception C3 this changes again to questioning whether the project will 
deliver a public benefit and engaging with the public, charities and professions. 
In conception C4 this becomes a matter of the SRO’s internal values and 
beliefs. The SRO fulfils their accountability by doing what they perceive to be 
the right thing. So the means of fulfilment changes from objective ones such as 
formal reports and board meetings, to increasingly subjective ones, i.e. as 
perceived by the SRO, informal means such as conversations and dialogue with 
colleagues in other departments (conception C2) and with charities and 
professions outside government (conception C3). In Gray and Jenkins’s (1993) 
terms, there is a change from an internal, explicit, relationship-specific code in 
conception C1 to an external, implicit, general code (such as a professional 
ethical code) in conceptions C2, C3 and C4.  
 
Judgement  
The component judgement does not directly appear in any of the attributes 
found in the data. It is, however, implicit in the attributes. In each conception the 
SRO is accountable for a particular subject to a particular set of principals, fulfils 
that accountability in a particular way, and at some point in time faces the 
consequences. The final attribute, consequences, implies that the principal 
must have passed judgement on the SRO’s actions in relation to the particular 
subject. However, judgement is an action of the principal, not the SRO. It is 
logical that judgement does not form part of an SRO’s conceptions.  
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Sanctions 
Sanctions are the final component of the literature based definition of 
accountability, and is reflected in the consequences attribute. SROs understood 
that there were consequences if the project went wrong. The attribute, 
therefore, implicitly reflects Mulgan’s (2003) point that accountability is a 
potential – the SRO may be called to account, but it is not a certainty. The 
consequences in the data are the loss of a bonus, damaged promotion 
prospects, the loss of employment, and damage to the SRO’s own reputation 
(conception C1), damage to the organization’s reputation and the loss of 
organizational benefits (conception C2), reduced public benefits (conception 
C3) and being able to live with themselves (conception C4). Only conception C4 
implies that a positive judgement by the principal (in this case the SRO 
themself) is a possibility. These reflect the full range of individual, 
organizational, formal and informal sanctions in the literature (Mulgan, 2003). 
 
A further point relates to this component. As I stated in Section 2.2.3, this 
component of accountability is controversial. Some scholars exclude it from the 
concept of accountability on the grounds that accountability is answerability, 
whereas responsibility is liability (Dwivedi and Jabbra, 1989; Flinders, 2001). My 
definition does exclude the sanctions component (see Section 2.2.4). The 
empirical evidence is that SROs were in no doubt that sanctions, both formal 
and informal, would apply in the event of a project going wrong. Again these 
ranged from objective sanctions such as the loss of a bonus (conception C1) to 
subjective ones such as damage to the organization’s reputation (conception 
C2) and less excellent outcomes for the public good (conception C3). In 
conception C4, the sanctions were entirely subjective and revolved around 
whether the SRO understood that they had personally succeeded or failed. So 
the empirical evidence is that accountability does include the component of 
sanction. So the results support both Behn’s (2001) and Mulgan’s (2003) 
definition of accountability, which includes the component of sanctions.  
 
One sub-component that is missing in my data, when compared to the 
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sanctions component in the definition, is that of rectification. Both Behn (2001) 
and Mulgan (2003) include rectification as part of the consequences that might 
arise in the event of a negative judgement by the principal. The results do not 
support this. There were no SROs who stated that if something went wrong they 
would be asked to put it right. Instead, sanctions were applied. The implication 
is that putting the problem right was someone else’s task. This is logical and is 
arguably a function of the difference between individual accountability and 
institutional accountability. When something goes awry, an institution may well 
have to rectify the problem, and although the accountable individual may have 
sanctions imposed, the task of putting matters right would probably fall to 
someone else. So individual accountability, based on the data, does not include 
rectification but does include sanctions. The confirmation of sanctions and the 
refutation of rectification are two further contributions from this research.  
 
Timeframe 
One component that appeared in the data but was not in the literature was that 
of time. Different conceptions had different time horizons in which SROs 
understood they were accountable. In conception C1 SROs were accountable 
within the timeframe of the project. In conceptions C2 and C3 SROs were also 
accountable if or when the project went wrong, and when the project benefits to 
the public were realized, respectively. In conception C4 SROs were responsible 
to themselves in perpetuity. Previous literature on accountability has only 
related time to accountability as part of the continuum of control, with 
accountability as an ex ante oversight mechanism (Scott, 2000).  
 
The findings, that there are different conceptions of when the SRO is 
accountable, can be explained in terms of the time-span of discretion (Jaques, 
1976; Jaques, 1982). An empirical concept, it is defined as ‘the maximum time 
during which the manager must rely upon the discretion of his subordinate’ 
(Jaques, 1976: 109). So in the context of a permanent organization such as the 
civil service, the CEO may be concerned with a time span of up to 100 years, 
whereas a team manager may be operating within a one year time span 
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(Stamp, 1986). A development of the concept of the time span of discretion is 
that of the temporal domain, i.e. the temporal area within which all individual 
activity takes place (Jaques, 1982). At the edge of the temporal domain is the 
temporal boundary, which can be understood as the maximum time span that 
figures in an individual’s thinking. 
 
In relation to accountability and the results, the time span of accountability can 
be defined as the maximum time span at the end of which the SRO 
understands he or she will be called or held to account. The time spans in the 
different conceptions have both prescriptive and discretionary elements. Time in 
conception C1 is conceived in both prescriptive and objective terms, whereas in 
the other conceptions it is conceived in discretionary and subjective terms. In 
conception C2 the time span is also framed around when or if the project goes 
wrong. This can be the time taken for an NAO inquiry, report and subsequent 
PAC hearing, or it can be the time taken for organizations outside the SRO’s 
own to hear that there are problems. In conception C3 the time span also 
relates to when the benefits to the public of the project will be realized. This is 
highly dependent on the type, scope and scale of the project. Some projects, 
such as the Connecting for Health project for the NHS (2006), have a time span 
of ten years, whereas other projects may have much shorter time spans. The 
point in time when the SRO understands he or she will be accountable for the 
delivery of a public benefit is entirely subjective in nature. Conception C4 
extends this conception of time further still. The SRO is always responsible to 
him or herself. Time, then, almost becomes irrelevant – there is no “when” (as in 
some point in the future): the SRO is permanently and always responsible.  
 
These views of time are consistent with the description of conceptions in 
phenomenographic research. A conception has a horizon that is the limit or 
extent of conceived meaning within which activity takes place (Sandberg, 1994). 
In these results, accountability has temporal horizons, which frame the time-
span within which the SRO conceives that they will be accountable. In Section 
5.3 I established that each successive conception builds on its predecessor to 
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form a hierarchy of increasing complexity and richness. Each conception 
represents a distinct, nested set of temporal domains with different temporal 
horizons. These change from being objective and prescriptive in conception C1 
to more subjective and discretionary in conceptions C2, C3 and C4. The 
addition of time is a further contribution from this research. 
 
6.2.3 Summary 
In this section I have reviewed the results in relation to both the definition of 
accountability and the five components of accountability found in the literature. 
In relation to my literature-derived definition of accountability, conceptions C1, 
C2 and C3 are all consistent with the definition, but conception C4 is different 
and can be classified as individual responsibility. Together, the conceptions can 
be viewed as a continuum ranging from an objective, external accountability to 
a subjective, internal responsibility. In relation to the five components of 
accountability, the results are consistent across four of the five literature-derived 
components. The component of sanctions forms part of the concept of 
individual accountability, but rectification does not. Time is a new component of 
accountability that was not suggested by the literature. Regarding when the 
SRO is accountable, each conception is different, ranging from within the 
project timeframe, through if or when the project goes wrong to when the 
benefits to the public are realized. Conception C4 has a different view of time in 
that responsibility is ever present.  
 
6.3 The Results and Other Individual Conceptions of 
Accountability 
As I set out in Section 2.4.1, Sinclair (1995) and Newman (2004) are the only 
other authors to have conducted empirical research into individual conceptions 
of accountability: Sinclair (1995) identified five forms of accountability: political, 
public, managerial, professional and personal. Newman (2004) identified seven 
forms of accountability: professional, public, financial, administrative, 
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managerial, user and community. These are summarized together with the 
results in Table 6-1 below:- 
Table 6-1: Comparison of the Results of this Study with Other Studies on Individual 
Accountability 
Study Sinclair (1995) Newman (2004) Results of this Study 
Political Professional Intra-organizational 
Public Financial Inter-organizational 
Managerial Administrative Public  
Professional Managerial Individual Responsibility 
Personal User  
 
 
Form of Accountability 
 Community  
 
I shall use the results of this study as an organizing perspective for the 
purposes of comparison with Sinclair’s (1995) and Newman’s (2004) studies. 
Table 5-3 contains a full description of this study’s results.  
 
6.3.1 Conception C1: Intra-Organizational Accountability 
This form of accountability is focussed around the regular reporting of progress 
against project targets to senior managers, management groups and political 
leaders within the organization. This is comparable with Sinclair’s (1995) 
managerial accountability, which is concerned with the monitoring of inputs, 
outputs and outcomes. It also has some elements of Sinclair’s (1995) political 
accountability, which is concerned with the accountability of public servants to 
politicians. This conception also has some overlaps with Newman’s (2004) 
managerial and financial accountabilities, the former being concerned with 
accountability to line managers and the latter with accountability for finances. In 
this conception SROs were accountable to managers and management groups 
within their own organizations for compliance with their allocated budgets as 
well as other resources. In some cases, this conception also overlaps with 
Newman’s (2004) user accountability, as the users of an SRO’s project were 
located within their own organization. There are also overlaps with Newman’s 
(2004) public accountability, which includes accountability to funding sources, 
as SROs were accountable to funders, who were usually senior managers or 
management teams inside the SRO’s own organization. 
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6.3.2 Conception C2: Intra-Organizational Accountability 
Conception C2 is concerned with accountability for organizational aspects of the 
project (such as reputation and benefits) to other organizations within 
government (such as other departments, executive agencies, the NAO and the 
PAC). This has some similarity to Sinclair’s (1995) public accountability, where 
CEOs were accountable to parliamentary committees as well as to the wider 
public. The overlap between conception C2 and Sinclair’s (1995) public 
accountability also extends to accountability to parliamentary committees. Both 
the results and Sinclair’s (1995) work recognize public accountability as 
including parliamentary bodies such as the NAO and PAC (although Sinclair 
does not name the bodies). This conception also partially overlaps with 
Newman’s (2004) user accountability, as the users of an SROs project were 
users in other departments or executive agencies. It has further parallels with 
Newman’s (2004) managerial and financial accountabilities, since the latter can 
be expressed in organizational terms. However, organizational reputation is 
absent from both Sinclair’s (1995) and Newman’s (2004) work.  
 
6.3.3 Conception C3: Public Accountability 
This is concerned with SRO accountability to the public, charities and 
professions for an outcome for the public good. Some characteristics of this 
conception are common to Sinclair’s public accountability, which is defined as 
‘informal but direct accountability to the public, interested community groups 
and individuals’ (Sinclair, 1995: 225). SROs who expressed this conception 
talked about engaging with charities and professions. They also recognized that 
the public was a difficult body with which to engage directly, so charities and 
professions became proxies for the public.  
 
Newman (2004) does not define public accountability. The varied nature of the 
participants in the research (civil servants, local government officers and 
voluntary sector managers) makes it difficult to define a public to whom to be 
accountable. However, Newman (2004) suggests that public accountability is 
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about demonstrating what you are doing – ‘to funders, to government, to local 
communities, to service users, to partners and a range of other constituencies’ 
(Newman, 2004: 26). This would appear to resonate with the concept of public 
accountability in conception C3. Newman’s (2004) consumer and user 
accountabilities also match this conception, as the users of a project or the 
consumers of a service that is supported by the SRO’s project could be 
members of the public.  
 
6.3.4 Conception C4: Individual Responsibility 
This conception is based on SROs being responsible for doing the right thing. 
This has similarities with Sinclair’s (1995) personal accountability, which is 
defined as ‘fidelity to personal conscience in basic values such as respect for 
human dignity and acting in a manner that accepts responsibility for affecting 
the lives of others’ (Sinclair, 1995: 230). As such, it is based on internalized 
ethical and moral beliefs and values. The results have strong parallels with this 
view of personal accountability, as the SROs who expressed it were concerned 
with acting in accordance with their own values. One respondent who 
expressed this conception stated that when faced with a decision that 
challenged their values, they would try to do what they thought was the right 
thing, or resign. A similar sentiment was expressed by one of Sinclair’s 
respondents: ‘Ultimately, if the government insists, I either implement their 
policies or step down. One would hope it doesn’t come to this – but I guess 
that’s the bottom line’ (1995: 231). Newman also recognizes personal 
responsibility. It is ‘based on qualities such as integrity, honesty, trust, 
professionalism and inclusiveness’ (2004: 25). It is not entirely clear whether 
Newman’s definition is completely consistent with conception C4. However, 
conception C4 is based around personal values, of which integrity, honesty, 
trust and professionalism were part.  
6.3.5 Summary 
The results of this research confirm many aspects of the extant literature on 
individual accountability. However, the nature of the results coupled with the 
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different contexts of the existing research make comparisons fraught with 
difficulty. There are significant overlaps between the forms of accountability 
outlined by other scholars and conceptions C1, C3 and C4. Public, personal, 
managerial, financial, user, community and administrative accountabilities all 
have overlaps with intra-organizational (C1) and public accountability (C3) as 
well as with personal responsibility (C4).  
 
In the case of conception C2 (intra-organizational accountability) the parallels 
are much smaller. The reasons for this are not clear: it may be that 
accountability for an SRO’s own organization is a form of accountability peculiar 
to the civil service. Sinclair (1995) and Newman (2004) both used existing forms 
of accountability derived from the institutional accountability literature rather 
than empirically derived forms of accountability. Overall there are significant 
parallels between the existing research on individual accountability and the 
results of this research. What the conceptions do reveal is that unlike both 
Sinclair’s (1995) and Newman’s (2004) studies, accountability is not a uniformly 
understood concept. It is understood in four qualitatively different ways. The 
refutation of accountability as a uniformly understood concept is a further 
contribution from this research. 
 
6.4 The Results and Other Typologies of Accountability 
In Chapter 2 I divided the various typologies of accountability into three broad 
categories: principal / mechanism typologies, subject based typologies, and one 
information and provision typology. I shall now discuss the results of this study 
in relation to these three groups. 
6.4.1 Principal / Mechanism Typologies 
In Section 2.2.4 I identified two distinct groups within this set of typologies: an 
American set and a “Westminster” set. I shall compare each of these in turn. 
 
American Typologies 
In relation to the American set of typologies, it is difficult to make a comparison 
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between the results of this study and Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) four types 
of accountability. This typology is based on the degree of institutional control 
over its own actions (high or low) and the source of agency control (internal or 
external). It is difficult to make any significant statement about how the results of 
this research relate to this typology, as I was not concerned with the source of 
accountability demands placed on the SRO. This means that I have not been 
able to establish or differentiate between the dimensions of institutional control 
and agency control on which Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) study is based.  
 
In relation to Deleon’s (1998) work, different conceptions reflect different forms 
of accountability. Conception C1 reflects a bureaucratic accountability (goals 
clear, means known). So in conception C1, the SRO is accountable for an 
objectively defined outcome (known goals) to a defined set of managers and 
management teams through a set of formal reporting mechanisms (known 
means). It is not entirely clear to what extent conceptions C2, C3 and C4 reflect 
different forms of accountability in Deleon’s (1998) typology. It is arguable that 
they reflect more than one form of accountability in this typology. If the goals are 
clear but the means are not, then conceptions C2, C3 and C4 reflect 
professional accountability (goals clear, means unknown). The goals in 
conceptions C2, C3 and C4 are the different subjects of the SRO’s 
accountability in Table 5-3: an aspect of the organization, a public benefit and 
doing the right thing respectively. The means are the different forms of fulfilment 
in each conception. If the goals are unclear and the means are unclear, this 
would suggest that conceptions C2, C3 and C4 reflect anarchic accountability. 
Similarly if the goals are clear but the means are clear, then they reflect political 
accountability. None of these different forms of accountability derived by Deleon 
(1998) can entirely be ruled out of the results, as there are overlaps with the 
conceptions. However, it is not possible to make a direct comparison for 
conceptions other than conception C1.  
 
“Westminster” Typologies 
The similarities between the results and the “Westminster” typologies are far 
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more evident. Conception C1 contains elements of Oliver’s (1991) political 
accountability, since Oliver allocates to ministers the accountability of civil 
servants in this category. Conception C1 also has a considerable degree of 
overlap with managerial accountability, which is concerned with managerial 
control of government departments though the use of specific objectives 
(Lawton and Rose, 1991; Stone, 1995; Flinders, 2001).  
 
There are strong parallels between conception C2, inter-organizational 
accountability and parliamentary accountability (Pyper, 1996a; Flinders, 2001) 
due to the inclusion of the NAO and PAC in the conception. The NAO and PAC 
also crop up in legal / judicial accountability (Lawton and Rose, 1991). It also 
has some similarities with Stone’s (1995) network relations accountability, which 
is concerned with relationships between individuals and organizations that work 
together in a particular area.  
 
Conception C3, public accountability, has a direct relationship with the public 
accountability defined in the literature: accountability to the public, individuals 
and community groups (Oliver, 1991; Pyper, 1996a). The data does not, 
however, include the Citizen’s Charter, the Patient’s Charter and consumer 
accountability (Lawton and Rose, 1991; Oliver, 1991; Pyper, 1996a).  
 
Conception C4, personal responsibility, also has a direct relationship with 
personal accountability as defined by Sinclair (1995) and Newman (2004), as 
explained in Section 6.3. 
 
6.4.2 Subject Based Typologies 
In Chapter 2 I outlined two subject based accountability typologies. Day and 
Klein (1987) differentiated between political accountability (where standards for 
the judgement of action were contestable) and managerial accountability (where 
standards for the judgement of action were agreed). Managerial accountability 
can be further subdivided into fiscal, process and programme accountabilities 
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(or economic, efficiency and effectiveness accountabilities). Behn (2001) takes 
a similar view - accountability can be for finance, fairness or performance. 
 
Conception C1 has a managerial accountability focus, as it is concerned with 
both fiscal and programme accountabilities (Day and Klein, 1987) and with 
finance and performance (Behn, 2001). Conception C1 is concerned with the 
SRO being accountable for both resources and the achievement of project 
performance targets. Conception C2 does not directly fit with either of these 
typologies - the SRO is accountable for an aspect of their own organization. 
However, an NAO report and PAC hearing can be concerned with financial, 
process and performance aspects of a project. The outcome of either of these 
events can have a substantial impact on an SRO’s own organization. There is 
then an indirect relationship between conception C2 and the two typologies.  
 
Conception C3, public accountability, has no direct relationship with either of the 
subject based typologies. It does have an indirect relationship with 
accountability for fairness (Behn, 2001). In this conception SROs are 
accountable for the delivery of a public benefit. Fairness in the administration of 
public services is arguably a public benefit, so the delivery of a project that, say, 
improved support to individuals appealing against the dismissal of a claim for 
benefits, would in effect mean that the SRO was accountable for fairness. 
Conception C4 - individual responsibility - has no relationship with either of 
these typologies.  
 
6.4.3 Information Seeking and Provision Typologies 
The one typology in this category has five elements: redirectory, informatory, 
explanatory, amendatory and sacrificial (Marshall, 1984; McVicar et al., 1998; 
Flinders, 2001) (see Chapter 2 for more details). I shall deal with each of these 
in turn. 
 
There are no parallels between redirectory accountability and the results of this 
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research. The SRO is accountable for the project and there is no one else that 
the SRO can redirect any queries to. Many respondents talked about how they 
understood that they alone carried the accountability for the project. There are 
overlaps between informatory and explanatory accountability and conceptions 
C1, C2 and C3. SROs gave out information and provided explanations to the 
superiors and management teams within their own organization (conception 
C1), to the NAO, PAC and other peer organizations (conception C2) and to the 
public, charities and professions (conception C3). There are no parallels 
between the results and amendatory accountability. The results make no 
mention of putting matters right should a project go wrong. However, there is a 
strong overlap between the results and sacrificial accountability. All SROs 
understood that they faced significant personal consequences if a project went 
wrong, including the loss of employment.  
6.4.4 Summary 
In this section I have compared the findings of this thesis with existing 
typologies of accountability. There are some parallels between the findings and 
the existing typologies of accountability. The degree of overlap with the 
American typologies is not large, although there are far greater overlaps with 
the “Westminster” typologies. The findings exhibit a high degree of commonality 
with political, parliamentary, public and managerial types of accountability. The 
results also exhibit some parallels with the subject based typologies, with 
conception C1 exhibiting a high degree of resonance with managerial 
accountability (Day and Klein, 1987). Conceptions C2 and C3 only have an 
indirect relationship with these typologies and conception C4 has no 
relationship at all. The data and results provide empirical evidence for the co-
existence of theoretically derived types of accountability with three conceptions 
of accountability. There are also some parallels between the information 
provision and judgement typology. These overlaps are partial, as the typology is 
based on the doctrine of ministerial accountability and this research concerns 
only SROs who are civil servants. This demonstrates the difficulty of using 
theoretically derived typologies in practice.  
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6.5 The Results and Accountability under NPM 
In Section 2.3.2 I described how NPM has had an impact on the accountability 
of civil servants. The NPM model of accountability requires the clear 
assignment of power rather than the diffusion of power, a clear, objective 
statement of goals and a focus on results rather than procedures (Hood, 1991). 
NPM has shifted the traditional objectives of governance away from socio-
economic progress, the alleviation of poverty, impartiality, fairness and justice to 
values such as efficiency, effectiveness and economic growth (Parker and 
Gould, 1999; Haque, 2000). Accountability for process has become 
accountability for results (Kernaghan, 2000). These changes have highlighted 
and exacerbated an existing accountability gap between the rhetoric of the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility and the practice of civil servant 
accountability, a gap that has developed as a result of the expansion of the 
state since the mid-19th century and the introduction of the parliamentary select 
committee system (Pyper, 1996a; Barberis, 1998). Some literature is strongly 
suggestive of the displacement of traditional accountability subjects and 
principals by those propagated by NPM (Parker and Gould, 1999). Bowerman 
(1998) suggests that there are conflicts and tensions between traditional public 
sector accountabilities and those created by NPM. These tensions also arise 
out of different interpretations of accountability and between the demands of 
different principals (Bowerman, 1998).  
 
There are three points that arise from the results in relation to NPM. First, the 
NPM emphasis on clearly assigned accountability for an objective performance 
target has been universally adopted and understood by SROs. All SROs 
expressed conception C1. Conception C1 is consistent with the NPM approach 
to accountability: clear, objectively defined goals, a defined set of principals, the 
clear allocation of authority and responsibility through hierarchical control 
(Rhodes, 1997). It is also consistent with the intra-organizational focus of NPM 
(Rhodes, 1997). 
 
Second, contrary to the suggestions made by some scholars, the NPM 
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approach to accountability has not entirely displaced traditional accountabilities. 
Conception C2 is consistent with the traditional characteristics of the 
bureaucratic organization with its emphasis on the needs of the organization 
(Kernaghan, 2000). Conception C3 is consistent with the traditional notions of 
accountability for the delivery of a benefit to the public and is concerned with 
accountability subjects such as fairness, justice and the prudent use of public 
resources by questioning whether a project is in the public interest. So in 
conceptions C2 and C3 traditional notions of accountability sit side by side with 
NPM accountabilities for performance. These findings, that traditional forms of 
accountability have not been displaced by NPM derived accountabilities 
together with their co-existence, represent two further contributions from this 
research. 
 
Third, there did not appear to be any tension or conflict between conception C1, 
with its NPM approach to accountability, and conceptions C2 and C3. SROs 
who expressed conceptions C2 and C3 did not express or reveal any hints of 
conflict in the way they expressed their conceptions of accountability. Instead, 
they formed a unitary, integrative and complex understanding of it. Those SROs 
who expressed conception C4 did suggest that they could see the potential for 
conflict between their own ethical and moral values and the requirements 
imposed on them by their respective organizations. They suggested that given 
the choice between what they believed in and what they could be asked to do, 
they would choose what they believed in and resign. This represents a further 
contribution from this research. 
 
6.6 The Results and Accountability in the Differentiated Polity 
In Section 2.3.3 I described the changes in the structure of the civil service 
since the inception of the current accountability doctrine in the 1870s. Civil 
servants no longer work in a Weberian hierarchy, but rather at the centre of a 
wide network of private sector suppliers, public agencies, non-departmental 
public bodies, policy interest groups, charities, professions, customers, citizens, 
 
196 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six               Discussion 
 
politicians and tax payers - described by Rhodes as a ‘differentiated polity’ 
(Rhodes, 1994: 4). Public services and policies are not decided by the prime 
minister and the cabinet: ‘rather, policies “emerge” from the deliberations of 
discrete, organized, closed networks of policy actors, although ministers and 
their departments are important players’ (Rhodes, Carmichael, McMillan, and 
Massey, 2003: 8). This emphasis on networks is a notable feature of the Labour 
government, which has emphasised the importance of trust-based networks for 
the delivery of public services (Rhodes and Bevir, 2001). Considine explains 
why these networks are problematic for traditional notions of accountability in 
the civil service. 
 
‘Accountability cannot be defined primarily either as the following of 
rules or as honest communication with one’s superiors. Rather it now 
involves what might be thought of as the appropriate exercise of a 
navigational competence: that is, the proper use of authority to range 
freely across a multirelationship terrain in search of the most 
advantageous path to success’ (Considine, 2002: 22).  
 
The results of this study reveal the complexity of accountability in government. 
Conception C1 shows that accountability to one’s superiors remains the 
dominant form of accountability in the civil service, since all SROs expressed 
this conception. Conceptions C2 and C3 add further complexity to this basic 
intra-organizational and hierarchical conception of accountability, revealing the 
extent to which public service definition and delivery is dependent on inter-
organizational co-ordination both within and without government.  
 
Conception C2, with its emphasis on peer organizations within government (and 
therefore momentarily excluding the NAO and PAC), reflects a form of 
accountability known as mutuality, which ‘involves accountability to a peer-
group rather than an external regulator, and shapes individual behaviour by 
group influence’ (Hood, 1998: 11). Mutuality is a characteristic of networks, 
where accountability is enforced by peers, and of traditional professions, where 
accountability is enforced by fellow professionals (Hood, 1998). It is similar to 
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Stone’s (1995) network relations accountability (see Section 2.2.2). The 
mutuality apparent in conception C2 reflects the ‘multiple sites of discretion in a 
complex, multi-level and dispersed field’ (Newman, 2004: 20). It is at least as 
important as accountability to managerial superiors and ministers (Stone, 1995). 
Mutuality is distinct from other types of accountability by virtue of the large 
number of actors that can be involved and ‘by the means through which 
administrative decision-making is legitimized’ (Stone, 1993: 518). In this case, 
mutuality works in both formal and informal ways. Formally, an SRO may have 
to co-ordinate their work with that of other departments and executive agencies. 
Informally, the SRO may wish to keep a peer in a related area informed on 
matters of mutual interest, rather than there being any formal relationship. 
 
Conception C3 also involves mutuality. In this conception the ‘dispersed field of 
agency and power’ (Newman, 2004: 20) now extends outside the realm of 
government. The SRO may seek advice and information on solutions to policy 
problems from charities, professions, policy interest groups as well as industry. 
This engagement is informal in nature, as the data suggests that the SRO 
engages with these bodies on an ad-hoc basis, with no formal mechanism for 
the SRO being held to account for their actions. SROs, as senior civil servants, 
are then important players in these exogenous networks (Rhodes et al., 2003). 
Conception C3 represents a more complex picture of a network, as in addition 
to the inter-departmental network of conception C2, there is now a wider, 
external network.  
 
The cumulative nature of the conceptions suggests that not all SROs recognize 
or navigate their way around these complex networks. Those who expressed 
conception C1 conceptually remained within the bounds of their organization, 
whereas those who expressed conceptions C2 and C3 went beyond these 
boundaries to co-ordinate and co-operate with other departments and executive 
agencies, and with a range of bodies outside government respectively. Those 
SROs who expressed either of these two conceptions have an understanding of 
accountability strongly akin to Spiro’s (2005) “multicentric accountability”, in that 
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SROs are accountable not only to their management, but to others ‘to different 
degrees, in different ways’ (Spiro, 1969: 98). These conceptions reflect the 
evolution of accountability from a top-down hierarchical form to a wider, more 
subjective form that reflects the complexity of the networks which comprise 
governance in the United Kingdom (Rhodes et al., 2003). 
6.7 The Results and the Paradox of Accountability 
In Sections 2.2.5 I have defined the concept of accountability. In the context of 
democratic government this definition raises a paradox, the resolution of which 
poses fundamental questions over the nature of the relationship between 
administrators and politicians. The paradox is as follows:- 
 
‘If public servants are accountable solely for the effective achievement 
of purposes mandated by political authority, then as mere instruments 
of that authority they bear no personal responsibility as moral agents for 
the products of their actions. If, on the other hand, public servants 
actively participate in determining public purposes, their accountability is 
compromised and political authority is undermined’ (Harmon, 1995: 
163-164). 
 
This paradox goes to the heart of the definition of accountability and the 
distinction I have drawn between it and responsibility. The paradox has been 
the source of an ongoing debate in the field of public administration since the 
1940s, first expressed in terms of different forms of responsibility, but latterly 
pursued in terms of different types of accountability (Mulgan, 2003). Harmon 
(1995) has split the antagonists into two camps - “hard-core” rationalist and 
“soft-core” rationalist groups. The former group, consisting of the scholars Finer 
(1941), Simon (1945) and Burke (1986), ‘cleave more strictly to the 
assumptions of rationalism’ (Harmon, 1995: 40), whilst the latter group, 
consisting of the scholars Friedrich (1940), Waldo (1952) and Cooper (1998), 
‘relax those assumptions without abandoning then altogether in order to 
subsume a wider range of opinion, or in the interest of flexibility, to account for 
practical difficulties in applying them in real-world situations’ (Harmon, 1995: 
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40).  
 
This debate has been characterized as a schismogenic paradox (Harmon, 
1995). The term “schismogenic” ‘refers to arguments, theories or perspectives 
that are broken or split at the outset’ (Quinn, 1988: 26). A schismogenic 
paradox can be defined ‘both as statements, singly or in sets, that either lead to 
self-contradictory conclusions or contradict one another, and as situations in 
which particular actions produce consequences that are contradictory to those 
intended, but which on closer examination are predictable and even logically 
inevitable’ (Harmon, 1995: 76). In the case of the paradox of accountability, 
there is ‘an irreconcilable conflict between hard-core and soft-core rationalism in 
which each side is able to marshal crippling objections against the other’ 
(Harmon, 1995: 164).  
 
The paradox of accountability is a result of dialectical interaction between the 
paradoxical character of both human nature and the institutional environment 
(Talbot, 2005). Whilst there are many different paradoxes, Lewis (2000) 
categorizes three types of paradox: learning, organizing and belonging. The 
paradox of accountability is both an organizing paradox, as it involves 
‘conflicting yet simultaneous demands for control and flexibility’ (Lewis, 2000: 
765-766) that arise out of the conflict between the delegation of administrative 
power and political control, and a belonging paradox as it involves the ‘complex 
relationships between self and other’ (Lewis, 2000: 766), the self being the 
accountable individual and the other being politicians and the public. This latter 
paradox arises out of the fundamental nature of individual accountability as a 
relationship between human agents and social systems (Tetlock, 1999).  
 
This paradox suggests that SROs are either accountable or responsible, but 
cannot be both. Conception C1 is consistent with a non-paradoxical view of 
accountability, as SROs who expressed this conception were accountable for 
achieving their projects’ objectives. However, these objectives were defined by 
their managerial superiors and ultimately emanated from their political leaders. 
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One SRO recounted that a minister had left the SRO’s department for a number 
of years and then returned to find the project he had mandated had not been 
completed. He then directed that it should be completed - and quickly.  
 
Conception C2 is also consistent with this non-paradoxical view of 
accountability, which in this conception, is focussed on the achievement of 
organizational improvements, an objective that is jointly determined with others. 
SROs also engage with other departments in order to market their projects and 
establish its relevance both to their own organization and others. This requires 
agreement, which cannot be imposed (Habermas, 1984). In seeking and 
making such an agreement, the SRO is seeking to achieve a particular end – 
the enhancement or protection of the reputation of their organization.  
 
In conception C3 SROs actively participated in the determination of public 
purposes through engagement with the public or their assumed proxies – 
charities and professions. In doing so they are agreeing and determining public 
purposes. However, because of the cumulative nature of the conceptions, those 
SROs who expressed this conception also expressed conceptions C2 and C1.  
 
Therefore conception C3 should reflect the paradox of accountability. Allowing 
civil servants to decide on public purposes results in either the atrophy of 
political control or, if they do not decide on such purposes, the atrophy of 
personal responsibility (Harmon, 1995). However, this conception has both the 
political and managerial control of conceptions C1 and C2, and the 
determination of public purposes (conception C3). The SROs who expressed 
this conception have therefore ‘become purposive without becoming 
schismogenic’ (Quinn, 1988: 43). So they have in some way dealt with this 
paradox. Lewis (2000) states that paradox can be dealt with through either 
avoidance, confrontation or transcendence. Unlike conceptions C1 and C2 
where the paradox is either unrecognized or avoided, the SROs who expressed 
this conception have either confronted the paradox or transcended it. 
Confronting a paradox suggests conflict and tension between the opposing 
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sides and involves reframing the paradox as an antinomial one, which ‘can only 
be struggled with rather than solved’ (Harmon, 1995: 77). Yet tension and 
conflict are not present in the data, either in the nature of the responses or their 
tenor. The SROs who expressed conception C3 have transcended the paradox 
and changed it from ‘either/or to both/and’ (Chen, 2002: 187). The ‘opposites in 
a paradox are not simply elements bound in a state of tension, but components 
interacting to form a state of wholeness’ (Chen, 2002: 188). These opposites 
have become interdependent rather than mutually exclusive.  
 
This notion, that the paradox has been transcended, also applies to conception 
C4, individual responsibility. The cumulative nature of the conceptions means 
that those SROs who expressed conception C4 also expressed all the other 
conceptions. In this case the determination of public purposes not only involves 
political authority and the public, but the personal beliefs and values of the 
SROs themselves. Conception C4, therefore, contains the political and 
managerial control of conceptions C1 and C2, the active determination of public 
purposes of conception C3 and the SROs own personal beliefs and values. 
They have then transcended the paradox of accountability and yet remained 
cognizant of the potential for conflict between their own values and beliefs and 
the organizational demands placed upon them. These findings, that the paradox 
of accountability is either ignored or transcended, are two further contributions 
from this research. 
 
6.8 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented the aims, methods and results of my research 
and discussed the relationship between the results and six key areas of 
literature: the definition of accountability; existing work on individual conceptions 
of accountability; existing typologies of accountability; the NPM view of 
accountability; accountability in the ‘differentiated polity’ (Rhodes, 1997: 4); and 
the paradox of accountability. I have also discussed the significance of the fact 
that a “public contact” department is correlated with conception C3.  
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The four conceptions of accountability identified in this study are consistent with 
the definition of accountability I presented in Section 2.2.1. All SROs 
understood that accountability included the component of sanction, a finding 
that contradicts the views of some scholars. Rectification, a component of 
accountability that most scholars would include in a definition of accountability, 
was absent from the data. A newly identified component of accountability – time 
– showed that those with different conceptions of accountability took different 
views of when they were accountable. This reflects a concept known as the 
time-span of discretion. In relation to accountability, this is the maximum time-
span at the end of which the SRO could be called to account. The four 
conceptions exist on a continuum ranging from the objective, explicit 
accountability of conception C1 to the subjective, implicit responsibility of 
conception C4. Each conception has a distinct temporal domain, at the edge of 
which is a temporal boundary representing the temporal limit of the perceived 
meaning of accountability within a conception.  
 
The results have significant overlaps with both Sinclair’s (1995) and Newman’s 
(2004) work. However, these overlaps are imprecise as a result of the 
differences between the inductive, data-driven approach inherent in 
phenomenography and the theoretically-based social constructivist approaches 
that both Sinclair (1995) and Newman (2004) have used. Whilst the parallels 
with the American constitutional accountability typologies are not significant, 
there is a considerable degree of resonance between the “Westminster” 
typologies and the results of this research. The extent of the resonance 
depends on the particular scholar’s definition of public, political, parliamentary 
or managerial accountability adopted. The results also show that the NPM 
approach to accountability has been universally understood by SROs in the 
sample. The literature suggests that the NPM emphasis on the clear 
assignment of accountability for the achievement of a performance target has 
displaced traditional notions of accountability such as fairness, equity and 
justice. However, the data shows that this is not the case for conception C3, 
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which is concerned with assigned accountability for an objective target and 
more traditional notions of accountability such as fairness, justice and the 
prudent use of public resources. Finally, those SROs who expressed 
conceptions C3 and C4 show that the paradox of accountability first posed by 
Friedrich (1940) and Finer (1941) has been transcended. Conceptions C3 and 
C4 also reveal a subjective, communicative accountability to the public co-
existing with an instrumental accountability to political masters in conceptions 
C1 and C2. In conception C4 this subjective, communicative accountability to 
the public co-exists with a further internalized subjective individual responsibility 
to personal values.  
 
Based on the review of the results presented in this chapter, the contributions to 
knowledge made by this research and summarized in this section are presented 
in Table 6-2 (overleaf). 
Table 6-2: Summary of Research Contributions to Knowledge 
Research 
Findings 
Contributions to Fields of Knowledge 
Five attributes of 
accountability 
Contributions to concept of accountability at the level of the individual: 
• Confirmation that the concept of accountability includes the 
attribute of sanction 
• Refutation that the concept of accountability includes the 
component rectification 
• Addition of the attribute of time to the concept of accountability 
• Addition of four qualitatively different understandings of the 
attributes of accountability 
 
Four levels of 
conception of 
accountability 
Contributions to individual conceptions of accountability: 
• Addition of hierarchy of conceptions of accountability 
• Refutation of accountability as a uniformly understood concept  
• Refutation of Harmon’s (1995) paradox of accountability  
• Addition of conceptions of accountability as an interdependent, 
integrated whole 
 
Four levels of 
conception of 
accountability 
Contributions to NPM perspective of accountability 
• Refutation of complete displacement of traditional 
accountabilities such as accountability to the public by NPM 
performance based accountability 
• Refutation of tension between NPM performance based 
accountability and traditional accountabilities such as 
accountability to the public 
Addition of co-existence of NPM performance target based 
accountability alongside traditional accountabilities such as 
accountability to the public  
. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
This chapter has five sections. In section 7.1 the wider theoretical implications 
of the research are discussed. I present the practical implications for theory and 
practice in section 7.2. In section 7.3 I examine the limitations of this research. I 
suggest an agenda for future research in this area in section 7.4 and close the 
thesis in section 7.5.  
 
7.1 Implications for Theory 
Table 6-2 presents 11 contributions to knowledge that are based on this 
research. I shall deal with the theoretical implications of these contributions in 
the next three sub-sections. 
7.1.1 Contributions to the concept of accountability at the individual 
level 
The results have four implications for the concept of accountability at the 
individual level. First, the results demonstrate that the concept of accountability 
at this level includes the component of sanctions. In section 2.2.3 I reviewed the 
literature on this aspect of accountability. Both Behn (2001) and Mulgan (2003) 
argue that accountability is ineffective without sanctions. This contrasts with the 
views of other scholars such as Thynne and Goldring (1987), Dwivedi and 
Jabbra (1989), Lawton and Rose (1991) and Flinders (2001). These scholars 
exclude sanctions from their definition of accountability. The results provide 
empirical support of a definition of accountability at this level that includes the 
component of sanctions.  
Second, the results refute that the concept of accountability at the level of the 
individual includes the component of rectification. Both Behn (2001) and Mulgan 
(2003) propose that rectification is part of the consequences that potentially 
could arise if the principal delivers a negative judgement. In Chapter 6 I argued 
that this was a result of the difference between individual and institutional 
accountability. Institutions may be asked to correct mistakes, whereas 
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individuals have sanctions imposed on them. The task of putting matters right 
falls to someone else. The data provides empirical support for excluding the 
component of rectification from the definition of accountability at this level.  
Third, the addition of the component of time to accountability implies that the 
definition of accountability would have to be extended to cover this component. 
This is not aspect of accountability that appears in the extant literature on 
accountability. However, the component time is consistent with the empirical 
concept the time-span of discretion (Jaques, 1976; Jaques, 1982). The four 
conceptions reflect different temporal boundaries within which the SRO 
conceives they will be accountable. The data supports a definition of 
accountability that includes time as one of the components of accountability at 
this level. 
 
Taking these points together and based on my earlier definition of accountability 
in Chapter 2, individual accountability can now be re-defined as a social 
relationship, with resources and responsibilities entrusted to a steward 
for a particular task by one or more principals, with the consequent 
potential for an account to be called for at some future time, judgement 
made and sanctions imposed.  
 
7.1.2 Contributions to individual conceptions of accountability 
Four implications arise from the four conceptions of individual accountability 
(Table 6-2). The first implication is based on the four qualitatively different 
conceptions of accountability. In Section 2.3.4 I concluded that SROs may have 
understandings of what they are accountable for and to whom they are 
accountable that are different from those defined by others. In Section 3.4 I 
further developed these conclusions. I proposed that first, the different ways in 
which accountability is understood by different SROs should be classifiable as 
one of a limited number of qualitatively different conceptions, and second, that 
the different ways in which individual accountability is conceived by different 
SROs could be arranged as a hierarchy of increasing inclusiveness and 
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complexity. I reviewed these conclusions in this research and the findings 
provide empirical evidence that the conclusions are correct.  
 
Second, the four conceptions demonstrate that accountability is not understood 
in the same way by all individuals in this particular social group. This finding 
refutes the implication of previous research, that accountability is uniformly 
understood by individuals (Sinclair, 1995) and provides empirical support for 
Newman’s (2004) view, that not all accountability discourses were given equal 
weight by her respondents. The data supports the notion that accountability is 
conceived by individuals in one (or more) of four qualitatively different ways.  
 
Third, conceptions C3 and C4 show that accountability is not understood in 
schismogenic terms, but rather as a complex, integrated, interdependent whole. 
This finding implies that the long-running debate, between the “hard-core” and 
“soft-core” rationalists in the field of public administration (Harmon, 1995) 
described in Chapter 6, is a theoretical one. The data establishes that those 
individuals who expressed conceptions C3 and C4 adopted a more complex 
and integrative understanding of accountability than the bi-polar nature of the 
debate between the “hard-core” and “soft-core” rationalists would imply. For 
these individuals there is no atrophy of either the political authority inherent in 
conception C1 or of the wider accountabilities of conceptions C3 and C4. 
Instead these individuals have transcended the paradox (Chen, 2002). These 
opposites, derived from the paradox of accountability (Harmon, 1995), become 
interdependent in these higher conceptions (Chen, 2002). The implication is 
that it is possible to determine public purposes without undermining political 
control. This challenges the notions put forward by the “hard-core” rationalists 
such as Finer (1941), Simon (1945) and Burke (1986) that civil servants cannot 
participate in determining public purposes without undermining democratically 
elected politicians. Instead the data tends to support the notions put forward by 
scholars such as Friedrich (1940), Waldo (1952) and Cooper (1998), that the 
practical limitations of political control result in the partial determination of public 
purposes by civil servants.  
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Fourth, the conceptions form a new typology of accountability. Whilst it is 
difficult to compare the American typologies such as those from Romzek and 
Dubnick (1987) and Deleon (1998) because of the different constitutional 
context, there are strong similarities between the conceptions and the 
“Westminster” typologies. Conception C1 is consistent with managerial 
accountability (Lawton and Rose, 1991; Stone, 1995; Flinders, 2001). 
Conception C2 reflects both parliamentary accountability (Pyper, 1996a; 
Flinders, 2001) and legal / judicial accountability (Lawton and Rose, 1991). 
Conception C3, public accountability, has a more direct relationship with the 
public accountability defined by scholars such as Oliver (1991) and Pyper 
(1996a). Conception C4, personal responsibility, has a direct relationship with 
both Sinclair’s (1995) and Newman’s (2004) personal accountability. The 
differences between current typologies and the results arise out of the 
perspective adopted in this research – that of the steward, the accountable 
individual.  
7.1.3 Contributions to the NPM perspective on accountability 
In Table 6-2 I presented three contributions in this field of knowledge. The 
theoretical implications of these contributions are twofold. The first relates to the 
finding that individuals fulfil the accountability relationships they conceive rather 
than just those that are mandated in conceptions C1 and C2. The implication of 
this finding is that defined and mandated accountability has not entirely 
displaced traditional notions of accountability. Whilst the SRO is accountable to 
a defined management group for the achievement of a performance target, the 
four different conceptions reveal the complex nature of accountability. 
Traditional notions of accountability to the public and to the SROs own 
organization (Parker and Gould, 1999; Haque, 2000) sit alongside 
accountability for results (Kernaghan, 2000) in conceptions C2 and C3. 
Expressed differently, accountability for outcomes has not replaced traditional 
process accountability, but instead is conceived in complementary terms in 
conceptions C2 and C3. Neither is there tension between these traditional 
notions of accountability and the defined and mandated accountabilities of 
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conceptions C1 and C2 (Bowerman, 1998). Instead, those SROs who 
expressed conceptions C3 and C4 integrated the defined and mandated 
accountabilities of conceptions C1 and C2 with traditional accountabilities.  
 
The second implication of the four conceptions in this field of knowledge relates 
to the notion of governance. The nature of the British state has changed from a 
departmental hierarchy to a series of ‘self-organizing, inter-organizational 
networks’ (Rhodes, 1997: 53). The civil servant sits at the centre of a wide 
network of private sector suppliers, public agencies, non-departmental public 
bodies, policy interest groups, charities, professions, customers, citizens, 
politicians and tax payers. Organizations within these networks are 
interdependent and interact with each other according to a set of negotiated 
rules (Rhodes, 1997). The networks themselves are self-organizing and 
autonomous: the state can only indirectly steer or influence them (Rhodes, 
1997). This leads to the idea of governance, rather than government. Flinders 
has defined governance theory as ‘the study of the structural manifestation of 
state adaptation to its external social, political and economic environment with 
particular reference to the evolving processes and mechanisms of control, co-
ordination, accountability and the location of power within complex networks’ 
(2002: 54). My focus is on the accountability aspect of this theory. 
The four conceptions represent the evolution of the practice of civil servant 
accountability, from a restricted practice internal to the civil service, to one that 
has changed to suit the networked nature of governance. The conceptions also 
reveal that a form of accountability known as mutuality, in which peer-group 
accountability shapes and regulates individual behaviour, plays a significant role 
(Hood, 1998) both within and without government. The conceptions also reflect 
Considine’s (2002) view of accountability as a means of navigating these 
complex networks. They also reveal how SROs have reconciled traditional 
accountabilities with the demands of performance management whilst working 
within intra- and extra-governmental networks. The implication of this 
reconciliation is that whilst the doctrine of accountability remains unchanged, 
individual SROs have developed four different conceptions of accountability 
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that, to different degrees, reflect the evolving form of the state.  
7.2 Implications for Practice 
Two practical implications arise from the four conceptions of accountability. The 
first relates to the current accountability doctrine. The Ministerial Code of 
Conduct (2001) states that ministers are accountable to Parliament for every act 
of their departments or associated executive agencies. However, ‘a lacuna has 
become apparent in the system of responsibility to Parliament, only partially 
closed by the emergence of a limited direct accountability of civil servants’ 
(Turpin, 1994: 109). In Chapter 2 I outlined the changes that have produced this 
disparity. Without either constitutional reform or a regression of government to 
the state of affairs that existed in the latter half of the 19th century when the 
current doctrine was developed, these changes, and the resultant disparity 
between practice and doctrine, are unlikely to disappear. One means of 
resolving this disparity is to recast the doctrine of ministerial accountability 
(Barberis, 1998). Any revision to the doctrine would have to determine the exact 
scope of authority delegated to civil servants and the boundaries between civil 
servants and ministers (Giddings, 1995). Barberis (1998) suggests a clearly 
defined set of zones of civil servant accountability: these include accountability 
for management, administrative functioning, discretion and finance to select 
committees, ombudsmen, the NAO and individual citizens. Ministerial 
accountability would then cover legislation, policy and the system boundaries 
within which management operates. Ministers would also continue to be 
accountable to the public, the Prime Minister and to Parliament.  
Under this recasting, the management of projects would fall within the 
boundaries of civil servant accountability. Project management has become a 
matter of great interest to select committees (House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts, 30th October 2006), with calls for the results of OGC Gateway 
Reviews to be made public (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 
2005) and thus subject to examination by the committees. However, the 
rationale for any project would remain with ministers as part of their policy 
accountability. The recasting of the doctrine and the formalization of civil service 
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accountability would in effect ‘mean the transposition into certain other areas of 
the kind of “competencies” already discharged by accounting officers’ (Barberis, 
1998: 467). In this case, the recasting would recognize the accountability of the 
SRO for the project. The accountability of the SRO to select committees for the 
management of the project would at least then be on an official basis.  
The second implication of the four conceptions relates to the audit of 
government projects. The political accountability of ministers to Parliament is 
dependent on effective managerial accountability for economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness by civil servants (Power, 1997). These notions are the focus of 
conceptions C1 and C2, where accountability is concerned with the 
achievement of performance targets (conception C1) and if the project goes 
wrong, to the NAO and PAC (conception C2). The inter-organizational aspects 
of conception C2, the public accountability aspects of conception C3 and the 
individual responsibility of conception C4 are outside the notions of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. These are aspects of accountability that are not 
currently captured in the audit process. Capturing these aspects may assist the 
NAO with its work but may also create problems for the NAO. The NAO is a 
‘neutral relay which enables Parliament to monitor the executive’ (Power, 1997: 
47) and as such does not evaluate the ends of government activity, only the 
means. Auditing what constitutes a public good (conception C3) or inter-
organizational accountability (conception C2) implies evaluating the ends which 
the projects are attempting to achieve. In the new accountability model I have 
described earlier, these ends would fall into the realm of the accountability of 
politicians, so the NAO would be making value judgments that could challenge 
the perceived neutrality of the NAO. Such a report from the NAO could 
potentially divide the PAC on party lines, thus undermining its credibility (Power, 
1997). It may well be that rather than capture these dimensions of audit, these 
should be left to the judgement of civil servants and politicians. Nevertheless, 
the extension of audit into these areas may well yield additional audit 
information that may provide further support for the decisions taken by an SRO 
in the course of a project. A scholarly and political debate is required on the 
relative merits and demerits of an extension of the scope of current audit 
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practices in the light of the results of this research. 
7.3 Limitations  
This research has four principal limitations which arise out of its method, context 
and sampling constraints.  
Method. The aim of phenomenographic research is to access an individual’s 
life-world experience of the phenomenon of interest (Uljens, 1996). However, it 
is not possible to directly access the respondent’s experience of accountability; I 
have only been able to access the respondent’s statements about their 
experience of accountability. It is not possible to entirely overcome this 
limitation, as one individual cannot share another person’s experience of the 
world. One possible way of reducing the impact of this limitation would be to 
engage in observation of the respondents. I would then have been able to 
observe situations in which they were being accountable. However, access 
constraints and the fragmented nature of the SRO role meant that this was not 
possible.  
Context. The results of this research are based on data obtained from SROs 
for IT based projects. This provides a consistent and stable context for 
capturing SROs’ conceptions of accountability. However, there are other types 
of projects such as non-IT based business change projects (one respondent 
was also SRO for a major project that aimed to renegotiate conditions of 
employment with the trades unions without provoking a strike) and construction 
projects. SROs for these types of project may have different conceptions of 
accountability.  
Sampling Constraints. The respondents come from a limited range of 
departments and executive agencies. I was not able to gain access to 
respondents from the Cabinet Office, H. M. Treasury, the Department for 
Transport and its associated executive agencies (e.g. Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Agency), the Department for Communities and Local Government 
and its associated executive agencies, the Department for International 
Development, some of the larger executive agencies such as the Defence 
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Procurement Agency, the Defence Logistics Agency and the Identity and 
Passport Service. It is possible that SROs in these organizations have 
conceptions of accountability that are different from those revealed in this 
research.  
Further, one respondent did not come from the executive arm of government, 
but the legislature. Potentially this could introduce an element of variation into 
the results, as the House of Commons is run by a Board of Management which 
reports to the House of Commons Commission which consists of six MPs 
(House of Commons Information Office, 2005). This distinction between the 
legislature and the executive changes the assumption of the doctrine of 
ministerial accountability, as no minister is in charge of the House of Commons. 
Neither are the staff of the House of Commons civil servants (House of 
Commons Information Office, 2003). Nevertheless, there are strong similarities 
between the civil service and the House of Commons in terms of the managerial 
arrangements in place. The Clerk of the House of Commons is both the 
accounting officer and the chief executive of the administration of the House of 
Commons (House of Commons Information Office, 2003). Operational practices 
are drawn from the civil service (hence I was able to gain access to one SRO 
from my contact at OGC). An SRO may have to account to The House of 
Commons Commission, which, as I have already noted, is staffed by six MPs. 
So there are significant overlaps at the operational and practical level between 
the administration of the House of Commons and the civil service as the 
administrative arm of government, even if there are substantial legal 
differences. 
7.4 Future Research 
The results of this research provide five pointers for further research. First, this 
research could be extended. Research into how SROs conceive accountability 
for non-IT based projects would add further to our knowledge of how 
accountability is conceived. Construction projects in particular offer a less 
controversial context than IT projects. Therefore, it may be possible to both 
observe and interview the respondents. The research could also be extended 
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into those organizations that have not participated in this research (see Section 
7.3).  
Second, this research has established how accountability is conceived by 
individual civil servants. The results reveal a hierarchy of conceptions of 
increasing richness and complexity from conception C1 through to conception 
C4. Previous phenomenographic research into work-based phenomena has 
established a hierarchy of conceptions and then arranged them relative to a 
specific criteria, such as performance (Sandberg, 2000; Chen and Partington, 
2004; Partington et al., 2005). The assumption that accountability improves 
performance is a longstanding and deep-rooted one (Dubnick, 2005). However, 
I have not established performance as the specific criterion for the hierarchy of 
conceptions, because earlier psychological research suggests that making an 
individual accountable does not necessarily improve performance (Lerner and 
Tetlock, 1999). Only certain forms of accountability result in increased cognitive 
effort, which may in itself not be beneficial (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). One 
limitation of the extant psychological research on accountability is that it has 
been limited to different forms of individual accountability. No empirical 
comparison has been made between individual accountability and the collective 
form of accountability traditional in the civil service. Such a comparative study 
would provide a basis for deciding whether or not making an individual 
accountable for the outcome of a project was more beneficial than the 
traditional form of collective accountability.  
Third, one of the assumptions behind the introduction of the role of the SRO is 
that such a role increases the chance of a project being successful. SROs are 
usually senior managers who, in hierarchical terms, are distant from the tasks 
where mistakes can be made. The success or failure of a project then becomes 
a ‘question of interpretation rather than objectivity’ (Holgersson, 2001: 114). 
Further, definitions of project success use objective criteria such as budget 
compliance, performance criteria and project plans (Association for Project 
Management, 2006). These definitions suffer from the same cognitive 
limitations as the objective definition of accountability that I have outlined in 
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Chapter 2. Given these limitations, interpretive research into the definition of 
project success would contribute to our knowledge and understanding of project 
success.  
Fourth, this research has focussed on one particular role in the civil service in 
which accountability plays a significant part. Further research into how 
accountability is conceived by other civil servants, such as accounting officers, 
or a cross sectional study within one organization, would add both to our 
knowledge of accountability and to the case for the formal recognition of civil 
servant accountability.  
Fifth, in Chapter 5 I established that conception C3, public accountability, was 
correlated with SROs working in organizations that had a high degree of public 
contact. This suggests that there are differences between organizations in how 
accountability is conceived, as the culture of a department or executive agency 
provides a framework within which civil servants act (Flinders, 2002). The 
statistical correlation can be ascribed to cultural differences between 
departments: those departments that have regular contact with the public 
appear to have responded to the ambition of the Modernising Government 
White Paper (1999) and focussed on the users of public services. Departments 
that do not have the same degree of contact with the public appear not to have 
responded. This is an area where further research is required. 
I also found that despite the mandatory nature and objective focus of the SRO 
role, there were differences between organizations in how the role of SRO was 
carried out. For example, one major department with a large number of projects 
had ten SROs. This meant that an individual was SRO for a considerable 
number of projects. Other organizations took the view that, given the burdens of 
the role, an individual should be SRO for no more than one project at a time. 
Again, this is an area for further research.  
7.5 End Note 
Accountability has a long history, conceptually and etymologically as a means 
of overcoming the problems of discretion, the abuse of power and poor 
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performance in the public sector (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). These 
problems were features of even the simplest democratic society such as Athens 
(Roberts, 1982), and remain features of today’s complex democracy. It would 
seem then that accountability will remain a ‘salient factor in the day-to-day 
conduct of government and the efficacy of parliamentary democracy’ (Barberis, 
1998: 451) and with it the continuing need to improve and add to our 
understanding of this tricky yet important concept. 
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Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. I am interested in establishing 
the different ways in which SROs understand their project accountabilities. The 
purpose of my research is to establish the range of understandings of SRO 
project accountabilities.  
 
First of all, let me assure you that this interview will be conducted under the 
Chatham House rule. Only my supervisor and I will have access to the 
recording and the transcript. The recording and transcript will be used solely for 
research purposes. Any quotations from or references to the interview will be 
completely anonymous.  
 
I would like to start with some background questions (age, length of service, 
time in departments and time as an SRO) before moving on to some specific 
questions about the specific project (or projects) for which you are an SRO 
(type of project, status and approximate budget). I would like to then move on to 
questions about your work and your accountability. These questions will be very 
open in nature and I will be asking you for examples to support your 
understanding. 
 
It’s only fair to tell you something about myself. I am a civil and structural 
engineer by background, managing projects from early on in my career. MBA 
1998, then onto management consultancy (PA) where I was involved with 
delivering business improvement projects ranging from new IT systems for a UK 
bank in its emerging markets business to assisting a UK government 
department with the technology aspects of its move into new accommodation. I 
then went to work for Energis as a programme director running business 
change programmes before I took up the opportunity to study for a PhD at 
Cranfield. 
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   CRITERION DESCRIPTION ASSESSMENT
 
COMMENTS 
1 Extent of spontaneous, rich, 
relevant answers 
Minor improvement
required 
 Replies were spontaneous and rich, but relevance needed to be 
improved.  
Action: Focus more on the understandings and experience of 
accountability.  
2 Length of interviewees 
answers versus interviewer 
questions. 
Minor improvement
required 
 Lengthy replies from interviewee, but marred by minor 
interjections from interviewer. 
Action: Less interruptions, more listening. 
3 Degree of follow up and 
clarification by interviewer. 
Minor improvement
required 
 Points on accountability were missed on occasions. Action: 
Listen for points on accountability, clarify, exemplify and repeat 
as required. Jot down the points as aide memoir. 
4 Extent of in-interview 
interpretation 
Improvement required Did this once, but other interpretations may have been missed. 
Action: Check and clarify meanings. 
5 Verification of answers by 
interviewer. 
Improvement required Did not do this. Action: Use ‘You said XXX, do you mean 
YYYY?’ type of questions. 
6 Degree to which interview is 
self contained. 
OK Action: None 
Interview Quality Assessment (Based on Kvale, (1996)) 
Interviews 1&2 
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Appendix C: Email sent approximately one week prior to 
interview  
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Dear SRO, 
I write to confirm our interview on [date] at [time]. The aim of the interview, 
which is to be conducted under Chatham House rules, is to explore your 
understanding of your accountabilities as an SRO. This form of qualitative 
research necessitates the recording of the interview for detailed post interview 
analysis. Please be assured that the recording remains absolutely confidential 
and is for research purposes only. I look forward to meeting you on the [date]. 
Kind regards, 
Jonathan Lupson 
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Conception Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception 1 To Whom 
To whom the SRO is 
accountable 
Subject 
What the SRO
understands they are 
accountable for 
 How the SRO fulfils 
their accountability 
Fulfilment Consequences 
What the SRO
understands to the 
consequences of being 
accountable 
 When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
Timeframe 
  
R1: ‘I felt I was accountable to 
the board for delivering this 
thing, but that in a sense the 
board's assessment of its 
successful delivery would be 
heavily influenced by the 
views of the stakeholders.’ 
 
 
 
R1: ‘I was the SRO for first of 
all our Internet presence, which 
was basically revitalising our 
website, redoing it entirely and 
building a virtual platform on 
which XXXX could plonk their 
websites so they were all 
served and managed here, 
rather than over there.’ 
 
 
 
R1: ‘It's partly about getting 
buy in particularly from our 
board, so they will themselves 
promote and defend what we 
are doing. It's about having 
relatively regular contact with 
the main people delivering the 
work to ensure that I'm 
comfortable with where it's got 
to. It's a sort of combination of 
being a sort of a pacemaker, 
pulling it along and sheepdog 
at the back, making sure that 
the stragglers don’t get lost, I 
find.’ 
 
 
R1: ‘…ultimately the board in 
crude terms decides my future, 
my pay amongst other things…’ 
 
 
 
R1: ‘there was a rather big 
issue as to whether to go live 
before Christmas or whether 
to delay it, which was going 
to delay it quite a long time. 
We had said, partly pushed 
by me that we would do it by 
the end of the year, and it 
was quite a difficult decision 
to take and ultimately, I felt a 
lot of accountability, because 
I suppose, as I was saying I 
was accountable this being, 
happening in the way I had 
promised…’ 
 
  
R2: ‘And Minister X had me 
in, twice I think, because he 
had been very badly burnt by 
ICT projects in Dept Z and 
broadly he said to me well, 
you know, I want to know is 
this going to work, because 
I'm not going to agree to it 
going live unless you can 
persuade me.’ 
 
 
R2: ‘I mean this system I’ve got 
at the moment has still got 
some performance problems. 
Now I've got a performance 
target, that I know how many 
milli-seconds each transaction 
is supposed to take and that is 
very hard edged and I will 
know, myself and my team will 
know whether or not we've 
succeeded.’ 
 
 
R2: ‘It means working 
upwards and outwards, both 
within the business and 
across Whitehall to a degree, 
mostly within the business, 
keeping the board from not 
being restive over the project, 
keeping then reassured as far 
as it is right to reassure them, 
keeping the business 
engaged, doing heavy lifting 
with the senior business 
community, really trying to 
make sure that if they don't at 
least support the project, at 
least they understand what it 
is and are prepared to send 
good messages down to their 
 
R2: ‘I personally would have 
taken it very badly because one 
of the things which matters most 
in the Civil Service, in my 
experience, is your reputation, 
that's what you have in the Civil 
Service after 25 years. That’s all 
you’ve got is your reputation, for 
either being somebody who can 
get things done and make them 
work, or somebody who is, you 
know, a bit sloppy and lets the 
catches slip. It would have hurt 
me personally in terms of how I 
regard my position within the 
organisation and I think how my 
colleagues see me, if this thing 
had been a complete Horlicks 
 
R2: ‘Firstly last November we 
were very close to going live, 
we were already six months 
late with the project. Do we 
go live, do we not go live. We 
started to see some 
networking difficulties around 
the project which we didn't 
entirely understand and the 
performance was a little bit 
uncertain. In the end I had to 
take the decision as to 
whether we're going to live 
and you could hedge around 
it with all sorts of things and I 
had a board there to advise 
me. Yes, I had an accounting 
officer and a Secretary of 
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Conception Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception 1 To Whom 
To whom the SRO is 
accountable 
Subject 
What the SRO 
understands they are 
accountable for 
Fulfilment 
How the SRO fulfils 
their accountability 
Consequences 
What the SRO 
understands to the 
consequences of being 
accountable 
Timeframe 
When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
troops about its relative 
importance. Working with 
stakeholders internally to 
release resource and to focus 
on the big issues which affect 
this project.’ 
and I’d rolled it out and caused 
people an immense amount of 
trouble and then would have had 
to pull it. So there is 
accountability in that sense. ’  
State, both of whom made it 
clear that they were in the 
decision making loop.’ 
  
R3: ‘As an SRO I am 
responsible to ensure that I 
can account to our ministers 
and to our perm sec and 
through them or directly to 
ministers for the way in which 
we are, we have understood 
the commission, which indeed 
have often come from 
ourselves but not always, that 
we have created proper plans 
and managed the risk 
knowledge, to deliver 
timetables, products and 
outputs that meet the needs 
of the objectives.’ 
 
R3: ‘So my job is to ensure that 
that's all there but actually my 
job as the SRO is to ensure 
that it all comes together and 
that at regular times I 
understand where we’ve got up 
to, so an update on progress, 
update on risks, what we are 
doing…’ 
 
 
 
R3: ‘I'm responsible for 
regular reporting of all of 
these things. I'm responsible 
for myself and other people 
knowing how far we’ve got, 
what resource we’re hitting, 
how we’re managing them. I'm 
responsible for ensuring that 
our ministers are up to speed 
and when they have their 
monthly stock takes on policy, 
their monthly stock takes on 
implementation, we have the 
messages that don't hide 
anything, that actually sort of 
prioritise and explain what 
we’ve got up to and what we 
haven't got up to.’ 
 
 
R3: ‘I am the Senior Responsible 
Officer both for the policy and 
delivery of these things. Its in my 
work, job description, it's the 
basis upon which my 
performance is appraised and 
my reward determined. It matters 
in quite practical terms therefore 
that I am successful at what I do. 
It matters because I’ve got a 
husband and 5 children to feed, 
you know, that sort of thing.’ 
 
 
R3: ‘…so it's up to me to 
make sure that the XXXX 
exists on the fifth of April next 
year…’ 
  
R4: ‘So I have to manage the 
[External] stakeholders as 
well, but I’ve chosen to hang 
onto the guy who's going to 
give me the money or not, 
who is the permanent 
secretary.’ 
 
R4: ‘…when I came you had an 
IT programme and it was 
costing £30 million and I closed 
it down. So I only lost £2 million 
because I closed it down 
quickly and all I now want for 
my IT programme is £2 million 
 
R4: ‘I actually have a boss, a 
boss or the bank manager, 
he's probably the bank 
manager is a better analogy 
than the boss and he's only 
going to give me the money if 
I fulfil these conditions. So I'm 
just going to look at him all the 
 
R4: ‘...when things go wrong he 
stands in the witness box and he 
puts me alongside and says I will 
support you or let you swing. If 
you didn't think to sort things out 
with me in the first place, then 
well God help you.’ 
 
 
R4: ‘I just put my business 
case together and it went to 
the change board last week. 
And I said to [THE 
PERMANENT SECRETARY] 
on the telephone what is it 
you want me to do, do you 
want a presentation or what, 
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Conception Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception 1 To Whom 
To whom the SRO is 
accountable 
Subject 
What the SRO 
understands they are 
accountable for 
Fulfilment 
How the SRO fulfils 
their accountability 
Consequences 
What the SRO 
understands to the 
consequences of being 
accountable 
Timeframe 
When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
anyway.’ 
 
way through and that's it.’ and he said about 20 
minutes. Have you got it 
together now? And I said 
pretty well. Let's talk about it 
then. Alright, well send it all 
into me, and then come in a 
couple of days afterwards. 
So I thought half an hour. He 
actually gave me an hour 
and a half…’ 
 
  
R5: ‘…at the highest level my 
work involves reporting to the 
next level up which is the 
Permanent Secretary on how 
things are going.’  
 
 
R5: ‘My accountability to him is 
not over spending my budgets, 
is delivering what I’ve said I will 
deliver in terms of products and 
achieving the outcomes that 
we’ve agreed will be the 
outcomes for the business 
overall.’ 
 
R5: ‘Ministers take a day-to-
day interest I mean 
sometimes they are actually 
wanting more information than 
actually I as an SRO felt I 
needed, but that’s all about 
trust when something is just 
so politically high-profile.’ 
 
 
R5: ' Well it means I’m sacked if 
we don’t achieve it. ‘ 
 
 
 
R5: ‘With the Ministers it’s 
your prior event and sort of 
looking forward to delivery, 
so it’s like inter-parliament, 
it’s usually post hoc when, 
and it’s usually when 
something’s gone wrong.’ 
 
  
R6: ‘…I think when you are an 
SRO and you have, we have 
a very, very good relationship 
with our Ministers, XXX and 
ZZZ, who are our key 
Ministers…’ 
 
 
R6: ‘We changed every single 
system over a weekend and we 
have the largest online 
transactional database in the 
world.’ 
 
 
R6: ‘…in my SRO role I was 
able to say ‘ah, I need some 
even higher executive support 
on this’ so I was able to go to 
the Chief Executive and say 
‘look, we are in this situation. 
Unless we do something 
about it soon this is going to 
escalate and we are going to 
be a serious issue of throwing 
this project off course.’ 
 
R6: ‘So as much as I would be 
hauled over the coals I suppose 
by the Accounting Officer for 
failing to live up to my 
responsibilities in this area…’ 
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Conception Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception 1 To Whom 
To whom the SRO is 
accountable 
Subject 
What the SRO 
understands they are 
accountable for 
Fulfilment 
How the SRO fulfils 
their accountability 
Consequences 
What the SRO 
understands to the 
consequences of being 
accountable 
Timeframe 
When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
  
R7: ‘He’s my boss, you know 
so clearly I am accountable to 
him. If things did go wrong he 
is the Accounting Officer for 
the XXXX so I mean he 
couldn’t dodge his 
responsibilities either, but you 
know there’s no way. But I 
guess the way of looking at it 
is you’d have to ask him how 
he looks at it, but the way I 
look at it is that he looks to 
me, he relies on me to ensure 
that things are going as they 
should be and for him to be 
informed where there is sort 
of real difficulty in which he, or 
perhaps the Directing Board 
or others, might be able to 
help…’ 
 
R7: ‘I’m the SRO for electronic 
XXXX.’ 
 
R7: ‘I chair the Programme 
Board, we have a Programme 
Board to help me, I am 
approached for advice, 
decisions, I receive a mass of 
papers to approve, I, 
importantly endorse the 
regular submissions that we 
send to the Minister…’ 
 
 
 
R7: ‘So they look to me for the 
answers if things do not go to 
plan, I would also hope because 
this is what’s going to happen 
that when it’s a success people 
will say, ‘and R7 is mainly 
responsible for that’’ 
 
R7: ‘I’ve mentioned the Chief 
Executive, I haven’t 
mentioned our Directing 
Board because, perhaps I 
ought to because I also 
report regularly to our 
Directing Board on our 
progress as well as the sort 
of bi-laterals with the Chief 
Executive.’  
 
  
R8: ‘…our Director of Finance 
comes from the Civil Service 
and like most Directors of 
Finance, he operates on a 
hand-to-mouth basis and 
doesn’t worry about slippage, 
delays and his deadlines and 
so on and we had great 
difficulty in convincing him 
that we actually needed to 
take on more staff and then 
keep them on, but you know 
the project isn’t going to end 
when go live starts, because 
 
R8: ‘Well it means that I’ve got 
to do whatever is within my 
power to make sure that the 
system is delivered.’ 
 
R8: ‘I suppose my other 
responsibility has been to 
ensure that we have adequate 
resources ourselves to do what 
we need to do to ensure that 
the system is delivered’ 
 
R8: ‘…chairing the Project 
Board and what goes with that 
which is partly a matter of 
diplomacy shall we say, 
sometimes making sure that 
all the documentation is 
produced on time…’ 
 
R8: ‘…in the end the buck stops 
with me…’ 
 
R8: ‘…the fact that the 
financial commentary on our 
business case was held up 
for 6 weeks which meant that 
it didn’t get to the XXX until 
after the House went up for 
the summer recess meant 
that the XXXX didn’t get this 
at all. So all my contingency 
went.’ 
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there is then the next stage.’ 
  
R9: ‘I get held accountable to 
a number of other people as 
well, the director-general of 
corporate affairs, who is 
XXX’s’ line manager and who, 
well who now chairs the 
Departmental Investment
Strategy Group…’ 
 
R9: ‘So in my own performance 
targets, are to basically develop 
and deploy the remote working 
solution to our 50 pilot users 
and get a positive result from 
the evaluation at the end of that 
to say they basically like the 
solution, its, that is the thing on 
which I will be judged…’  
 
  
R9: ‘So obviously I receive 
reports of progress, I chair 
regular meetings to establish 
where we are and what the 
issues are and deal with those 
issues. But I actually have to 
report progress onto, if you 
like, the owners of the overall 
strategy.’ 
 
R9: ‘Practically, it means that 
written into my personal 
objectives is a successful 
outcome for both of those two 
projects as specific objectives. 
Now that means that I'm 
appraised against those set of 
objectives and my pay and 
overall reporting, sorry, overall 
performance marking is based 
on how I do in achieving those 
objectives amongst the others, 
the others that I have. So that's 
what it means at a practical, at a 
practical level…’ 
 
 
R9: ‘Well yes, really, our XXX 
strategy committee meets 
quarterly. Strictly it should be 
a gathering of the 
programme SROs, so XX as 
the head of this unit and the 
Senior Responsible Owner 
for the entire infrastructure 
programme is the one who 
should be held accountable 
at that, at that board, but in 
practice one of my other jobs 
is I actually act as secretary 
to that board as well because 
of my role in trying to 
coordinate all these things so 
I'm actually always there, so 
I’m always called upon to 
report where we stand with 
projects for which I'm 
responsible.’ 
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R10: ‘I mean I’m accountable 
to my boss, I’m accountable 
to the Board, I’m accountable 
to the XXX XXX Group 
because that’s the process 
that we have in place to, if 
you exercise governance over 
this corporate endeavour.’ 
 
 
R10: ‘…the performance 
metrics on that are very much 
linked to achieving specific 
milestones at specific times.’ 
 
 
R10: ‘I mean when it comes to 
the Board I am required to 
brief the Board on where the 
programme’s at, what the 
issues are, what the 
challenges are and they quiz 
me on what we are doing 
about it and in some cases 
how they could help.’ 
 
R10: ‘What does it mean to me is 
I get sacked if we don’t deliver, 
that’s what it feels like.’ 
 
 
R10: ‘I mean when it comes 
to the Board I am required to 
brief the Board on where the 
programme’s at, what the 
issues are, what the 
challenges are and they quiz 
me on what we are doing 
about it and in some cases 
how they could help.’ 
  
R11:’I mean in terms of what 
actually happens, the Chief 
Executive has, and is kept 
informed of, plans, budgets, 
the usual and each week I’ve 
got to set a series of reports 
that we’ve agreed between 
us, but basically a progress 
chasing report,’ 
 
 
 
R11: ‘I regard myself as 
responsible for everything but 
the very lowest level of detail. If 
the projects aren’t working well 
I consider myself accountable 
… well accountable for making 
sure they do work well, that the 
resourcing, that everything is 
there that they need.’  
 
 
R11: ‘Because I go up every 
week, it’s part of the Executive 
Committee Meeting, now if 
they’ve got a full agenda I can 
be on there for 10 minutes or I 
can be on there for an hour 
depending on how much time 
they want to spend, and it 
doesn’t necessarily reflect the 
amount that I might need from 
them, so I find that a little bit 
constraining.’ 
 
R11: ‘I think there will clearly be 
a disappointment in me but I 
wouldn’t say it’s the career 
damaging level or worse, mainly 
because I was brought in at a 
fairly late stage and I think, and 
there was a general recognition 
that the programme wasn’t doing 
terribly well so to that extent, I 
mean there is a sort of certain 
cushion there…’ 
 
 
R11: ‘And each week I go up 
[TO THE CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE] and do a blow 
by blow account 
  
R12: ‘…our Accounting 
Officer, our Chief Executive… 
he delegates, he has 
delegated on this occasion to 
me this project, so I am 
accountable to him so that he 
meets his objectives if that’s 
not too around the houses but 
that’s how it is.’  
 
 
R12: ‘So I think you know do I 
feel accountable and
responsible for bringing in this 
project on time and on budget 
absolutely.’ 
 
R12: ‘when we decided that 
we would take back the 
migration area which had 
been run under someone 
else’s stewardship, our 
concerns were mounting, 
ultimately I had to say no, 
stop, I’m drawing a line here 
and making very clear to you, 
you the Board that this is 
 
  
R12: ‘So for example if the 
budget was three times over 
what it was expected to be, am I 
directly accountable for that? 
Question. Ultimately someone 
might say well you didn’t do a 
very good job and hence by that, 
through that process you for 
example might not get a bonus, 
you might not get a pay increase, 
 
R12: ‘’ Well I have to give 
him a report every week at 
the Board.’ 
 
 
258 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
 
Conception Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception 1 To Whom 
To whom the SRO is 
accountable 
Subject 
What the SRO 
understands they are 
accountable for 
Fulfilment 
How the SRO fulfils 
their accountability 
Consequences 
What the SRO 
understands to the 
consequences of being 
accountable 
Timeframe 
When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
where it stops.’ you might not get another job.’  
  
R13: ‘We did at the time we 
introduced XXX we were 
working to the [Minister]  and 
we did briefings before we 
went live with it and had to 
report on how it went.’ 
 
 
R13: ‘Well, I’m accountable in 
the sense that there are 
specific spending review 
targets to which my projects 
and the programme 
contributes, the main one of 
which is about achieving 
paperless transactions. I can’t 
remember the exact words but 
you know most government 
transactions to be fully 
electronic by, actually it is this 
year, 2005.  But there are 
others about reducing the cost 
of compliance with tax and 
other regimes.  So in terms of, 
you know, running the 
programmes to deliver those 
benefits, they are linked into 
SRO for targets.  So I am 
directly accountable for 
achieving those and feeding 
those through to the centre and 
in that sense you know I am 
accountable to the top of the 
office.’ 
 
 
R13: ‘We did at the time we 
introduced XXX we were 
working to the [Minister]  and 
we did briefings before we 
went live with it and had to 
report on how it went.’ 
 
 
 
R13: ‘So I put it up, notified it a 
red, justified, you know, what, 
why I was marking it as red and 
waited for the sun, you know for 
the roof to fall in and the thunder 
clouds to clap and all this kind of 
stuff. Not a sausage, not a 
sausage.’ 
 
 
R13: ‘I was talking about and 
they would meet sort of as 
and when in the run up to 
implementation of XXXX, sort 
of every six weeks or so.  It 
was quite intensive.’ 
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R14: ‘I’m accountable, I mean 
Ministers are seized of the 
fact that it’s happening and 
believe it’s a good thing…’ 
 
 
R14: ‘…one of my targets was 
actually to bring TARGET 1 off 
last December, which we 
missed…’ 
 
 
 
R14: ‘I will provide the top 
cover and ensure that the 
resources were there and 
ensure that Ministers remain 
committed and so on…’ 
 
 
R14: ‘I report to the Permanent 
Secretary and one of my targets 
was actually to bring TARGET 
1off last December, which we 
missed, but he says he doesn’t 
mind that too much because he 
understands the reasons….’ 
 
R14: ‘I mean I talk to him 
about it, I give him six 
monthly reports, written 
reports, on it and we talk 
about those a bit…’ 
 
 
  
R15: ‘I’m accountable up the 
line, ultimately to Ministers, 
my successive heads of unit 
have left me to get on with the 
job which I’ve appreciated, 
the Grade 3’s I know and get 
on with but rarely see, people 
above that I hardy see these 
days. Ministers I don’t think 
I’ve seen in months on the 
project, probably because it’s 
gone well, not gone badly.’ 
 
 
R15: ‘Well success now means 
starting the new contracts on 
time and the new contracts 
working properly with no major 
glitches…’ 
 
 
 
R15: ‘Yes, we have at the 
moment we have a formal 
meeting once a week, a check 
point meeting to take stock of 
where we are on the 
transition, and that involves 
everyone reporting on what 
they’ve been doing for the 
past week and what their 
current issues are and we go 
through actions from the 
previous week.’ 
 
 
R15: ‘I think the worst that would 
happen to me is that I wouldn’t 
be asked to take on SRO roles in 
future and as I’m not being 
offered any at the moment it’s no 
real hardship…’ 
 
 
R15: ‘…we in fact are being 
subjected to a Gateway, 
Gate 4 at the very moment 
so you should ask me at the 
end of the week and I will say 
how it’s going but so far we 
are on track to deliver new 
contracts on the first of April.’ 
 
 
  
R16: ‘I would be the person to 
speak to the Board.  So I 
would have to sit there with 
my Programme Manager and 
my colleagues and say I am 
very sorry this all went 
horribly wrong and we were in 
fact doing the wrong thing and 
it was a bit of a waste of 
investment really.  So I would 
be accountable, they would 
 
R16: ‘It’s a data programme to 
give us IT systems to support 
measurement of whether we 
are achieving our public service 
agreements across the 
department.’ 
 
 
R16: ‘The day to day XXXX 
Committee, particularly the 
YYYY Committee of which I 
am a member, there is six or 
seven of us, though never that 
number turn up, on the YYYY 
Committee, meets weekly, will 
be reviewing before it goes 
through a process of review 
for major change projects, 
RAG status, are they on track. 
 
R16: ‘I feel accountable to the 
Chairman, success or failure 
there would have a significant 
impact on my status... not my 
status but my reputation, my 
future prospects and all those 
sorts of things.’ 
 
 
R16: ‘We are implementing 
the project in phases so that 
we are starting with PSA 1 
which is the one about the 
XXXX  and we are starting 
that, I have got my dates 
muddled up but later this 
summer and then we are 
progressively rolling out the 
others.  I was going to say 
July but I am slightly 
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call me to account.’ 
 
This is not one of our mission 
critical projects in terms of 
OGC so you know we 
wouldn’t hit the radar often but 
it would hit the radar if it is 
going off track, if it is showing 
in the red and on a rolling 
basis we would say now how 
is that going, is it still relevant 
that I would be the person to 
speak to the Board.’ 
 
uncertain as to whether it is 
July, as we’ve not had a 
project board for about a 
month.’ 
 
 
  
R17: ‘Well Programme XXX is 
a good example, when it got 
into difficulties our ministers, 
XXX and XXX, were on their 
feet in Parliament fairly 
regularly, having to explain 
themselves. I felt very 
accountable to them for 
having delivered something 
that didn’t work as it was 
supposed to work.’ 
 
 
R17: ‘I mean meeting the 
objectives set for the 
programme as amended during 
its life, that for me is success, it 
is quite simple.’ 
 
 
R17: ‘On Programme XX I 
saw ministers every week for 
two years.  I brought them up 
to date with the progress, 
covered the hot spots, 
listened…heard what they 
were thinking about it, what 
the political dimensions were, 
what they thought would be 
happening on the floor of 
Parliament, handling that. On 
the others, the smaller ones 
the less sensitive ones, I tend 
to go perhaps every couple of 
months and we will try and 
find an hour which is quite a 
long time with a minister, try 
and find an hour when I would 
get the team to explain where 
we are and how it is going and 
we will try to get in advance 
most of the questions.’  
 
 
R17: ‘I was the person who could 
provide space with the 
programme director and others 
when people maybe were being 
rather cross with them, take that, 
I was the person who got some 
skills and experience from other 
bits of my work which helped 
manage the crisis that we had’ 
 
 
R17:On Programme XX:  ‘I 
saw ministers every week for 
two years.’ 
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R18: ‘But one way or the 
other if there’s a brief for the 
Permanent Secretary about 
that appearance it’ll be a 
pretty uncomfortable
conversation.’ 
 
R18: ‘…you are going to be 
 
 
able to get your T&S online, 
won’t that be splendid because 
you won’t have to fill in all those 
boring forms, or your PA’s 
won’t and by the way you get 
the money more quickly too. 
 
 
R18: ‘So actually the key 
points for me are the 
meetings, the monthly 
meetings of the Project Board, 
which I chair and what I want 
is good material, I need the 
highlight report from the 
Project Manager, I want the 
things in pods diagram and 
anything else they think I need 
to know, including anything 
they want me to say to the 
Programme Board, because 
actually me saying it will help, 
so there’s a bit of sort of quiet 
underpinning as it were, then 
there’s the kind of formal 
documentation and it’s my job 
then to go through that 
documentation either so I can 
say good things at the Board 
about how it’s going or to ask 
the awkward question about 
why that thing in our next case 
somehow they haven’t made 
much of it in the highlight 
report actually looks to me 
quite troubling and is that right 
or have I misunderstood or, 
what are they going to do 
about it?’ 
 
 
R18: ‘I think in the end it does 
mean that if either the thing goes 
down in flames or it takes a little 
bit longer that it should have 
done for no good reason, you are 
in the firing line because you’re 
job is to make sure that the 
Project Manager is good enough 
and is getting there and has the 
support, whether that’s in 
resource terms or because the 
interactions have been sorted 
and the supporting people are in 
place to do it, so in a sense 
you’re quite clear, you’ve failed in 
ensuring that the Project 
Manager has the expertise or the 
support or whatever to keep the 
show on the road.’ 
 
 
 
R18: ‘We have once a month 
the Board director’s KIT, 
keeping in touch session, 
which is where the top sort of 
16 people or so in the 
Department come 
together…’ 
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R19: ‘But I would say that my 
accountability still fell 
backwards, in other words 
ministers have said that they 
want this thing done and I’m 
doing it so they expect me to 
deliver it, therefore I’m 
accountable [TO 
MINISTERS]…’ 
 
 
R19: ‘So that… and I was 
supposed to deliver x,y and z 
and, as I said, it was the 
complication that I did not 
directly command the full 
resource of the programme but 
nobody questioned the fact that 
I was SRO and was 
accountable to delivering those 
outcomes.’ 
 
R19: ‘So I needed to sort that 
out and that involved giving 
some messages about, if you 
like, the effective practice of 
programme and project 
management as distinct from 
reading the manual and 
applying it with all the heavy 
handedness, it was
dysfunctional, frankly.  So I 
 
spent quite a lot of time with 
people, sometimes upset 
people, trying to sort the 
budget out.  A lot of very, 
frankly, no great suffrage and 
you’d expect a programme of 
that nature in this Department 
to be ship-shape more or less, 
but it wasn’t and so I was 
given some fairly basic 
remedial work, because 
everybody had got very 
uptight about things and there 
were some difficult things. So 
I had to wade in, it often felt 
like wading through treacle.’ 
 
 
R19: ‘I don’t think I read that as 
particularly that if I would be 
blamed or sacked or something 
like that, but that the first line of 
accountability rested with me in a 
sense in which it didn’t rest with 
either those working for me or 
with my boss. Now quite what 
the practical exercise of that 
would be I don’t know.’ 
 
 
 
R19: ‘…we did make a 
number of our customers 
quite cross quite quickly by 
saying that we were going to 
deliver this stuff by early 
January 2006 and then we’re 
not going to, so there were 
very clearly shifting, 
timescales In particular, 
which to me suggested that it 
wasn’t properly grounded…’ 
  
R20: ‘You know when you’ve 
been in to see a Minister and 
they’re not happy, you know 
it… but the Secretary of 
State’s not averse to ringing 
up and saying, hey…’ 
 
R20: ‘We’ve got a Programme 
and we need to deliver this 
Programme and we need to 
keep it as close to target and 
time as possible. And it’s about 
budget, making sure we can 
deliver it on budget. So those 
 
R20: ‘So the time I spend on it 
is probably, averages four to 
five hours a week, but I would 
have fairly daily contact with 
my Regional Implementation 
Director, he’s the guy who’s 
full time on delivering the 
 
R20: ‘To the Department of 
Health? Well actually, in strict 
terms, none at all…. In reality, if 
they say “jump,” I jump. My 
career prospects are very much 
led by my relationship with that 
Team, and also if we’re not 
 
R20: ‘Well I seem him over a 
period of two days every 
month at something that they 
call a ‘top team’ meeting, 
which is him and his National 
Directors for all parts of the 
NHS and all of the SHA Chief 
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are, if you like, the three 
priorities I have in mind at the 
time and in order to do that as 
an SRO, I suppose leadership 
is the, a key thing on that. The 
ultimate responsibility for this 
Cluster’s delivery it lies with 
me, rests with me, but it does 
require pretty clear and visible 
leadership from me to make 
sure that all of the elements are 
pulling together on this.’  
 
Eastern Regions Programme. 
The sorts of things that I will 
be dealing with him will be, 
how is our Local Service 
Provider performing against 
the Plan, and are there issues 
of which we need to escalate 
with that Provider? 
 
 
delivering in Bedfordshire and 
Hertfordshire, Ministers will get 
involved and I will come under 
considerable pressure through 
the Civil Servants to deliver, or 
do the other thing. WHAT’S THE 
OTHER THING? Well, go! 
Execs. 
  
R21: ‘Either my Director, my 
Director General, Ministers 
and external stakeholders are 
all committed, that this will 
actually support the strategy, 
so that’s sort of pulling the 
strings.’ 
 
 
 
R21: ‘I’m there to make sure 
that the programme is going in 
the right direction and will fulfil 
its deliverables and meet its 
objectives. 
 
R21: ‘…we’d pulled together 
all the findings, developed a 
proposal and went and sold it 
round this building and in 
London, to Ministers, signed 
up lots of people to it, signed 
up our stake holders to it and 
had a proposal that we could 
actually take forward.’ 
 
 
R21: ‘I mean obviously 
credibility, people see that you’ve 
actually managed a programme 
effectively then they’re more 
likely to give you another 
programme to manage 
effectively, but you know they 
have trust in you and especially 
this type of programme which 
involves so many organisations, 
the partnership working and 
there is a lot at stake, your own 
personal credibility ‘cos a lot of 
people see you actually in a lot 
or organizations.’ 
 
 
R21: ‘we’ve just gone to 
Gateway 1 of the actual 
project in terms of the XXX 
PROJECT and learner 
registration service and the 
YYY PROJECT.’ 
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 R22: ‘My only accountability 
actually is to my line manager 
and to the Minister, formally, 
there’s nice clarity around 
that.’ 
 
 
R22: … I’m the responsible 
owner for something called the 
Integrated Working Project, 
which is about operating 
integrated working across 
children’s services, health 
education, social care and the 
family and the XXXX Project, 
which is a several hundred 
million pounds IT enabled 
programme…’ 
 
R22: ‘There’s an influencing, 
decision makers, key 
influencing the decision 
maker’s responsibility around 
the SRO, whatever it is, you 
need to explain, it’s not that 
difficult to do because most 
Ministers have either been 
singed when something went 
seriously wrong and they do 
not want to be in charge of the 
next project that fails, the next 
big IT cock-up so that’s good, 
they’ve been educated by that 
experience and you can put 
the fear of God into them to 
some extent.’ 
 
 
R22 ‘I think I feel it around your 
credibility and pride in your public 
service role, that yes you’re there 
to serve the Government of the 
day and your Minister and people 
understand that in a democracy 
that’s the way decisions get 
made…’ 
 
 
R22 ‘…we’re about to set a 
budget for the next 9 months, 
but we were talking there 
about a budget of several 
million pounds.’ 
 R23: ‘We have now created 
and put in place a body, a 
committee, if you like, to 
whom I will be accountable, 
who will help me to account, 
so that if SPIRE, as a XXXX 
family project, goes belly up, 
that group, the XXXX 
Collaboration Group, will want 
to know why.’ 
 
 
R23: ‘There are very definitely 
efficiencies to be had, because 
we are running too many GI 
utilities, and if you can actually 
provide one core one, albeit 
you’ll still have some GI 
capability within your
organisations, that’s owned by 
them, rather than corporately, 
that’s fine, but actually, at the 
moment we don’t have that, 
and therefore we tend to run 
overlapping functions, and, yes, 
there’s therefore a 
rationalisation issue which will 
deliver the efficiencies.’ 
 
R23: ‘…and your name is very 
 
much attached to that, as the 
leader of that programme, 
then there is a clear 
reputational issue, because 
these things are high profile, 
they’re visible. If you do well, if 
you like, you’re associated 
with it in a positive way, if you 
do poorly you don’t, basically.’ 
 
R23: ‘If you mean, do I get the 
sack for it, well, it would have to 
be fairly extreme before I got the 
sack.’ 
 
 
R23: ‘The whole of my 
funding review programme 
will be gatewayed after 
Christmas..’ 
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R24: ‘So I think that’s where 
the accountability, I mean 
ultimately it’s to the 
Management Board and 
Permanent Secretary…’ 
 
 
R24: ‘It means that insofar as it 
is within our power… we have 
to deliver.  We’ve got clear 
deliverables, clear
interdependencies and they 
have to be met and that’s what 
we stand and fall by and 
everything outside that is kind 
of not worth a hill of beans.  
The rest of it is needed.’ 
 
‘R24: ‘So we have a lot of 
reporting responsibilities in 
terms of fairly detailed 
 
 
monthly reports to the 
Permanent Secretary, and to 
various other forums.’ 
 
 
 
R24: ‘…we get beaten up by the 
other programmes and by our 
peers who say, “You’re not 
delivering.  I thought you were 
going to give us this by then, da-
da-da-da-da-da.”’ 
 
R24: ‘About nine months ago 
we had a Gateway Review 
(Gateway Zero).  This was 
our second Gateway Zero.  
We went red again, but not 
surprisingly.’ 
  
R25: ‘There's also a direct 
accountability line to the 
Permanent Secretary for the 
processes he's set up to 
manage all programmes in 
the office, where there is a 
separate reporting system 
and format that goes with it 
and at quarterly meetings on 
the performance of the group 
as a whole, it would come up 
and perhaps you could raise it 
directly if you felt sufficiently 
worried about something.’ 
 
R25: ‘It means I’m responsible 
for getting it delivered. It 
doesn’t mean I have to do the 
work, in fact I shouldn’t be 
doing all the work, but I'm 
overseeing it. It ought to be 
green, if it’s not green, my job is 
to ensure that the action is 
being taken that will get it to 
green and it’s explaining their 
position to Ministers and the 
Permanent Secretary.’ 
 
 
 
R25: ‘…in the briefing for the 
last ministerial meeting 
covering XX we were quite 
open about the status of our 
programme being red…’ 
 
 
 
R25: ‘In practice ‘What does my 
accountability mean?’ Almost the 
worst that could happen is 
,”You’re the wrong person to be 
doing this, we don’t want you to 
be SRO any more, off you go to 
run our pay service in Bootle,” or 
something career developmental 
of that sort.’ 
 
 
R25: ‘I was told, in effect, the 
answer is XXXX, it goes live 
on 1 April ’06 in two years 
time, your task is to deliver 
it…’ 
  
R26: ‘I actually thought the 
lines of accountability were 
reasonably clear.
Organisationally, it was 
straight to XXXX in effect, to 
the Permanent Secretary. My 
boss, who was the Second 
 
R26: ‘I think it was overall 
health it seems to me was what 
it was about. Are you providing 
confidence to all those key 
stakeholders, particularly the 
ones you’re directly
accountable for that this 
 
 
R26: ‘The Steering Group was 
just one of a number of 
mechanisms that I had to 
engage with – including the 
Ministerial, it’s called XXXX 
Committee, plus the Group 
Board at the XXXX…’ 
  
R26: ‘It gives me the shivers just 
thinking about it.’ 
 
 
 
R26: ‘So we’re six months in, 
but I’m signing in effect blank 
cheques to XXXX who 
delivers the IT to whom this 
voice is saying, “We haven’t 
got the money for this yet, 
but I am underwriting, I have 
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Permanent Secretary, XXXX, 
and this wasn’t only normally 
XXXX’s style I must say but 
he kept pretty much out of 
that relationship. He just left it 
to XX because XX was very 
‘mission critical programme’ 
focussed.’ 
Programme is basically in good 
shape, recognising what point 
of its cycle it’s at and that there 
are always going to be issues 
and problems. Is this 
Programme in overall good 
shape or isn’t it? And if it isn’t 
what are you doing about it? 
That’s what I felt accountable 
for.’ 
 
 
 
spoken to my Accounting 
Officer XXX, we are 
underwriting this because if 
you don’t get that money 
then the Programme’s going 
to slip another six months 
and you’re going to end get 
into a self-fulfilling prophecy.’ 
 R27: ‘Oh my accountability is 
absolutely to the Permanent 
Secretary and to the Home 
Secretary. My accountability 
is to my bosses.’ 
 
 
R27: ‘My job as the SRO is to 
make sure that the projects are 
delivered.’ 
 
 
R27: ‘…you have whatever 
reporting arrangements you 
have in place. There are a 
number in the XXXX, which 
culminate in the report, which 
goes monthly from each major 
report to the Group Executive 
Board in which I as SRO have 
to sign off what I believe the 
status of my project to be.’ 
 
 
 
R27: ‘To me, if I don’t deliver, my 
position is on the line.’ 
 
 
R27: ‘…you have whatever 
reporting arrangements you 
have in place. There are a 
number in the XXXX, which 
culminate in the report, which 
goes monthly from each 
major report to the Group 
Executive Board in which I as 
SRO have to sign off what I 
believe the status of my 
project to be.’ 
 
 
  
R28: ‘I had a session last 
week in front of what's called 
the Performance Delivery 
Board, which is a fun 
occasion on which the 
Permanent Secretary and a 
distinguished non-Executive 
member of our Board and our 
Director of Strategy and our 
DG of Finance get hapless 
 
R28: ‘I do have this 
accountability for the delivery of 
benefits…’ 
 
 
 
 
R28: ‘One is keeping her in 
touch through, you know, 
copies of papers, you know, 
Programme Board papers, 
etc., all the usual things, risks 
and issues … we do a weekly 
Risks and Issues Log, etc. 
Partly through, you know, the 
sort of catch-up sessions that 
we have. I mean I have 
 
R28: I am PROGRAMME X as it 
were in a … so the Permanent 
Secretary thinks PROGRAMME 
X, yeah, that's ME and, you 
know, there's a sort of … and 
conversely, in terms of 
successes that we have, you 
know, I sort of represent what's 
success and what's failure about, 
around the programme.’ 
 
R28: ‘‘I had a session last 
week in front of what's called 
the Performance Delivery 
Board,…’ 
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Directors in front of them to 
account for their performance 
and that is a sort of 
illustration, if you like, of what 
I would mean by 
accountability…’ 
 
 
regular one-to-ones with her 
when we run through what are 
the main issues of the 
moment, etc., and then of 
course, to some extent, we're 
in it together when we get 
caught up with something like 
the Performance Board where 
I'm up in front of the 
Permanent Secretary and 
she's sort of up in front of him 
as well of course as my Line 
Manager…’ 
 
  
R29: ‘In my SRO role I meet 
regularly with those who are 
actually owning and doing the 
work to achieve the objectives 
that I’ve taken ownership of.’ 
 
R29: ‘So he and I sat down, we 
discussed objectives, we have 
an agreed set of objectives that 
I’m working to, he sits down 
with me, we review them on a 
regular basis; adjust them 
accordingly.’ 
 
 
R29: ‘And that’s how I spend 
50% of my time, looking 
across DH, and trying to get 
that alignment, what I would 
call the alignment.  How do I 
get the IT proposition smack 
in the mainstream with 
everything pointing in the 
same direction to make it the 
opportunity it is? Then the 
other 50% of my time is spent 
really relating out to the NHS 
and trying to find the things 
that will enable the NHS that 
can only and should only be 
done once, nationally. So the 
discipline is not to do things 
they should be doing, but to 
do the things that they really, 
logically, would expect 
someone with a National 
  
R29: ON MEETING THE 
PROGRAMME SRO: ‘Once 
a week, minimum, on one 
subject or another, either 
directly or indirectly, more 
that that if you include email 
and telephone it’s going to be 
more than that.’ 
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Director’s role, to do.’ 
 
 R30: ‘. I’m held to account for 
my London performance by 
the SRO above me. That was 
a guy called XXXX and still is 
actually he’s just had a 
change of role. He was the 
Chief Operating Officer for the 
Department.’ 
 
R30: ‘At the National Board, 
and indeed the National 
Programme Executive, each 
month we review the 
performance of each of the 
Clusters. We have to give 
account for the performance of 
our own Clusters…’ 
 
R30: ‘…from governance 
perspective is that there is a 
Cluster Board and I Chair the 
Cluster Board. The Cluster 
Board is made up of a range 
of NHS colleagues, also some 
people from ‘Connecting for 
Health’ Leeds, senior people 
from the ‘Connecting for 
Health’ London office (the 
Cluster office), most 
particularly the so-called RID 
(the Regional Implementation 
Director) and then a range of 
Primary Care Trusts and 
Acute Trusts and Mental 
Health Trust Chief Executives. 
So chairing that Cluster 
Board, which is the peak of 
local, London governance on 
this particular topic, is one of 
my chores. I also participate in 
a thing called The Programme 
Executive which meets 
fortnightly. The Cluster Board 
has met monthly for most of 
its existence. The PEX meets 
fortnightly and it’s formed 
  
R30: ‘I acquit that by my … I 
think it’s monthly meetings or 
bi-monthly meetings, I can’t 
remember which, but you go 
in there with a much more 
detailed array of performance 
indicators to talk about I 
guess.’ 
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mainly of Chief Information 
Officers. I’ve been involved in 
it pretty much along, and from 
time to time I’ve chaired it to 
make sure that there’s a 
linkage between perhaps the 
governance arm and the 
operational arm.’ 
 
 
 
270 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
 
 
Conception Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception 2 
 
To Whom 
To whom the SRO is 
accountable 
Subject 
What the SRO
understands they are 
accountable for 
 How the SRO fulfils 
their accountability 
Fulfilment Consequences 
What the SRO
understands to the 
consequences of 
being accountable 
 When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
Timeframe 
  
R1: ‘…the board's
assessment of its successful 
delivery would be heavily 
influenced by the views of 
the stakeholders. So if I 
popped up and  told the 
board this was a brilliant 
project, magisterially run and 
hugely successful, but 
AGENCYX  said it didn’t 
work for their XXXX 
customers, AGENCY Y  said 
it didn’t deliver XXXX  advice 
and half the XXXXX  said 
they couldn't use it because 
the technology was 
incompatible with their own, 
they would have a fairly big 
 
impact on the assessment of 
my performance…’ 
 
R1: ‘…these rather difficult 
internal changes which the 
efficiencies programme
involves, the efficiencies 
plan involves, because we 
 
are going to end up having 
to save a lot of money, 
which in a people based 
organisation comes down to 
people in some way. Either 
we have fewer of them, or 
we pay them less, or they 
spend less on buying 
things.’ 
 
 
 
 
R1: ‘Now my view is that it is 
my job to decide on the 
overall global level of 
savings we are trying to 
achieve and then to say to 
the folk, here you are, it's 
now up to you to come up 
with your propositions as to 
where the savings should 
be, to actually identify 
actually where we’re going 
to make the savings, which 
jobs are going to go.’ 
 
 
R1: ‘So quite what the 
accountability will mean in 
terms of what happens to 
me I couldn't tell you yet. But 
I think you'll be pretty 
apparent it hasn't worked. It 
will be very difficult for me to 
persuade people that it isn’t 
at least in part my 
responsibility that it hasn't 
worked. And there was a 
very big impact on the 
organisation, because 
actually those savings are 
going to be put into our 
bottom line by the Treasury. 
And therefore our budget will 
reflect the assumption, 
they’re being made, if 
they’re not been made, 
someone somewhere is 
going to have less money.’ 
 
R1: ‘So I think that it will be 
pretty clear to people from 
18 months from now 
probably, whether this is a 
project which is likely to 
succeed or not. And if it is 
not, we are going to a great 
black hole in our finances. 
So quite what the 
accountability will mean in 
terms of what happens to 
me I couldn't tell you yet. But 
I think you'll be pretty 
apparent it hasn't worked. It 
will be very difficult for me to 
persuade people that it isn’t 
at least in part my 
responsibility that it hasn't 
worked.’ 
  
R2: ‘I take the National Audit 
Office seriously. I think that 
they do try and arrive at 
good and clear judgements.’ 
 
 
 
R2: ‘There is an 
accountability there [to the 
NAO] in terms of the 
reputation of the 
Department, which is 
important to me. I've worked 
here for a long time and the 
way in which the 
Department is profiled 
 
R2: ‘It means working 
upwards and outwards, both 
within the business and 
across Whitehall to a 
degree,’  
 
 
 
R2: ‘…if I ran a project which 
then was then so awful that 
the National Audit Office 
quite rightly came in and 
ripped it to shreds. I would 
feel we'd let ourselves [THE 
DEPARTMENT] down.’ 
 
R2: ‘But I was very 
conscious whilst I was doing 
that that I had to have 
enough of an audit trail that 
if there was a Public 
Accounts hearing I would be 
able to say yes, we did look 
at the question of liability, I 
did assure myself as to how 
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publicly matters to me and it 
matters to my colleagues 
and I would feel I've let the 
organisation down if I ran a 
project which then was then 
so awful that the National 
Audit Office quite rightly 
came in and ripped it to 
shreds. I would feel we'd let 
ourselves down.’ 
 
much I genuinely thought it 
was our fault or their fault 
and what the contract said.’ 
 
  
‘R3 ‘’Their [DEPT XXX] 
timetable wasn't particularly 
transparent to us. I needed 
to negotiate at my level with 
their director to ensure that 
we sat on their steering 
group and vica versa and 
shared the documentation 
and had joint planning 
sessions.’ 
 
R3: ‘I was responsible for 
making that happen, not 
personally, I didn't draft 
everything you'll be glad to 
know, but for pulling the 
levers, internally, for pulling 
the levers in quite a lot of 
other places across 
Whitehall.’ 
 
 
R3: ‘I was responsible for 
making that happen, not 
personally, I didn't draft 
everything you'll be glad to 
know, but for pulling the 
levers, internally, for pulling 
the levers in quite a lot of 
other places across 
Whitehall. I did some things 
myself which only my 
position or my knowledge or 
whatever, were able to do’ 
 
 
 
R3: ‘I was responsible for 
that sort of putting all that 
round it, getting the right 
people in the right places to 
be able to do this, making 
the atmosphere correct so 
that it would happen and 
doing some of the 
negotiation, providing a 
really honest assessment of 
where we were heading with 
ministers balanced against 
the probability of defeat in 
the House if we didn't do 
something…’ 
 
 
R3: ‘I was responsible for 
that sort of putting all that 
round it, getting the right 
people in the right places to 
be able to do this, making 
the atmosphere correct so 
that it would happen and 
doing some of the 
negotiation, providing a 
really honest assessment of 
where we were heading with 
ministers balanced against 
the probability of defeat in 
the House if we didn't do 
something…’ 
  
R4: ‘I need Dept XXs’ 
agreement and because 
we’re going to move across 
to Dept XY, I need Dept 
XYs’ agreement.’ 
 
 
 
R4: ‘That I have all things 
delegated to me that the 
Permanent Secretary has on 
his shoulders, but just for 
this agency, which is about 
financial efficiency, probity 
and all those sorts of things. 
And that I have to act 
 
R4: ‘I have a duty, I was 
going to say duty of care, it's 
probably not a bad 
expression to use, to 
understand what it is that 
they’re [EXTERNAL DEPT] 
trying to set up and 
wherever possible to make 
 
R4: ‘And I almost try to 
forget actually while this just 
goes on and just see where 
it settles and recognising 
that it may not settle, we 
[THE ORGANIZATION] may 
not actually get a 
programme.’ 
 
R4: ‘. But I suppose I would 
think about it in terms of the 
PAC. If I was asked why I'd 
done this, I would say 
because it has a major 
benefit, not a marginal 
benefit just for a few people. 
We spend that money, does 
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accordingly and therefore 
whatever programme I come 
up with has to be set within 
that context and that we are 
in a particularly difficult era 
because of the Gershon 
Review and I have to take 
account of that as well and 
that is my prime 
responsibility.’ 
sure that my programme fits 
with that.’ 
 
 
 
it really have a significant 
effect and it would be 
avoiding what happens at 
the moment which is money 
being wasted.’ 
 
 
  
R5: ‘…ultimately just being 
the person who will in fact sit 
in front of the Public 
Accounts Committee and be 
accountable for the 
programme at the end of the 
day.’ 
 
 
 
R5: ‘…the programme 
expects that through the 
investment in the IT, the 
business process change 
and such like we’re putting 
through, we’ll be able to 
make a head count saving of 
about 8,000 people, so as 
SRO I am thinker, I think I 
am responsible for ensuring 
that what goes in comes 
through, actually can deliver 
into the business a saving of 
8,000 people.’ 
 
R5: ‘…my accountability is to 
be able to answer any of 
their [The PACs] questions 
about decisions I have taken 
in the course of a 
programme about levels of 
investment, particularly on 
the risk management. What 
analysis has been done, 
what actions have been 
taken about the, you know, 
what contingency has been 
built in, about advice that’s 
been sought about sourcing 
decisions that might have 
been taken.’ 
 
 
 
R5: ‘we deal in very large 
sums of money, just in the 
business that I’m in, we’re 
doing, if we’re doing things 
on the XXXX Fund I have 11 
million customers so any 
changes you make, they’re 
and you know, things that 
you do actually cost a lot of 
money to do and we spend 
vast sums of money.’ 
 
R5: ‘With the Ministers it’s 
your prior event and sort of 
looking forward to delivery, 
so it’s like inter-parliament, 
it’s usually post hoc when, 
and it’s usually when 
something’s gone wrong.’ 
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R6: ‘Also in dealing with the 
DEPT C in the sense of 
managing their expectations 
on occasion, or being 
warned that potentially we 
are not going to get a green 
light from DEPT C, we are 
going to get an amber, 
because we haven’t got 
certain elements of the 
project quite right.’ 
 
 
 
R6: ‘Going from a one main 
frame with a back-up main 
frame, the intricacies of this, 
the business benefits, the 
success of it wasn’t the fact 
that, yes, technically it was 
always achievable. The 
benefits and the successes 
of that were the fact that the 
business is now more 
resilient, so the success is to 
the business...’ 
 
R6: ‘I have had to sell 
PROJECT X and actively 
market it. Not just a meeting 
this particular need, but we 
can go beyond it and 
achieve this. And when the 
figures come out and we 
have to tender for it is going 
to cost X million, I can justify 
that by saying we are getting 
value for money and things 
like that.’ 
 
R6: ‘Being responsible for IT 
and IS doesn’t mean that I 
just focus in the success of 
the fact that the IT guys 
actually pulled it off and 
made it happen. It’s actually 
the success it has given to 
the business.’ 
 
R6: ‘…if the system is falling 
over every day, the general 
public are unhappy because 
their XXXX is being delayed 
because of us. That is 
something the Minister 
needs to be aware of 
because he may be asked a 
parliamentary question on it 
by an angry citizen…’ 
  
R7: ‘So there is a reporting 
regime to the OGC which 
goes on to the Prime 
Minister…’ 
 
 
 
R7: ‘And we could see then 
that there were clear 
administrative efficiencies 
from creating a paperless 
system, as the kind of 
development at least in our 
mind was progressing, we 
began to see that the real 
winners in this, but not the 
only winners, but the biggest 
winners, would be the XXXX 
public…’ 
 
 
R7: ‘…we know we have to 
do is proceed by consensus 
and agreement, that’s so 
we’ve got to take those 
stake-holders along with us. 
So it is consensus that we 
seek and it’s contemplation 
that lies behind all that we 
do as, speaking at what’s 
called XXX [EXTERNAL] 
Forum meeting just over a 
week ago and ….’ 
 
 
R7: ‘…we’d be cutting off 
our nose to spite our face 
really, we want to see this 
happen and at this early 
stage, it would sat an 
appalling example if we 
were to move to that…’ 
 
R7: ‘…to put it in simple 
terms, if things do not go as 
well as people have been 
led to expect, then they will 
look to me for the answers 
and they will regard it as my 
responsibility to ensure that 
things do go well and that is 
of course what I am 
endeavouring to do. So they 
look to me for the answers if 
things do not go to plan, I 
would also hope because 
this is what’s going to 
happen that when it’s a 
success people will say, ‘and 
Ted is mainly responsible for 
that’.’ 
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R9: ‘So it’s a corporate 
endeavour but with if you 
like with a certain singularity 
for the department that is 
you’re holding this 
endeavour on behalf of the 
[EXTERNAL] stakeholders 
and making it happen so 
that’s how I would 
characterise that.’ 
 
R9: ‘it really involves me… if 
you like owning the benefits 
on behalf of the 
organisation..’ 
 
 
 
R9: ON EXTERNAL 
STAKEHOLDERS: ‘I am to 
an extent acting as their 
agent in some respects so, 
not always necessarily in 
ways that they might fully 
appreciate.’ 
 
 
R9: ‘I mean reputational risk 
is not only important in a 
personal context, it’s to 
everybody. It’s very 
important in the context of 
these big, visibility
programmes to the 
reputation of the enterprise 
and I think that is something 
that you’re aware of 
becoming increasingly
sensitive to. With these big 
change programmes, 
because it’s not just the 
 
 
departments’ reputation it’s 
the reputation of the, of what 
that contributes to the 
reputation of the public 
sector as a whole.’ 
 
 
R9: ‘I will have to explain 
where we stand and why we 
delivered the things or why 
we didn't deliver the things 
to the top of the office, to the 
board, to the Permanent 
Under-secretary, more 
frequently to the ICT 
strategy committee and to 
the head of the IT strategy 
unit here…. 
  
R10: ‘So it’s a corporate 
endeavour but with if you 
like a certain singularity for 
the department’ 
 
 
R10: ‘I think in a strategic 
sense, although responding 
to this being more joined up 
which we saw as being the 
business imperative, it was 
also about driving out 
efficiency and so there is, 
there was a 10% efficiency 
target associated with the 
XXX as well.’ 
 
R10: ‘...it’s a professional 
focus in the sense that I am 
employed by this 
organisation to do the best I 
can for the organisation, 
within the overall corporate 
framework that we have… 
 
 
R10: ‘I could end up with the 
best IT system in the world 
but if my user base out there 
of 300,000 people all think 
it’s no good then I have 
failed, even though I’ve got 
the best IT system in the 
world.’ 
 
 
R10: ‘I could end up with the 
best IT system in the world 
but if my user base out there 
of 300,000 people all think 
it’s no good then I have 
failed, even though I’ve got 
the best IT system in the 
world.’ 
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R12: ‘Well the most 
important stakeholders are 
our Ministers and Treasury, 
Treasury being a sense, the 
shareholder in a corporate 
analogy, they have the 
power of life and death in 
that sense… so yes you feel 
accountable to these people, 
you feel you know if I don’t 
deliver my piece of this 
jigsaw, lots of other people 
are going to be pretty 
disgruntled about that.’ 
 
 
R12: ‘I want to provide it to 
the organisation in the best 
way we possibly can so that 
the organisation will flourish 
and prosper as a result of 
hopefully having good core 
systems, so I see it in that 
sense.’ 
 
 
 
R12: ‘So I see myself in a 
sense as stewarding this 
move, call it business 
change if you like but it’s 
partly that, that says for the 
good of all…’ 
 
 
 
R12: ‘I want to provide it to 
the organisation in the best 
way we possibly can so that 
the organisation will flourish 
and prosper as a result of 
hopefully having good core 
systems, so I see it in that 
sense.’ 
 
R12: ‘Come and talk to me 
afterwards, don’t forget 
we’ve gone live, I’ve just got 
the keys to my new Ferrari, 
am I going to drive it at 
180mph on a test track, of 
course I’m not, but in three 
months time I might, after 
I’ve been round the track a 
few times, building up, 
getting a feel for it, seeing 
where it slips.’ 
  
R14: ‘I found there the way, 
what was helpful was there 
was talk to Treasury first, 
you know get Treasury on 
our side and then ventilate it 
internally in the office and 
once the Treasury was on 
our side, it was much easier 
in the office because 
basically in DEPT N  the 
service is provided…’ 
 
 
 
R14: On the wider change: 
‘… I was sort of overseeing 
that wider change but it was 
quite helpful to know the 
details of that in order to 
persuade both the XXXX 
and the XXXX  that 
PROJECT A wasn’t just 
another short-term
problem….. 
 
R14: ‘I’m the Chairman of 
the XXXX Board in XXXX 
XXXX which has all the 
agencies on it so that was a 
 
natural position from which 
to give them this vision and 
to raise it with them and 
work through any problems 
they had and to get an 
agreement on it and we 
formed a separate sponsor 
group for PROJECT A  
which is really just the XXXX  
Board wearing different hats, 
it’s the same people, it’s the 
Director of External Agency 
X, the Director of External 
Agency Y, Director of 
External Agency Z and so 
 
R14: ‘we have a slightly bad 
sort of record with the 
Treasury in terms of XXX 
under-spending, you know 
being passed a lot of money 
and then of course the 
police need it and they don’t 
spend it and so there’s a 
slightly jaundiced view of the 
XXX…’ 
 
R14: ‘…if there was some 
grossly inefficient use of the 
money or fraud or something 
he would have to answer for 
that to the Public Accounts 
Committee and he would 
therefore expect me to 
ensure that nothing like that 
does happen.’ 
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on, so it’s people with whom 
I have quite a strong 
relationship anyway for a 
whole wider range of 
business reasons…’ 
  
R16: ‘I feel accountable to 
them [OGC] as a police 
person.  They are the police, 
I mean the joke, well it is not 
a joke it is the old cliché.  
You know the OGC, 
anybody at the centre, the 
Cabinet Office, they’re here 
to help, oh yeah actually 
they are not here to help.’ 
 
 
R16: ‘It is a corporate good, 
this PSA Information 
System, it is for all of us.’ 
 
 
R16: ‘I am representing all of 
us, come on is it actually 
going to deliver the thing we 
need for the department or 
have we redefined it out of 
existence?’ 
 
 
R16: ‘I am much more 
bothered (a) that we bought 
something out of
departmental money that 
was a complete waste, you 
know we poured n million 
down the drain, it didn’t give 
us what we wanted, it was 
irrelevant as it turned out…’ 
 
R16: ‘I think it means that if 
 
for whatever reason the 
project fails to deliver, fails to 
deliver a product which the 
department wants, delivers it 
at a price we can’t afford, on 
a timescale that is 
unacceptable to us or fails to 
then I am accountable.’ 
 R18: ‘Significant amounts of 
public money were involved, 
questions in Parliament, 
emergency debates, Public 
Accounts Committee and it 
had to get the Select 
Committee very rapidly 
involved and the Senior 
Responsible Officer of the 
time, the Accounting Officer, 
the Permanent Secretary, 
very, very unhappy indeed 
about the pretty tough time 
at the Accounts Committee 
where the first question was 
so are you going to resign 
 
R18: ‘I am not in Civil 
Service terms accountable 
to the Treasury, but 
nonetheless they are there 
to keep an eye on the 
Department. They’re
perfectly entitled to ask 
awkward questions if they 
want to and you would have 
to deal with them, it’s very 
important, this Department 
 
has a reputation with the 
Treasury of being a 
competent place and not 
because the more they think 
we know what we’re doing 
 
R18: ‘I mean actually there’s 
something about making 
sure that the rest of the 
Department or whoever, at 
least intermittently knows 
that this is going on.  Clearly 
in so far as you can 
domesticate it and get on 
with it, that’s absolutely fine 
you must not waste people’s 
time, you don’t need to tell 
them now, but just 
occasionally you need to 
give it a bit of surface around 
the Department, higher up in 
the Department, whatever, 
 
R18: ‘…that was a very 
tough time for the 
Department politically and 
managerially because these 
were things that we 
should’ve seen coming and 
on the whole didn’t.’ 
 
 
R18: ‘…the fact is if 
something gets to that level 
of political profile and 
crossness as it were, then if 
you’re the SRO for the thing 
that’s gone wrong, just 
conceivably you might get 
dragged along with the 
Permanent Secretary, 
although they’ll do the 
talking. But one way or the 
other if there’s a brief for the 
Permanent Secretary about 
that appearance it’ll be a 
pretty uncomfortable 
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XXXX?’ 
 
the less they bother us.’ so people remember this is 
happening, it’s a good piece 
of work, that people are 
working really hard at it, I 
mean partly to they can hold 
you accountable for how it’s 
going, but actually because 
lots of hard work going into it 
and people need to be 
celebrated and given the 
degree of kind of profile 
every so often and you can 
do that.’ 
conversation.’ 
 
  
R20: ‘I do feel accountable 
to them [EXTERNAL 
AGENCY EMPLOYEES].  I 
do feel a lot of my input into 
this Board is to keep people 
aware that the systems we 
need to deliver and deliver 
them in a way in which these 
people want to use them, 
are those systems, which 
make a difference to their 
job. And those are the 
Decision Support, the order 
of XXXX, the results 
reporting, the PAX system, 
the Electronic Transmission 
of Prescriptions, which is 
different to Electronic 
Prescription Writing. Those 
sorts of systems are really, 
really important to clinicians.’ 
 
R20: ‘So when you’re 
implementing major
database changes to your 
business, you do need to 
find some resources to have 
staff trained, to have staff 
available to do the 
changeover and so on, and I 
think that’s the usual sort of 
battle; we don’t want to give 
anymore than we have to 
give to that.’ 
 
R20: ‘I think there’s quite a 
lot of, work with my 
colleague SHA Chief 
Executives who, if it’s this is 
a part time job for me, it’s 
even more of a part time job 
for them, and it’s important 
to enthuse them with what 
this Programme can do for 
them and get their 
commitment to attend the 
Cluster Board meetings, 
which we have, which since 
I’ve been in post I’ve moved 
around from being fairly 
operational, led by the Chief 
Information Officers, largely 
because they’re the full time 
guys in each SHA, to being 
led by the Chief Executives 
on what we want to discuss 
in terms of what are the 
  
R20: ‘But on the whole, the 
NHS is paid for by people 
who don’t use it, by 
taxpayers who are healthy, 
and it’s funding people who 
are not healthy, and those 
taxpayers are, and will 
increasingly, make choices 
to go and get their 
healthcare elsewhere, and 
will withdraw support for the 
NHS if we don’t do 
something about it.’ 
 
 
R20: ‘So we’ve got various 
levels of achievement of the 
programme, I think we’re 
talking a 0-6 level, so it’s 
getting from having no 
connectivity or functionality 
to having functionality at the 
top level, Level 6, which we 
expect to have in 2009.’ 
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strategic goals, aims, what’s 
the vision for this 
programme in the Eastern 
Cluster, and what can we do 
to maximise the benefit out 
of this programme?’ 
 R21: ‘Either my Director, my 
Director General, Ministers 
and external stakeholders 
are all committed, that this 
will actually support the 
strategy, so that’s sort of 
pulling the strings.’ 
 
R21: ‘Well at the outset I 
explained to some of them 
the reductions in
bureaucracy, the efficiency 
savings and those are the 
direct benefits that we will 
actually measure through 
the programme.’ 
 
R21: ‘I need to be conscious 
of and be able to represent 
the Department, so my 
credibility is not just in 
respect of this, but in 
actually representing the 
Department.’ 
 
 
 
R21: ‘…the fact is that if I 
make a mess of it, then that 
reflects back on the 
Department’ 
 
R21: ‘…if we don’t deliver, 
being able to explain, so 
everything that could be 
done, has been done that 
we’ve managed it along the 
way and coped with the risks 
and developed 
contingencies if the risk ever 
came to be.’ 
 
 R22: ‘I feel accountable in 
some respects to the 
Cabinet Office/OGC/Central 
Government because the 
degree of Central
Government, Cabinet Office 
sort of process…’ 
 
R22: ‘…, if you’re 
accountable, you have to be 
the person who doesn’t let 
the difficult issues go, that 
forces their confronting.’ 
 
  
R22: ‘We called a meeting 
with him [THE INFORMATIO 
COMMISSIONER], got him 
in, sat him down and gave 
him a good listening to and 
tried to reassure him…’ 
 
 
 
R22: ‘I think I feel it around 
your credibility and pride in 
your public service role, that 
yes you’re there to serve the 
Government of the day and 
your Minister and people 
understand that in a 
democracy that’s the way 
decisions get made…’ 
 
 
 
R22: ‘if Ministers decide 
tomorrow they want nothing 
more to do with this, then the 
SRO will be confident that 
they had done so on the 
basis of the best advice and 
that the work that had been 
done had been done to the 
relevant standard all that 
had been done well. So the 
decision that they would take 
would be about the relative 
priority of these particular 
[ORGANIZATIONAL] 
objectives.’ 
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 R23: ‘In this case, probably, 
it’s mainly the XXX family, 
i.e. XXX policy, and the 
delivery agencies that 
respond.’ 
 
 
R23: ‘I think my definition of 
professional is to be clear 
what it is your 
responsibilities are, to 
deliver those to the best 
possible standard, and most 
certainly to an acceptable 
standard, and to ensure that 
that is nested within the 
corporate objectives of the 
organisation you work for.’ 
 
 
R23: ‘…it’s actually about if 
you’re committed to the 
organisation, and to the 
things it does and the things 
it stands for, and you have a 
significant chunk of 
responsibility for helping you 
to do that, then you want 
that to work, and you want it 
to be successful.’ 
 
 
R23: ‘…the reputation of the 
organisation, if we’re seen to 
foul up that sort of thing 
that’s pretty poor, it doesn’t 
look good for us as an 
employer…’ 
 
R23: ‘And it is accounting for 
the things that go wrong if 
they go wrong, and feeling 
that you are the one who 
actually does need to go in 
front of the Management 
Board and explain why the 
blooming thing didn’t work 
when it ought to have done.’ 
 
 R27: ‘And in that sense we 
are accountable to 
Parliament, and through 
Parliament to the public.’ 
 
R27: ‘…but our reputation 
was on the line if they had 
failed to follow them.’ 
 
 
R27: ‘I got very closely 
involved in agreeing both the 
remit for the ‘business 
change’ elements, with 
agreeing that with the Senior 
Board within the Department 
at the time, and in the nature 
of the delivery of what was 
going to be delivered.’ 
 
 
 
R27: ‘Reputation is crucial 
… The XXXX has not had a 
great deal of confidence in 
its own ability to deliver 
projects, and it was 
extremely important to us 
that we delivered this Project 
on time and on budget 
because it showed that the 
XXXX could do that. What 
we actually did was to 
deliver our Project on time, 
on budget.’ 
 
R27: ‘It’s me that gets fired if 
the project doesn’t produce 
the benefits.’ 
 
 R29: ‘I mean before that I 
might be asked by the 
OGC…’ 
 
R29: ‘you’ve accepted a 
particular responsibility and 
accountability for an 
organisation…’ 
 
R29: ‘Well like any 
Headquarters job it means 
that you don’t do it yourself. 
It means that you … so I 
basically look at all the 
levers, opportunities, policies 
that might either incentivise, 
inhibit, speed up, decelerate 
 R29: ‘In my case then the 
ultimate thing to think about 
is what I might be asked at 
the Public Accounts 
Committee. I mean before 
that I might be asked by the 
OGC or I might be asked by 
the overall SRO for the 
Programme or by the 
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the take-up of the IT 
opportunity, and try to 
manage them to where they 
will provide maximum 
leverage and minimum 
hindrance.’ 
 
Permanent Secretary for 
DEPT or XXX in the financial 
part. I might be asked by lots 
of people before that…’ 
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R3: ‘It will be a good 
outcome for the public good, 
the UK citizenry, if by 2050 
the generation that is XXXX 
then, okay, work out 
therefore that it is our 
children, has throughout its 
educational and working life, 
understood the importance 
of planning for XXXX both 
through working and 
saving…’ 
 
R3: ‘Public outcomes are far 
more, far less tangible but 
we're seeking to try and start 
building them into our project 
planning now, that's actually 
quite hard, so long-term 
economic benefits now start 
featuring in our business 
case, they’re a bit beyond 
where we sometimes get. It 
will be a good outcome for 
the public good, the UK 
citizenry, if by 2050 the 
generation that is XXXX 
then, okay, work out 
therefore that it is our 
children, has throughout its 
educational and working life, 
understood the importance 
of planning for XXXX  both 
through working and 
saving….’  
 
 
 
R3: ‘So I was responsible for 
thinking through in fairly 
quick order what needed to 
be done, with the right sort 
of people, put sufficient 
resource into it without 
putting resource into it, as it 
were, officially, to think 
through it in sufficiently 
orderly way to know what 
had to be done, be able to 
give an assessment to 
ministers of the policy 
solution we had in mind, its 
risks, which are high 
because it requires an open 
partnership with industry in a 
way that government 
normally doesn't do with 
primary legislation, with a 
timetable which will get us 
XXXX  in the spring of 2005, 
for reasons I really won’t go 
into now, without too many 
obstacles and what have 
you. I was responsible for 
that sort of putting all that 
round it, getting the right 
people in the right places to 
be able to do this, making 
the atmosphere correct so 
that it would happen and 
doing some of the 
negotiation, providing a 
really honest assessment of 
 
R3: ‘That accountability to 
me means the difference 
between personal
achievement and personal 
failure, job satisfaction and 
job disappointment,
leadership success and 
leadership disappointment 
and outcomes for the public 
good and, not outcomes for 
 
 
the public good, less 
excellent public outcomes, if 
I can put it like that.  So it's 
very personal, it matters to 
me, that's what my job is 
designed around, to deliver 
those things. It matters to my 
staff through my leadership 
and it matters to the actual 
policy outcomes.’ 
 
 
R3:  I am striving to ensure 
that when someone looks 
back and it's not going to be 
me in 2050, that they can 
see that what we were doing 
even back here was on the 
right road…’ 
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where we are at.’ 
 
  
R4: ‘I have to recognise on 
the one hand that our 
clients, which are my XXXX, 
are socially disadvantaged, 
have manifest needs and 
therefore need a lot of 
support in order to put their 
case forward.’ 
 
R4: ’….it would be getting, I 
can't quite remember what 
the expression is, getting the 
most for my bucks? 
 
R4: ‘If I have that amount of 
money to do, to use within 
those parameters, how can I 
get the best bang for my 
bucks? So, how can I get 
some things at the end of 
the day, it is a system by 
which individuals can seek 
redress for not being 
awarded XXXX. So how can 
I make that system work in 
the best way possible? So if 
I spent a million quid so that 
they can pick up the 
telephone, that sounds 
good. But is that actually the 
best way of spending that 
million quid or is there 
something else we could've 
done which would make it 
much more effective and 
make it much more likely 
that it was a fair system? So 
working out the best ways of 
using that money would be 
really important for me.’  
 
 
R4: ‘I feel bad, very bad, that 
in practice something like 
68% of our people will lose 
their jobs. I don’t feel very 
proud about any of that, but 
probity, financial
consciousness means that 
we’re doing things in an 
inappropriate way and that 
money is better used in 
some other way. So we will 
reduce it to one. So even if 
that means a number of 
people lose their jobs, a 
number of people lose their 
jobs.’ 
 
R4: ‘Which means that XXX 
can ring us up and we’ll help 
them fill the forms in and 
we’ll answer their questions 
and instead of leaving them 
 
 
wondering what happens 
over 13 months, we are 
going to do an awful lot more 
to communicate with them 
as to where their case is, 
what they have to do next.’ 
  
R5: ‘…I’ve got an 
accountability to the 4 million 
plus households that actually 
have entitlement to this 
product.’ 
 
 
 
R5: ‘I am very proud of the 
fact that for XXX that by 
March this year we had 
taken an extra million people 
out of poverty. And that’s 
what gets me up in the 
 
R5: ‘…it is actually at looking 
at treating every pound as if 
it were your own.’ 
 
 
 
R5: ‘I’m very firmly 
accountable to Ministers for 
the steps we had taken to on 
you know, sourcing, 
contingency capacity, really 
to make sure it was a 
smooth delivery in there and 
 
R5: ‘I think a lot of people 
think the accountability ends 
when the project goes live in 
there, I think it actually goes 
on from coming through until 
the benefits are actually 
realised… 
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morning.’ 
 
they are very concerned 
about the risk management 
as it comes through because 
anything that goes wrong is 
just on the front page of the 
Press. The business we are 
in, Government IT project 
goes wrong, you’re going to 
immediately get the 
coverage in the papers’ 
 
  
R7: ‘I feel most accountable 
to the public because as a 
public servant, I mean all, 
the whole of the public 
service is about making life 
better for citizens that might 
sound all too altruistic but I 
mean surely that is at the 
essence of what we’re all 
trying to do…’ 
 
 
R7: ‘So what we, the focus 
has changed if you look at 
our strategy you’ll see the 
main focus is on benefits for 
the XXX  public bringing 
greater certainty and clarity 
to the process of XXXX…’ 
 
 
R7: ‘Yeah, the best and 
most recent example 
perhaps is last week where I 
spoke to at an evening 
dinner, the XXXX Forum, 
this is, it’s a sort of loose 
association the XXXX 
Forum, the leading light is 
the Chief Executive of one of 
the XXXX channels, it also 
owns XXXX companies and 
the theme is, the thing that 
brings them all together is 
XXXX and the use of 
technology.’ 
 
 
R7: ‘I can tell you that I 
would think it must be as 
high as three or four and 
probably more people 
who’ve said ‘Have you 
XXXX recently’ and they will 
recount an experience which 
really added to the stress 
and trauma that they felt and 
very, very often not always 
of course, but very often. 
The problem is of the nature 
of my XXXX told me that 
further down the chain, 
somebody is not ready to 
xxx, you know they’re still 
waiting at xxx, and the 
problems come up just at the 
last minute and nobody was 
aware of it…’ 
 
R7: ‘So people will be able 
to see, we believe, I believe 
that they should be able to 
make choices as well you 
know if you’re in the happy 
position as some people are 
of having maybe a couple of 
people, two or three all 
wanting to buy your home, 
maybe at slightly different 
prices, well what you could 
say is, in electronic XXXX 
environment, you told me 
that you’re you know, you’re 
just about to exchange 
contracts or whatever, well 
let me have a, take me into 
your chain so I can see for 
myself that this is in fact the 
case.’ 
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R16: ‘I have always had a 
very strong sense of I could 
have travelled first class, but 
I’ll be perfectly comfortable 
in second class which I think 
the tax payer would rather I 
did that actually, than threw 
their money about.  And I 
think in XXXX  department 
one has a very, very strong 
sensation that actually it is 
not just a game.  You know 
that £25 million or whatever 
could be being spent on a 
new hospital or my children’s 
school or you know so I do 
have a sense of 
accountability to the tax 
payer.’ 
 
 
R16: ‘You know this is 25 
years in the civil service.  I 
am much more bothered (a) 
that we bought something 
out of departmental money 
that was a complete waste, 
you know we poured n 
million down the drain, it 
didn’t give us what we 
wanted, it was irrelevant as it 
turned out.  It didn’t do what 
we wanted it to do and more 
importantly the XXX... we 
put a lot of effort in here to 
XXXX, I like to see it spent 
on things that the tax payer 
would like us to spend 
money on.’ 
 
 
R16: ‘I have to say not 
everybody, has a strong 
consciousness of is this a 
good use of tax payers 
money and I have always 
had a very strong sense of I 
could have travelled first 
class, but I’ll be perfectly 
comfortable in second class 
which I think the tax payer 
would rather I did that 
actually, than threw their 
money about.’ 
 
R16: ‘…we bought
something out of
departmental money that 
was a complete waste, you 
know we poured n million 
 
 
down the drain, it didn’t give 
us what we wanted, it was 
irrelevant as it turned out.  It 
didn’t do what we wanted it 
to do and more importantly 
the XXX... we put a lot of 
effort in here to XXXX, I like 
to see it spent on things that 
the tax payer would like us 
to spend money on.’ 
 
 
R16: ‘…we are starting with 
PSA 1 which is the one 
about the XXX gap…and we 
are starting that, I have got 
my dates muddled up, but 
later this summer’’ 
  
R20: ‘What we do here is on 
behalf of patients, and it’s 
very easy to lose that view. 
You often find with clinicians, 
although a clinician’s clearly 
got a vocation, most of them 
have, the vast majority of 
them have, they do lose 
sight of the patient 
sometimes because the job 
is so important. The science 
of what they’re doing 
becomes very important. 
Patients just pass that 
scientific process. I think it’s 
very important for people in 
 
R20: ‘The NHS’s ability to 
provide comprehensive
services is restricted by the 
difficulty of transferring data 
between organisations. I 
think there’s a real 
governance issue - in clinical 
terms – for you as a patient 
who might pitch up in a 
hospital, having had an 
accident, and might also 
have a rare condition being 
treated in another hospital, 
and the hospital you pitch up 
at, won’t know that. And 
unless you’re conscious and 
 
R20: ‘I had I think a fairly 
clear view in my mind about 
what the power of IT could 
be in terms both of 
enthusiasm … well, it being 
better for patients, raising 
quality, giving decision 
support and therefore 
improving safety, and also 
enthusing the clinicians who 
were doing it that they were 
going to be able to … 
working with patients and 
they would have all of this 
information at their 
fingertips.’ 
  
R20: ‘I think there’s a real 
governance issue - in clinical 
terms – for you as a patient 
who might pitch up in a 
hospital, having had an 
accident, and might also 
have a rare condition being 
treated in another hospital, 
and the hospital you pitch up 
at, won’t know that. And 
unless you’re conscious and 
capable of telling them, they 
might not discover it.’ 
 
R20: ‘So like at the moment 
the end of last month, 
patients are being offered 
choice from the end of last 
month.’ 
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Conception 3 
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consequences of being 
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Timeframe 
When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
my position who are, if you 
like, within a helicopter 
above them, to root that out, 
just to identify it, root it out 
and make people aware all 
the time that we are here to 
provide a service for 
patients, and if they don’t 
like the service we’ve got, 
then we’re not doing the job 
we’re supposed to do.’ 
 
capable of telling them, they 
might not discover it.’ 
 
  
R21: ‘I have a responsibility 
for actually understanding 
our requirements in terms of 
the 14-19 agenda’ 
 
R21: ‘I look after a 
programme called XXXX 
and that programme is 
looking at improving how 
information about learners 
and learning is accessed 
and shared across the whole 
of the learning and the skills 
sector, which is everything 
from age 14 upwards, so it’s 
education in schools, 
colleges, work based 
learning providers, adult and 
community learning and 
higher education and the 
aim of this programme is to 
improve the services that are 
provided to young people 
and adults in terms of the 
support, guidance, advice, 
information, support services 
when they’re actually in 
learning and also financial 
support and entitlement.’ 
 
 
R21: ‘Then there are a huge 
range of policy benefits, 
which we will probably seek 
to evaluate and measure 
through other 
programmes…’ 
 
R21: ‘…through improved 
decision making by learners, 
improved decision making 
by providers, by funders, 
because they have more 
information, can easily 
access information, can 
make better decisions about 
their future choices, about 
which provider they go to, 
which will help them to stay 
in education rather than 
choosing the wrong course 
and dropping out…’ 
 
R21: ‘So policy agenda 
since the 1st 2001 has also 
reinforced the need for 
XXXX and even more 
recently has been the 
efficiency agenda, because 
this approach should also 
secure efficiency savings.’ 
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R22: ‘…a good first point of 
contact in terms of 
promoting the welfare and 
wellbeing of children…’ 
 
R22: ‘…the rationale for XXX 
is that it will secure better 
outcomes for children, a 
better experience of public 
services for children and 
their families if we can join 
up the delivery of education, 
health, social services, youth 
offending services at local 
level.  If we can do that and 
the reason why that will have 
that desired effect is that that 
will enable earlier
intervention, more effective 
intervention, at the early 
stages when something is 
going wrong with a child’s 
life, whether that’s
educational attainment,
family background, youth 
offending behaviour etc. that 
is the basic rationale.’ 
 
 
 
R22: ‘…this is the DEPT X 
talking to…Primary Care 
Trusts, [PROFESSION A], 
[PROFESSION B], endless, 
endless stakeholders, the 
[CHARITIES], [CHARITY A], 
[CHARITY B], so the 
representation, whether 
that’s clearing the text of bits 
of written communication, 
but more often doing 
presentations, doing one to 
one meetings, representing 
the project at other parts of 
the programme, you’re doing 
around and talking to people 
and the civil servants 
working on XXXX and 
YYYY….’ 
 
   
R22: ‘…one of which is the 
role out of 3,500 children’s 
centres, that’s the integrated 
services for the 0 - 5 years 
olds, by 2010.’ 
 
  
R29: ‘…my SRO proposition 
involves the effective use of 
large amounts of public 
funds and the benefits are of 
direct interest to a large 
proportion of the average 
punting population…’ 
 
 
R29: ‘I might be asked by 
lots of people before that, 
but at the end of the day this 
is public money being 
invested for public benefit 
and therefore, ultimately, 
you need to plan on being 
able to account in the normal 
way that an Accountable 
Officer does.’ 
 
 
R29: ‘I’m absolutely clear 
that what I do has to pass 
what I call ‘the mother test,’ 
which is … I can’t sit with 
own my mother and explain 
what I spend my time doing 
and why it’s useful, and I’m 
unlikely to pass the test at 
some point further down the 
track.’ 
 
 
R29: ‘If you’re taking 
responsibility for something 
that nobody has ever done 
before, it’s reasonable to 
assume that you’re going to 
have to make some 
judgments based on 
experience rather than 
evidence of past success, 
failure, or whatever. So it’s 
just, you just have to adjust 
that that proposition and be 
ready for the question, “Well 
 
R29: ‘What that means is 
that whether or not one 
believes one has the means 
or whether one believes one 
has the authority or whether 
one believes that it’s doable 
the point is you’ve accepted 
a particular responsibility 
and accountability for an 
organisation in the case of 
Accountable Officer for an 
NHS Trust, and in the case 
of this, the responsibility for 
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couldn’t you have done it 
better?” Well the answer is, 
“Undoubtedly.” In that 
situation if we stick at this for 
any length of time there are 
going to be occasions where 
you look back and say, 
”Actually I could have done 
that there.”’ 
the benefits being realised 
from £6bn worth of IT 
investment over 10 years.’ 
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Conception Attribute of conception of accountability 
Conception 4 
 
To Whom 
To whom the SRO is 
accountable 
Subject 
What the SRO
understands they are 
accountable for 
 How the SRO fulfils 
their accountability 
Fulfilment Consequences 
What the SRO
understands to the 
consequences of 
being accountable 
 When the SRO will be 
accountable.  
 
Timeframe 
 
  
R3: ‘It's my opportunity to 
make a difference, in a 
tangible way through what I 
am and what I do.  
Sometimes it means 
governancey sort of things 
which I loathe I have to say, 
but a necessary evil, 
sometimes it means seeing 
something happen as a 
result of something I’ve 
instigated and supported.  
And that's it, it's personal 
pride in the job in the end.’ 
 
 
R3: ‘That accountability to 
me means the difference 
between personal 
achievement and personal 
failure, job satisfaction and 
job disappointment,
leadership success and 
leadership disappointment 
and outcomes for the public 
good and, not outcomes for 
the public good, less 
excellent public outcomes, if 
I can put it like that.’ 
 
R3: ‘It took quite a lot of 
 
 
effort and quite a lot of 
pushing and the sort of 
personal ,you know, we can 
make this happen, there is 
nothing to stop it except 
organizational bureaucracy, 
it’s not high enough up 
anybody's priorities, there is 
nothing physically stopping 
us….’ 
 
R3: ‘That accountability to 
me means the difference 
between personal 
achievement and personal 
failure, job satisfaction and 
job disappointment,
leadership success and 
leadership disappointment 
and outcomes for the public 
good and, not outcomes for 
the public good, less 
excellent public outcomes, if 
I can put it like that.’ 
 
R3: ‘I was responsible for 
bringing in the XXXX, the XXXX, 
okay, back in 2001 and I think the 
thing that made me proud about 
that was we did in fact make a 
difference to the market in 
XXXX.’ 
 
  
R12: ‘Well, to myself I 
suppose in some ways, you 
know.  You want to do 
things you want to make 
sure that it’s successful so 
there’s a personal pride isn’t 
there. You’re accountable to 
yourself.’ 
 
 
R12: ‘You want to do things 
you want to make sure that 
it’s successful so there’s a 
personal pride isn’t there.’ 
 
R12: ‘Have you done 
enough, have you done all 
the right things, there’s a list 
of things I haven’t done 
right, an absolute litany, well 
there’s a few things I’ve 
probably done right too and 
on balance I think we’re 
where we are.’ 
 
 
R12: ‘But could you live with 
yourself sitting on the 
beach, I personally couldn’t, 
it’s a personal thing.’ 
 
 
R12: ‘Yeah, next week when the 
family go off on holiday and I 
don’t, sorry, the week after next. 
Where do I feel I should be?  
Here, always here, so I’ve made 
that decision.’ 
  
R21: I’m totally committed 
to making sure this happens 
and although we’re 
transferring responsibility 
for delivery, I will be still 
 
R21: ‘…it’s also to report 
on, celebrate success so in 
reviews with any of those 
there will be saying, they 
will be saying we have done 
 
R21: I’m totally committed 
to making sure this 
happens…’ 
 
R21: ‘.  It wouldn’t have 
happened if I hadn’t told it, 
this whole programme is my 
programme and so people 
know that I am committed to 
 
‘R21: I’m totally committed to 
making sure this happens and 
although we’re transferring 
responsibility for delivery, I will be 
still retaining the SRO role and if I 
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retaining the SRO role and 
if I move jobs I will be 
making, being very clear 
about who is it gonna take 
on the SRO role, I want to 
make sure that they retain, 
that the programme moves 
forward, continues at the 
level that it’s being 
managed to date. So there 
is an inner commitment to it 
isn’t there?  I hold myself to 
account as well for it I 
suppose in that sort of 
sense.’ 
 
this on the XXXX front, 
progress was made, let’s 
celebrate it.’ 
‘ 
it, it’s my baby, it might be 
an ugly baby, but it’s mine, 
so there’s that sort of 
recognition I suppose that 
people have seen. 
move jobs I will be making, being 
very clear about who is it gonna 
take on the SRO role, I want to 
make sure that they retain, that 
the programme moves forward…’ 
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Appendix E 
 
Summary demographic data 
Respondent 
 
 
 
 
Age    
(years) 
 
 
 
Educational 
Attainment 
 
 
 
Length of 
time in civil 
service 
(years) 
 
Length of 
time in 
senior civil 
service 
(years) 
Conception 
 
 
 
 
R1 48 U 27 8 C2 
R2 47 U 26 9 C2 
R3 42 M 18 7 C4 
R4 57 P 1 1 C3 
R5 49 M 28 17 C3 
R6 37 M * 3 C2 
R7 59 A 41 19 C3 
R8 61 U 37 4.5 C1 
R9 44 M * 4 C2 
R10 49 U 27 4 C2 
R11 50 U 16 5 C1 
R12 46 U 7 6 C4 
R13 48 U 28 * C1 
R14 54 U 30 16.5 C2 
R15 43 U 21 * C1 
R16 49 M 25 14 C3 
R17 54 M 29 14 C1 
R18 46 P 20 11 C2 
R19 53 U 30 15 C1 
R20 55 M 15 2 C3 
R21 48 A 28 2 C4 
R22 43 U 19 9 C3 
R23 50 U 8 4 C2 
R24 50 M 8 2.5 C1 
R25 52 M 20 12 C1 
R26 43 U 21 10 C1 
R27 56 U 35 * C2 
R28 53 U 30 14 C1 
R29 48 M 0.75 0.75 C3 
R30 48 M 25 2 C1 
      
Average  49.4  22.17 8  
 
Key 
• *  = Respondent did not provide the data 
• A = “A” levels 
• U = undergraduate degree 
• M = masters degree 
• P = doctorate 
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